Roig Commercial Bank v. Secretary of the Treasury

82 P.R. 358
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedApril 11, 1961
DocketNo. 11481
StatusPublished

This text of 82 P.R. 358 (Roig Commercial Bank v. Secretary of the Treasury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roig Commercial Bank v. Secretary of the Treasury, 82 P.R. 358 (prsupreme 1961).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Blanco Lugo

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Roig Commercial Bank v. Treas. of P. R., 74 P.R.R. 919 (1953), we decided that in order that a corporation may be allowed the credit under § 36(a) of the Income Tax Act of 1924 (13 L.P.R.A. § 739(a) with respect to the amount of taxes paid to the Government of the United States, it is necessary that said federal taxes refer to income also taxable in Puerto Rico, that is, that they form part of its locally taxable gross income. The purpose for the allowance of this credit is to avoid double taxation. Consequently, we set aside the allowance of a credit with respect to federal taxes paid in relation to income from interest on obligations of the United States because these interests are tax exempt in Puerto Rico, and are not part of the gross income under the provisions of § 31(a) in relation to § 15(6) (4) of said Act (13 L.P.R.A. § § 734(a) and 694(6) (4)),1 and therefore, do not form part of the taxable income.

[360]*360In the ease at bar the issue is whether a corporation which is not allowed a credit with respect to federal income tax paid to the Government of the United States on obligations and bonds of the United States, may claim said amount as deductible from its gross income, pursuant to § 82(a) (3) (6) of the Act (13 L.P.R.A. § 735(a) (3) (6)), as it prevailed in 1947, and which in effect provides:

“Section 32(a). — In computing the net income of a corporation or partnership subject to the tax imposed by section 28, there shall be allowed as deductions:
(1).
(2).

(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year except: (a) .... (6) So much of the income and excess-profits taxes imposed by the authority of the United States, any possession of the United States other than Puerto Rico, or any foreign country, as is allowed as a credit under section 36. . . .”

The plaintiff, Roig Commercial Bank, is a corporation organized under the laws of Puerto Rico doing business in Puerto Rico with its main office in the city of Humacao. During the year 1949 it paid the Government of the United States the sum of $8,393.23 as income tax on interest from United States bonds. In the return filed in the year 1949 it claimed the amount thus paid as a deduction from its gross income. The Secretary of the Treasury denied this deduction and, consequently, notified the plaintiff on November 2, 1953,2 of a deficiency amounting to $3,888.25, with interest and penalties. The action of the Secretary was [361]*361evidently prompted by the language of our decision in Roig, supra, which we copy below3 (at pp. 924-25) :

“(2) Section 30 provides that in the case of a corporation the term ‘net income’ means the gross income as defined in § 31 (that is, in § 15) less the deductions allowed for in § § 32 and 9. Section 32, in its paragraph A-3, admits, in part, as deductions, ‘Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year except: .... so much of the income and excess-profits taxes imposed by the authority of the United States, any possession of the United States other than Porto Rico, or any foreign country as is allowed as a credit under § 36.’ The taxes which constitute the credit allowed by § 36 are excluded from the taxes ivhich constitute the deductions recognized in § 32. Had § 36 not existed, said taxes would have been deductible. The tax on the interest in question is not part of the gross income and therefore, it did not have to be deducted from the gross income.

Feeling aggrieved by the action of the Secretary, plaintiff appealed to the Tax Court, which sustained the deficiency imposed, relying on the quoted dictum. From the judgment [362]*362rendered an appeal was taken before this Court, praying that the deduction be allowed (a) pursuant to the provisions of § 32 (a) (3); or (b) pursuant to the provisions of § 32(a) (1), because the same constitutes ordinary and necessary expenses of the taxpayer’s business.4

The position of the Secretary is to the eifect that an expense not attributable to the taxable income, such as federal taxes for interest on obligations and bonds of the United States, should not be allowed as a deduction from the gross income. In other words, in order that this deduction be allowed it must refer to income included in the taxable gross income. This reasoning is valid in the cases of credits against taxes to be paid, because the obvious purpose is to avoid double taxation. Roig Commercial Bank v. Treas. of P. R., 74 P.R.R. 919 (1953). Now, regarding deductions, no authority whatsoever has been cited in support of the contention that the allowance of a deduction depends exclusively on its reference or relation with any item included in the gross income. It is well-known that deductions are a legislative grace. Descartes, Treas. v. Tax Court, 71 P.R.R. 230, 236 (1950). Buscaglia, Treas. v. Tax Court, 67 P.R.R. 548 (1947). In matters of deductions we do not believe that the purpose of avoiding double taxation necessarily comes into play. An examination of § § 16 and 32 in their entirety will demonstrate that the Legislature has allowed certain deductions without their having any relation whatsoever with the gross income of the taxpayer. Thus, for example, the deduction of interest paid “without any restrictions whatsoever” are permitted, Community of the Heirs of Fajardo v. Tax Court, 73 P.R.R. 499, 507 (1952) and among them, those related to debts incurred in order to purchase or build homes (paragraph 2 (a) of § 32); losses [363]*363sustained and not compensated for by insurance (paragraph 4 (a) of § 32); cf. Banco de Ponce v. Secretary of the Treasury, 81 P.R.R. 432, 443 (1959); of contributions and gifts made to specific institutions (paragraph 10(c) of § 32TT; and in the case of individuals, fifty per cent of the amount paid for medical services and other services enumerated (paragraph 11 of § 16). Likewise, deductions of territorial taxes paid on the residence of the taxpayer are permitted, as well as the amount paid for excise on public attractions, and until 1954,5 of the inheritance tax paid by the heirs, Descartes v. Tax Court, 79 P.R.R. 128 (1956), despite the fact that “the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, or devise” was expressly excluded from the gross income. (Section 15(6) (3) — 13 L.P.R.A. § 694(6) (3).) It is also significant that when reference is made to a deduction for interest paid, it does not include the interest paid in relation to indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations or values other than those obligations of the United States issued after September 24, 1917, the interest upon which is wholly exempt from

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82 P.R. 358, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roig-commercial-bank-v-secretary-of-the-treasury-prsupreme-1961.