Rogers v. Westhoma Oil Co.

291 F.2d 726
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedMay 4, 1961
DocketNos. 6522-6548
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 291 F.2d 726 (Rogers v. Westhoma Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rogers v. Westhoma Oil Co., 291 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1961).

Opinions

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

These 27 consolidated appeals are from separate judgments entered in declaratory judgment actions brought by lessors or their successors to determine whether the oil and gas leases involved had terminated as to all horizons below sea level at the expiration of their respective primary terms because of failure to obtain production. They present a common question of law bearing on similar and! undisputed facts. Tjventy-four of the actions were removed from Kansas state courts and three were filed originally in federal court. There is unquestioned diversity jurisdiction. The parties, agreeing that there were no factual issues, each moved for summary judgment and' the lower court held that the leases had all been continued beyond their primary terms by gas production secured within those terms from horizons above sea level. The lessors have appealed.

The 27 leases cover land in the Hugoton Field, Seward County, Kansas, and were identical in form, differing only as to date, lessor or lessors, and land descriptions. Twenty-four were executed! during 1941 and 1942 and three in 1944. Each was for a 10-year primary term. By mesne assignments Plains Natural Gas Company (Plains) became the owner of the leases as to all horizons above sea level and appellee-defendant Westhoma Oil Company (Westhoma) became the owner of the leases as to all horizons below sea level. No question is raised as to the validity of these assignments on the basis of horizontal divisions.

The Kansas Corporation Commission by proration order established 640 acres as the basis for computing allowables in the Hugoton Field.1 In an appropriate manner, Plains acted to consolidate its holdings into 640-acre units. The statement accomplishing this purpose provided that:

“[A] 11 producing horizons which are situated above and down to, but not below, the sea level, shall be deemed, treated and operated as a consolidated gas leasehold estate.”

[729]*729Within the primary term of each lease Plains secured commercial gas production from above-sea-level horizons on each of the consolidated units. As to 9 of the leases the producing well is on the leased land and as to 18 the well is located elsewhere on the unit involved. No production of oil or gas was obtained during the primary term from below-sea-level horizons.

Each lease contained a “thereafter” clause which will be discussed later. Ordinarily an oil and gas lease is extended beyond the primary term by a “thereafter” clause if a producing well is obtained at any location on the leased premises during the primary term.2 None of the parties question the general rule that production from any part of a consolidated or pooled unit perpetuates all leases within the unit, even as to ununitized acreage, unless the leases provide to the contrary.3 Each lease in question also contains what is called a “Pugh clause” 4 which is designed to prohibit lease continuation beyond the primary term as to nonproducing areas not included within a productive unit.

The habendum clauses of the leases provide a term of 10 years and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from the premises “and as long as hereinafter otherwise provided in the event of consolidation.”5 The parties agree that the occurrence of production on or off the leased premises included within a unit makes no difference in the disposition of the controversy and that the “hereinafter otherwise provided” clause controls because there was consolidation. In these circumstances, this court is not concerned with what the situation might be in the absence of such an agreement.

The Kansas Supreme Court has established rules which govern the construction and application of oil and gas leases in that state. In Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465, 468-469, it is said that the intent of the parties is the primary question ; that reasonable rather than unreasonable interpretations are favored; that meaning 'should be ascertained by consideration of all pertinent provisions rather than “by a critical analysis of a single or isolated provision”; that in the event of ambiguity or uncertainty consideration must be given to “the instrument as a whole, the object sought to be obtained, and other circumstances, if any, which tend to clarify the real purpose and intent of the parties”; and that a practical and equitable construction must be given to ambiguous terms. We must decide the cases on the basis of the instruments before us and the Kansas law.

The trial court held that the Pugh clauses were written in “surface sounding terms” and do not “specifically or clearly designate underground horizons” and concluded that the provisions of the Pugh clauses terminating the leases at the end of the primary terms as to ununitized nonproducing portions apply only to “partial unitization of less than all of the surface acreage covered by the leases.” As all the surface acreage was unitized,' and as there was production from each unit, the decision was that the leases were continued beyond the primary terms as to all horizons.

Admittedly, the Pugh clauses apply to vertical divisions of the leased premises. [730]*730The query is whether they apply to horizontal divisions. In determining the issue we are aided by no decisions which are directly in point. Broussard v. Phillips Petroleum Company, supra, and Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Hutchins, 217 Miss. 636, 64 So.2d 733, 65 So.2d 824, relied on by lessors, are not helpful as each concerned the application of a Pugh clause to a vertical rather than a horizontal division. Westhoma relies on Martin v. Texas Gulf Producing Co., 223 Miss. 872, 79 So.2d 270, involving a lease which did not contain a Pugh clause. The court there rejected the contention that -failure to drill below a horizon which had been unitized and from which production had been obtained off the leased premises but within the unit terminated the lease. White v. Frank B. Treat & Son, 230 La. 1017, 89 So.2d 883, also cited by Westhoma, was concerned with a mineral servitude rather than a lease and held that production from a unitized zone continued the servitude as to all zones. No Kansas decisions bearing on the specific point have been brought to our attention.

Under the Pugh clauses the lessee is authorized to consolidate the leasehold estate, “or any part or parts thereof,” with the mineral leasehold estate, “or parts thereof,” in other lands upon which the lessee at the time has a valid lease. The consolidation is limited to include not more than 2,560 acres. The lengthy and technical arguments as to whether the word “part” is confined to vertical divisions on the basis of surface acreage or also encompasses horizontal divisions on the basis of depth can be simply resolved. The ordinary practice is to confine consolidations to a formation or pool which constitutes a known common source of supply.6 In situations where there is more than one source or pool underlying the same land 7 a comprehensive consolidation from the surface to the center of the earth carries with it the potential of grievous complications if different geographical units are established for different producing formations.8 The leases contain no prohibition against the recognized practice of consolidating in terms of sources of supply, pools, or depth.

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J. P. Rogers v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, (Two Cases). A. L. Hilbig v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, Frank G. Boles and Katie M. Boles v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, (Seven Cases). Blanche Engel v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, (Two Cases). Robert W. Baughman and Helen E. Baughman, His Wife, Robert W. Baughman, Oliver S. Brown and Guy E. Spear, Executors and Trustees of the Estate of John W. Baughman, Deceased v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, A. L. Hilbig and Esther Mae Hilbig v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, Lula Dunlap, H. Harold Dunlap, Pearl Pitcher, Robert L. Dunlap, Josephine Light, Marilyn E. Dunlap, Catherine C. Dunlap and Charles M. Light, Jr. v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, (Two Cases). Robert W. Baughman, Oliver Brown, and Guy E. Spear, Executors of the Estate of Ella Baughman, Deceased v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, Goldie B. Dubois v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, Alice Marjorie McGill and Sherley McGill v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, Paul R. Packer v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, Etta Hawk v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, Orville Belile and Helena L. Belile v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, N. G. Morlan and Okel E. Morlan v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, E. D. Hampton and Flora Hampton v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, Merle W. Bloom, Mldred L. Bloom, Nellie J. Vail, L. A. Bloom, Mildred C. Bloom, Edna E. Headrick, Roy W. Headrick, Wilma A. Keating and James B. Keating v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation, (Two Cases). Joseph A. Hanlin, Francis B. Hanlin, Mary J. Brewington and Ray Brewington v. Westhoma Oil Company, a Corporation
291 F.2d 726 (Tenth Circuit, 1961)

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291 F.2d 726, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rogers-v-westhoma-oil-co-ca10-1961.