Rogers v. Dare

Ohio Supreme Court

Rogers v. Dare

1 Wright 136, 1 Ohio Ch. 136

DecidedOctober 15, 1832

StatusPublished

This text of 1 Wright 136 (Rogers v. Dare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rogers v. Dare, 1 Wright 136, 1 Ohio Ch. 136 (Ohio 1832).

Pincite

Opinion

BY THE COURT.

An attorney at law cannot be compelled, and will not be permitted, to disclose what.his client, as such, has confidentially confided to him; but his situation, as attorney at law,, does not excuse him from testifying to facts affecting his client, the-knowledge of which he derived from other sources.

THE COURT, to the jury. The claim of the plaintiff rests upon, the assumption that the bill of sale to Dare being unaccompanied with the actual possession of the engine, is void. The position is-not sound. The court has frequently decided that the want of actual possession following a bill of sale of personal property, was not fraud in itself, but only a circumstance of fraud. There is nopretence here but that the transaction between Harding and Dare' was a bone fide one, and the plaintiff certainly was not deceived by the possession of Harding, nor thus induced to give credit upon the supposition that possession was evidence of property, because he-had notice of Dare’s claim.

Verdict and judgment for the defendant.

• The engine had been taken possession of by Hutchinson, a security for Harding to Rogers, Dun had brought suit for it. After the decision above, it was agreed, that if Hutchinson took the engine to Dun in Zanesville, and paid the costs the suit should be discontinued.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

BY THE COURT.

An attorney at law cannot be compelled, and will not be permitted, to disclose what.his client, as such, has confidentially confided to him; but his situation, as attorney at law,, does not excuse him from testifying to facts affecting his client, the-knowledge of which he derived from other sources.

THE COURT, to the jury. The claim of the plaintiff rests upon, the assumption that the bill of sale to Dare being unaccompanied with the actual possession of the engine, is void. The position is-not sound. The court has frequently decided that the want of actual possession following a bill of sale of personal property, was not fraud in itself, but only a circumstance of fraud. There is nopretence here but that the transaction between Harding and Dare' was a bone fide one, and the plaintiff certainly was not deceived by the possession of Harding, nor thus induced to give credit upon the supposition that possession was evidence of property, because he-had notice of Dare’s claim.

Verdict and judgment for the defendant.

• The engine had been taken possession of by Hutchinson, a security for Harding to Rogers, Dun had brought suit for it. After the decision above, it was agreed, that if Hutchinson took the engine to Dun in Zanesville, and paid the costs the suit should be discontinued.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

1 Wright 136, 1 Ohio Ch. 136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rogers-v-dare-ohio-1832.