Rogers v. Saul

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 30, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-00216
StatusUnknown

This text of Rogers v. Saul (Rogers v. Saul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rogers v. Saul, (E.D. Tex. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION CHINE ROGERS § § § § Case No. 2:21-cv-216-RSP COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL § SECURITY ADMINISTRATION MEMORANDUM RULING On January 20, 2021, Administrative Law Judge Mary Abbondondelo issued a decision finding that Petitioner Chine Dianne Rogers was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from January 12, 2014 through the date of the decision. Ms. Rogers, who had just turned 50 and had two years of college resulting in certification as a nursing assistant, was found to be suffering from severe impairments consisting of degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, arthritis, fibromyalgia, and depression with anxiety. These impairments resulted in restrictions on her ability to work and she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 12, 2014. Before that time she had been employed for 3 years as a breastfeeding peer counselor for Texas Public Health. Tr. 106. She was not able to return to that type of work. After reviewing the medical records and receiving the testimony at the June 25, 2020 telephone hearing where Petitioner was represented by her attorney, Gregory R. Giles, the ALJ determined that Petitioner had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform less than sedentary work as defined in the regulations. Specifically, she found that Petitioner was able to lift and carry up to 10 pounds occasionally and lesser amounts frequently, sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, and stand and walk for two hours in an 8-hour workday. She can stoop two thirds of a workday, and occasionally crouch, crawl, and kneel. She can reach in all directions, handle, and

finger no more than two thirds of the workday. Finally, she can tolerate contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public no more than two thirds of the workday. Considering Petitioner’s RFC, the ALJ relied upon the testimony of Vocational Expert Wilfred P. Roux and found that Petitioner had the residual functional capacity to perform certain jobs that exist in substantial numbers in the national economy, such as addresser clerk, charge account clerk, telephone order clerk. This resulted in a finding of not disabled. Petitioner appealed this finding to the Appeals Council, which denied review on May 25, 2021. Petitioner timely filed this action for judicial review seeking remand of the case for award of benefits. This Court's review is limited to a determination of whether the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence. See Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (Sth Cir.1995); Greenspan vy. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (Sth Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 1984, 131 L.Ed.2d 871 (1995). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but can be less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (Sth Cir.1995). A finding of no substantial evidence will be made only where there is a “conspicuous absence of credible choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.” Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 640 (Sth Cir.1988) (citing Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (Sth Cir.1983)). In reviewing the substantiality of the evidence, a court must consider the record as a whole and “must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 818, 823 (Sth Cir.1986). Petitioner raises three issues on this appeal:

1. The ALJ failed to conduct a proper analysis of Plaintiffs limited use of her left shoulder, arm and hands and did not address this in her hypothetical; 2. The ALJ erred in finding there was no evidence to support Plaintiffs diagnosis of fibromyalgia; 3. The ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment is not supported by the substantial evidence in this claim. Issue No. 1: The chief evidence that Petitioner relies upon for this issue is the March 11, 2021 report of a physical examination conducted by Dr. Dale E. Goins, M.D. on February 23, 2021. Tr. 16-19. Two things stand out about this report. First, the examination was conducted a month after the ALJ issued her decision on January 20, 2021. Second, the report does not identify her “left shoulder, arm and hands” as impaired. In fact, all five of the impairments that Dr. Goins identified (cervical disc disease, fibromyalgia, arthritis, depression, and anxiety) were the impairments found to be severe by the ALJ. Tr. 18. Dr. Goins did note work restrictions that were more limiting than those the ALJ set out in her RFC (such as limiting “prolonged” lifting or carrying to 5 pounds and requiring frequent breaks). Tr. 19. However, that makes the timing of the examination critical. Petitioner sent Dr. Goins’ records to the Appeals Council with her appeal of the ALJ’s decision. The Council responded: “You submitted a record from Wadley Rural Health Clinic dated February 23, 2021 (8 pages). The Administrative Law Judge decided your case through January 20, 2021. This additional evidence does not relate to the period at issue. Therefore, it does not affect the decision about whether you were disabled beginning on or before January 20, 2021.” Tr. 2. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Court is “constrained by the record which was available to the ALJ.” Carrier vy. Sullivan, 944 F.2d 243, 247 (Sth Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider these records for the first time on this appeal.

Petitioner proceeds to identify medical records that she argues support her complaints of pain in her hands. Dkt. No. 17 at 7— 10. However, the ALJ agreed that Petitioner has limitations on her use of her hands and arms, which is why the RFC limits the ability to “reach in all directions, handle, and finger” to only frequent, as opposed to continuous, activity. Tr. 28. Petitioner also relies upon the report of Dr. Jonathan Thomas, her rheumatologist, discussing whether she is developing polyclonal gammopathy. The December 12, 2019 report notes, however, that she “does not appear to have an active ongoing inflammatory connective tissue disease ... Polyclonal gammopathy is very nonspecific and does not necessarily indicate an underlying problem.” Tr. 1040. Petitioner has not shown that the ALJ erred in her analysis of Petitioner’s left shoulder, arm, and hands. Issue No. 2: This issue is harder to analyze. Petitioner argues that the ALJ “erred in finding there was no evidence to support Plaintiffs diagnosis of fibromyalgia.” However, the ALJ determined that Petitioner had the severe impairment of fibromyalgia. Tr. 26. In the paragraph Petitioner quotes from the ALJ’s decision, she did find that the fibromyalgia did not meet a Listing, which would have ended the analysis and resulted in a finding of disability. Tr. 27. But the ALJ noted that Petitioner had a “diagnosis of fibromyalgia.” Tr. 26. Petitioner bears the burden of proof on a step three issue of whether she meets a Listing.

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Rogers v. Saul, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rogers-v-saul-txed-2022.