Rogers v. Carr

Supreme Court of Georgia

Rogers v. Carr

47 S.E.2d 813, 203 Ga. 594, 1948 Ga. LEXIS 380

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedMay 12, 1948

Docket16206.

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 47 S.E.2d 813 (Rogers v. Carr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rogers v. Carr, 47 S.E.2d 813, 203 Ga. 594, 1948 Ga. LEXIS 380 (Ga. 1948).

Pincite

Opinion

Atkinson, Justice.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The ordinance here in question contains the following provision: “Each and every applicant for a license shall and will be carefully considered by the Mayor and Councilmen of the City of Blairsville, and after a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances, any and all applications, in the discretion of the authority aforesaid, they will then grant or deny the applicant a license.”

The transportation of passengers for hire upon the streets of a city is not an inherent right, but a privilege which the municipality, in the exercise of discretion may grant or refuse. Schlesinger v. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148 (2) (129 S. E. 861); Clem v. LaGrange, 169 Ga. 51 (4) (149 S. E. 638, 65 A. L. R. 1361).

The writ of mandamus will issue only to enforce a duty which is imposed by law. The law must not only authorize the act to be done, but must require its performance. It must appear that the petitioner has a clear legal right to have performed the particular act which he seeks to have enforced. Hart v. Head, 186 Ga. 823 (199 S. E. 125); Harmon v. James, 200 Ga. 742 (38 S. E. 2d, 401).

*596 The ordinance under which the license is sought authorizes the mayor and council to grant or deny the application in their discretion; and where they have exercised the discretion reposed in them and refused an application, the courts will not control their discretion by the writ of mandamus. Harbin v. Holcomb, 181 Ga. 800 (184 S. E. 603); Tate v. Seymour, 181 Ga. 801 (184 S. E. 598); Hodges v. Kennedy, 184 Ga. 400 (191 S. E. 377).

The instant case differs from the case of McWhorter v. Settle, 202 Ga. 334 (43 S. E. 2d, 247), as the ordinance there relied upon made no provision for the exercise of the discretion of the mayor and council in granting or denying a license.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Candler, J., who is disqualified.

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