Rojas Chavarria v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: 24-7841
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUDITH VANESA ROJAS CHAVARRIA; No. 24-7841 ALEX JOHN MAZA PRADO; J. S. M. R., Agency Nos. A246-265-968 Petitioners, A246-265-969 A246-265-970 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted June 10, 2026 Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, W. FLETCHER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners, Judith Vanesa Rojas Chavarria (“Rojas Chavarria”), her husband,

Alex John Maza Prado (“Maza Prado”), and their daughter, J. S. M. R., seek review

of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. withholding of removal, and protection under the regulations implementing the

Convention Against Torture. We deny the petition in part, grant in part, and remand.

1. To be eligible for asylum, Petitioners must show they are refugees,

unwilling or unable to return to Peru “because of persecution or a well-founded fear

of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). They must show that a

protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the

applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

The record compels the conclusion that Petitioners’ political opinion was a

central reason for their persecution. Maza Prado testified that he supported Fuerza

Popular, a political party that opposed the one supported by Los Rusos, the criminal

organization. Maza Prado allowed his neighbors to display advertisements

supporting Fuerza Popular on his business. One day, Los Rusos attempted to paint

“[p]olitical slangs of the party that they support” on the walls of his business without

permission. Rojas Chavarria was struck in the mouth by Los Rusos members when

she protested the group’s efforts to display “political campaign propaganda” at their

restaurant. Her brother, who defended her at the time, was shot in the head a few

days later. The IJ found Petitioners’ testimonies to these facts credible.

Petitioners’ political opinion was therefore at least one central reason for their

persecution. The dispute over political advertisements inherently reflects Los

2 24-7841 Rusos’ knowledge of Petitioners’ opposing political opinion: “[s]ociety would

naturally ‘attribute[] certain political opinions to [Petitioners]’ based on” Petitioners’

display of political advertisements for Fuerza Popular. Rodriguez-Zuniga v.

Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d

787, 791 (9th Cir. 1990) (first alteration in original)). The timing of the brother-in-

law’s shooting, shortly after the confrontation, further supports the political nature

of their persecution. See Deloso v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 858, 865–66 (9th Cir. 2005)

(timing of attacks indicated they occurred on account of a protected ground). To the

extent Los Rusos were also motivated by financial gain, “the persecutor’s mixed

motives do ‘not render the opposition any less political, or the opponent any less

deserving of asylum.’” Yan Xia Zhu v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir.

2008) (quoting Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Because Petitioners have demonstrated “past persecution on account of

statutorily protected grounds at the hands of individuals whom the government was

unable or unwilling to control, [they are] entitled to a presumption of a well-founded

fear of future persecution.” Singh v. Garland, 97 F.4th 597, 606 (9th Cir. 2024)

(citing Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004)); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13

(b)(1)(ii). On remand, the BIA must shift the burden to the government to “show by

a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant either no longer has a well-

founded fear of future persecution in the country of his nationality, or that he can

3 24-7841 reasonably relocate internally to an area of safety.” Singh, 97 F.4th at 606 (quoting

Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2019)).

2. “A petitioner is entitled to withholding of removal if he can establish a clear

probability that his life or freedom will be threatened upon return on account of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

Singh, 97 F.4th at 609 (citation modified). “As with asylum, [petitioners] can

generate a presumption of eligibility for withholding by showing past persecution.”

Hanna v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2007).

Because Petitioners showed past persecution on account of political opinion,

there is a presumption of eligibility for withholding of removal. 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(b)(1)(i); see also Hanna, 506 F.3d at 940. “This presumption may be

rebutted only if the government shows a fundamental change in circumstances or

shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant could reasonably

relocate within the country of that person’s nationality.” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(b)(1)). The burden shifts to the government on remand.

3. We deny Petitioners’ applications for asylum and withholding of removal

premised on their membership in particular social groups. None of their three

proposed groups meets the requirements of immutability, particularity, and

distinctness. See Andrade v. Garland, 94 F.4th 904, 910 (9th Cir. 2024).

4 24-7841 4. We also deny Petitioners’ application for protection under the regulations

implementing the Convention Against Torture. Petitioners have failed to

meaningfully raise this issue in their opening brief, thereby waiving it. See

Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n issue referred

to in the appellant’s statement of the case but not discussed in the body of the

opening brief is deemed waived.”).

Petitioners’ Motion for Stay of Removal [Dkt. Entry No. 26] is granted.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART, GRANTED IN PART;

REMANDED. The Parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

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