UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
RICHARD ELBERT ROGERS, JR., Case No. 1:24-cv-00146-AKB Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE
SHOSHONE COUNTY; SHOSHONE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; SCHWARTZ LAW; and LISA M. CHESEBRO,
Defendants.
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Richard Elbert Rogers, Jr.’s Complaint based on Plaintiff’s status as an inmate. The Court now reviews the Complaint to determine whether it should be summarily dismissed in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Pleading Standards and Screening Requirement A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under modern pleading standards, Rule 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal/Twombly “facial plausibility” standard is met when a complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” or if there is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the complaint has not stated a
plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678, 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bare allegations amounting to a mere restatement of the elements of a cause of action, without adequate factual support, are not enough. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires the Court to review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity, or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss any claims lacking adequate factual support or claims that are frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court also must dismiss claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted or claims seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. These last two categories—together with claims falling outside a federal court’s narrow grant of jurisdiction—encompass those claims that might, or might not, have factual support but nevertheless are barred by a well-established legal rule. The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims was expanded by the PLRA, giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims, sua sponte, before or after opportunity to amend). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading requirements, dismissal under §§ 1915 and 1915A is still appropriate if an affirmative defense is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the
complaint.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction. Plaintiff alleges that, “on August 26, 2021 and thereafter,” he was the subject of a malicious prosecution in Shoshone County. (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 2). According to Plaintiff, the County withheld exculpatory evidence and “deliberately failed to provide public defense unburdened by an overwhelming workload.” (Id.). As a result, claims Plaintiff, he was not provided adequate defense counsel in his criminal proceedings. (Id. at 2, 6). Plaintiff also complains that the Shoshone County Sheriff’s Office tainted the jury pool. (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff also argues that a prosecutor with Shoshone County was involved in spreading a “false rumor” that Plaintiff had committed suicide in prison. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff’s defense attorney was also allegedly involved in spreading this rumor. (Id. at 6). According to Plaintiff, the Shoshone County Sheriff’s Office was responsible for stealing some of his commissary funds while he was detained in the Shoshone County Jail and that some of Plaintiff’s personal property has been destroyed. (Id. at 3). Finally, unidentified sheriff’s deputies purportedly “left [Plaintiff] on the ground for about four hours after he was transfered [sic] to their custody.” (Id.). Plaintiff brings his claims under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff twenty-eight days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take
into consideration the following. A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Governmental officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”).
Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists . . . a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff can establish this causal connection by alleging a defendant (1) set in motion a series of acts by others that violated the Constitution, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of such acts, which the supervisor “knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury”; (2) knowingly failed to act or acted improperly “in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates”; (3) acquiesced in the constitutional deprivation; or (4) engaged in conduct showing “a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1205-09 (internal quotation marks omitted). To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity—such as Shoshone County— a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the
injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against such an entity are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). An entity also “may be held liable under § 1983 when the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority” or when “such an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591
F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). An unwritten policy or custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. i. Claims Related to Plaintiff’s State Criminal Conviction
It appears that most of Plaintiff’s claims—particularly, his claims of malicious prosecution, ineffective assistance of counsel, and juror bias—are likely barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a civil rights claim “is not cognizable under § 1983” if the plaintiff’s success would “render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Id. at 486-87. That is, if a favorable verdict in a civil rights action “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of the plaintiff’s conviction, the plaintiff must first show that “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 487. As the Supreme Court later clarified, “a state
prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). In any amended complaint, Plaintiff must explain the status of his state court conviction and explain how the criminal charges of which he complains relate to his current incarceration. If Plaintiff was convicted in the criminal proceedings he challenges, and if that conviction has not been invalidated, his claims will be subject to dismissal under Heck. ii. State Action Requirement Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against his criminal defense attorneys are implausible for the additional reason that those attorneys were not acting under color of state law. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal
proceeding.”). Indeed, a defense attorney “is not acting on behalf of the State; he is the State’s adversary.” Id. at 322 n.13 (emphasis added). iii. Conditions of Confinement or Detention Claims Plaintiff claims that he was left on the ground in the jail for several hours. Plaintiff provides no other details about this incident, nor does he assert he was injured as a result. The Complaint is overly vague and generalized on this point and does not allege any specific injury as a result of the unidentified deputies’ actions. Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim regarding the conditions of the Shoshone County Jail. Plaintiff may attempt to remedy this deficiency in an amended complaint. His allegations appear to implicate either the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, depending on Plaintiff’s status at the time the claims arose. a) Eighth Amendment If Plaintiff was a convicted inmate at the time the claim arose, then the Eighth Amendment would control. That amendment guarantees the right to minimally adequate conditions of confinement. “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which house persons convicted of serious crimes[] cannot be free of discomfort.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). However, though prison conditions may be restrictive—even harsh— without violating the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are required to provide prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id. at 347; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show that he is (or was) “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” or that he has been deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” as a result of the defendants’
