Rogers v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs

636 F. Supp. 1476, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24403
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJune 10, 1986
DocketCiv. A. 86CV60117-AA
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 636 F. Supp. 1476 (Rogers v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rogers v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 636 F. Supp. 1476, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24403 (E.D. Mich. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOINER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons stated below, the court grants the motion for a preliminary injunction.

This dispute arises out of the plaintiff Sunrise Lions Club’s (Sunrise) admission of plaintiff Lore A. Rogers (Rogers) as a member in violation of the Constitution and Bylaws of the defendant International Association of Lions Clubs (International). The violation of the International’s rules lead it to revoke Sunrise’s charter as a Lions club and to refuse Lions’ membership to Rogers. The behavior which lead to the International’s taking this drastic action of terminating an entire club’s membership *1478 can be simply stated; Sunrise admitted a woman, Rogers, to Lions' membership.

Plaintiffs challenge the International’s policies of refusing to admit women, claiming they amount to sex discrimination under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (Elliott-Larsen Act) Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§ 37.2101 et seq. Defendant responds that its actions are not forbidden by the Elliott-Larsen Act for two reasons: 1) it did not deny equal utilization of public accommodations or public service because of sex and 2) it is a private club exempt from the Act.

As a preliminary matter, the court must address the defendant’s motion raised at oral argument, that Sunrise lacks standing to sue under the Elliott-Larsen Act because it is a corporate entity. Defendant relies upon the language of Mieh.Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2302, which states that “a person shall not ... [d]eny an individual” the rights guaranteed under the statute. Defendant construes this language to mean that only individuals have standing to sue for violations of the Elliott-Larsen Act. The court disagrees.

The remedies section of the Act, Mich. Comp.Laws Ann. § 37.2801, provides that: “A person alleging a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief ...” The word “person” is defined in Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 37.-2103(f) to include corporations and “any other legal or commercial entity.” It is clear that Sunrise would qualify as a person under this language.

Plaintiff Rogers is an individual who is alleged to have been discriminated against by the defendant. The denial of plaintiff Rogers’ rights under the statute has caused harm to plaintiff Sunrise, too. The denial of Rogers’ rights is the discrimination that started the events leading to the harm of plaintiff Sunrise. This court holds that Sunrise, a “person” under the Act, can bring an action under the Elliott-Larsen Act but it must show there was a violation of individual plaintiff Rogers’ rights which was related to the harm it suffered.

The standard for granting a preliminary injunction has been stated by this court in Poscoe v. I.R.S., 580 F.Supp. 649, 651 (E.D.Mich.1984), aff 'd mem., 755 F.2d 932 (6th Cir.1985). The party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that:

... (1) that theré is a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits; (2) that failure of the Court to grant the requested relief will result in irreparable injury (also described as a showing that the party seeking relief is without an adequate remedy at law); (3) that the balance of hardships, taking into account the hardship that will result to the party seeking relief if relief is denied, and the hardship that will result to the party opposing the relief if relief is granted, tips decidedly in favor of the party seeking relief; and (4) that public policy militates in favor of granting the requested relief ...

Id. at 651.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The first requirement the plaintiffs must establish to obtain a preliminary injunction is a likelihood of success on the merits. In this case, plaintiffs’ likelihood of success rests on their ability to fall within the statutory provisions of the Elliott-Larsen Act. The pertinent sections are Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§ 37.2301, 2302. The relevant portions of section 2302, the operational section of the public accommodations act, provide that:

... [A] person shall not ... [d]eny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of ... services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of a place of public accommodation or public service because of ... sex ...

Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 37.2302.

Place of public accommodation and public service are defined in section 2301 as follows:

(a) “Place of public accommodation” means a[n] ... institution of any kind ... whose ... services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are ... made available to the public.
*1479 (b) “Public service” means ... a tax exempt private agency established to provide service to the public.

Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 37.2301.

The court finds the Lions clubs fall under the definitions of both a place of public accommodation and a public service. Sunrise is a place of public accommodation because its meetings are in a public place and are open to the public. Plaintiff Sunrise holds its breakfast meetings at a local restaurant, Howard Johnson’s, which is open to the public. Meetings are open to members, guests, visiting Lions, and strangers. Moreover, Sunrise’s services, the volunteer efforts of its members, are made available to the public.

Lions clubs are also, in the words of the International’s general counsel Joseph Stone, “tax exempt private agencies established to provide service to the public.” It is undisputed that the Lions clubs in this case are nonprofit corporations, i.e., tax exempt agencies. There is also no question that the whole purpose of the Lions’ organization is to provide volunteer public services through its members. The International provides services to the local clubs so that they can, in turn, serve the public. The court finds this is sufficient to establish that the Lions’ clubs are public services.

Defendant next argues that even if it falls within the literal language of section 2302, it is exempted from its prohibitions by virtue of the private club exemption. Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 37.2303. This statute provides that:

This article shall not apply to a private club ... not in fact open to the public____

This statutory provision has not been interpreted by the Michigan courts. However, the United States Supreme Court has given some guidance as to what factors should be considered in deciding when a club is private. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,-, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3254-58, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984), citing Nesmith v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir.1968), and National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 NJ.Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33, aff'd mem., 67 N.J.

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Bluebook (online)
636 F. Supp. 1476, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24403, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rogers-v-international-assn-of-lions-clubs-mied-1986.