Rohr v. State of Utah

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedOctober 18, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00659
StatusUnknown

This text of Rohr v. State of Utah (Rohr v. State of Utah) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rohr v. State of Utah, (D. Utah 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

ANGELA ROHR, et al., MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ Plaintiffs, EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING v. ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STATE OF UTAH, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-00659-AMA-DBP Defendants. District Judge Ann Marie McIff Allen

Before the Court are Plaintiffs pro se Angela Rohr, Louis Rohr, Gina Martinez- Ferrate, Andre Martinez-Ferrate, and Marylin Westenkow’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (“Motion”).1 Defendants State of Utah, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Diedre Henderson, Shelly Jackson, and Ryan Cowley oppose the Motion (“Opposition”).2 This Court previously denied the portion of the Motion requesting a temporary restraining order.3 The Court now considers the request for preliminary injunction. Upon consideration of the Motion, Memorandum of Clarification, Opposition thereto, the hearing held on September 19, 2024, relevant law, and underlying facts of the case, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for preliminary injunction.

1 ECF No. 3. 2 ECF No. 18. 3 ECF No. 8. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs support two individuals that are allegedly running for the offices of United States President and Vice President, Shiva Ayyarudai and Crystal Ellis.4

Mr. Ayyarudai and Ms. Ellis have struggled to establish their candidacies in Utah under Utah State’s application of federal and state law.5 Mr. Ayyarudai’s declaration for candidacy was originally accepted by the Lieutenant Governor’s Office on June 18, 2024.6 The office then subsequently removed Mr. Ayyarudai for not meeting the “natural born citizen” requirement pursuant to the U.S. Constitution because he became a U.S. citizen through the naturalization process.7

Utah allows presidential candidates unaffiliated with a party to name their presidential electors. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-13-301(1)(c). Mr. Ayyarudai allegedly named Plaintiffs and others as his presidential electors as part of his original declaration for candidacy.8 After the Lieutenant Governor’s Office removed Mr. Ayyarudai from the Utah ballot, Plaintiffs allege that they also were removed from the ballot as electors.9 Plaintiffs then brought this action because they believe that they are entitled to act as presidential electors in the coming November General

Election.10

4 ECF No. 3, at 3-5. 5 ECF No. 3, at 5-7; see also ECF No. 18, at 2-3. 6 ECF No. 19, at 3 ¶¶ 13-14; see also ECF No. 3, at 4-5. 7 ECF No. 3, at 7. 8 See ECF No. 3, at 4-5. 9 ECF No. 3, at 5-6. 10 See ECF No. 3, at 3-7, 11; Hearing Transcript, at 8-9. Plaintiffs allege that (1) they themselves were on the ballot “under the banner of their Pledged Candidate ‘Shiva Ayyarudai’” as electors for the election, (2) were taken off pursuant to the Lieutenant Governor’s Office’s actions, and (3) seek to be

reinstated.11 Therefore, Plaintiffs request that this Court “enjoin the Defendants from removing the Plaintiffs and [six others] from the Utah Ballot for the November 5, 2024 General Election.”12 II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Article III Standing Courts established under Article III of the U.S. Constitution are empowered to

hear and resolve “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Though many issues may be presented as a case or a controversy, Article III courts may only hear those that are “appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (internal citation omitted). This principle has led to the Article III standing doctrine. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Article III standing is a threshold jurisdictional question. See, e.g., United

States v. 148,840.00 in United States Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2008). To have standing to bring a claim, a plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) a traceable connection between the injury and alleged conduct, and (3) an injury that will be redressed by a favorable court decision. Id. at 560-61 (internal citations omitted). To assert an injury in fact, the alleged injury must be (a) concrete

11 ECF No. 3, at 3-7, 11; Hearing at 8-9. 12 ECF No. 3, at 11. and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Id. at 560. A “particularized” injury “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 338, 339 (2016) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiffs “raising only a generally available grievance about government . . . do[] not state an Article III case or controversy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. A generally available grievance about government arises when Plaintiffs “claim[] only harm to [their] and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seek[] relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits [them] than it does the public at large . . . .” Id.

B. Preliminary Injunction To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. See, e.g., Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (internal citations omitted).

“At the preliminary injunction stage, then, [] plaintiff[s] must make a ‘clear showing’ that [they are] ‘likely’ to establish each element of standing.” Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 1972, 1986 (2024) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiffs “bear the burden of establishing standing . . . .” Id. (internal citation omitted). III. ANALYSIS A. Plaintiffs lack an injury in fact because their names were never on the Utah ballot and they have no right to be presidential electors. Plaintiffs allege that they are injured because they were on the Utah ballot on June 18, 2024 “under the banner of their Pledged Candidate ‘Shiva Ayyarudai’” as electors for the general election. This construction is erroneous. Plaintiffs’ names were never on the Utah ballot. And the name “Shiva Ayyarudai” represents only the

natural person seeking candidacy in the general election. See Utah Code Ann. § 20A- 9-101(1)(a) (‘“Candidates for elective office’ means persons who file a declaration of candidacy . . . to run in a regular general election . . . .”); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-6-302 (lacking any mention of presidential electors on the Utah ballot). Indeed, Utah law makes certain that “[c]andidates for elective office” explicitly excludes presidential electors. § 20A-9-101(1)(b). Thus, Plaintiffs were not on the Utah ballot as presidential electors.

Further, there is no cognizable, unfettered right to be a presidential elector. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. 578, 589 (2020) (“the power to appoint an elector (in any manner) includes power to condition his appointment . . . .”). The U.S. Constitution commands “[e]ach State [to] appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors” for the office of President of the United States. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1, cls. 1-2. Utah has created such a process through the

Utah Election Code.

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Related

Whitmore Ex Rel. Simmons v. Arkansas
495 U.S. 149 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Burdick v. Takushi
504 U.S. 428 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
504 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1992)

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Rohr v. State of Utah, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rohr-v-state-of-utah-utd-2024.