actions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). An Eighth Amendment claim requires the plaintiff to satisfy both (1) an objective standard, “that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment,” and (2) a subjective standard, that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). As for the objective prong of the analysis, “[n]ot every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Rather, the deprivation alleged must be objectively sufficiently harmful
or, in other words, sufficiently “grave” or “serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (“After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). With respect to the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment violation, “deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence, [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. To exhibit deliberate indifference, a defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk,
but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro, 833 F.3d 1060. Moreover, even prison officials who did actually know of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety will not be liable under § 1983 “if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. b) Due Process Clause If, however, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident described in the Complaint, then the Court must analyze the claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the government from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Pretrial detainees have a right to adequate conditions of detention while they are awaiting trial. A due process violation occurs when the conditions to which the detainee is subjected amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Conditions-of-detention claims are analyzed using a standard of “objective deliberate indifference.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). Under that standard, a detainee must establish the following elements: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. The application of this standard “will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although the Court uses an objective standard in evaluating conditions-of-confinement claims of pretrial detainees, this standard must not be confused with the objective standard used for evaluating claims of negligence under state law. This is because negligence—the “mere lack of due care” by a governmental official—“does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (stating that negligence and ordinary negligence are not actionable under § 1983, because such actions are not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person”). Therefore, a pretrial detainee complaining of unconstitutional conditions of detention must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. iv. Property Interest Due Process Claims Plaintiff claims that he has suffered the destruction of personal property and that he has had money stolen from his jail commissary account. It appears from these allegations that Plaintiff is attempting to assert due process claims based on the deprivation of a property interest. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from
depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. However, the right to due process is “not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.” Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, even the intentional deprivation of personal property by prison officials will not support a due process claim under § 1983 if the prisoner has an adequate remedy under state law. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Idaho has adopted the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”), Idaho Code § 6-901, et seq., to provide a remedy for citizens injured by the tortious acts of governmental entities, officials, and employees. As a general rule, “every governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages
arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties.” Idaho Code § 6-903(1). One exception to this rule is that “any law enforcement officer,” acting “without malice or criminal intent and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct,” shall not be liable for a claim that “arises out of the detention of any goods or merchandise.” Idaho Code § 6- 904B(1). It is unclear whether this exception to liability applies when a jail or prison official deprives an inmate of personal property. Importantly, however, even assuming that this exception applies in the jail or prison context, it would not immunize prison officials from liability for acts that are grossly negligent, reckless, or willful and wanton.
Because an inmate who is deprived of property as a result of prison officials’ grossly negligent, reckless, or willful and wanton conduct has an adequate remedy under the ITCA, Plaintiff’s due process claims based on such a deprivation are implausible. v. Suicide Rumor Claims Plaintiff appears to assert that certain Defendants’ actions in spreading a false rumor of his suicide violates the Constitution. However, these types of allegations cannot support a civil rights claim under § 1983. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that verbal harassment, abuse, and threats, without more, are not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under § 1983); Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1987) (use of derogatory racial epithets does not violate Fourteenth Amendment). Therefore, Plaintiff has no plausible constitutional claim based on the false suicide rumor. B. State Law Claims In addition to § 1983 claims, Plaintiff purports to assert state law claims, though he does not specifically identify any such claims. Because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon
which relief may be granted, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint and is allowed to proceed on a federal claim, and if that amended complaint states a plausible state law claim, the Court will reconsider the issue of supplemental jurisdiction. 4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met—for example, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the elements of an Eighth Amendment or due process claim; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant.
In addition, Plaintiff must include facts showing he can meet the Monell requirements, if applicable (explained above). Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds
by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within twenty-eight days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that
the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has twenty-eight days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, he must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if he no longer intends to pursue this case.1 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed
with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order.
1 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, his request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint.
La DATED: April 30, 2024
af Wt Amanda K. Brailsford Vas —= U.S. District Court Judge
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 15