Rogers v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.

185 Cal. App. 4th 1403
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 30, 2010
DocketC061943
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 185 Cal. App. 4th 1403 (Rogers v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rogers v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 4th 1403 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

*1405 Opinion

ROBIE, J.

Plaintiff Alika Rogers was injured in 2005 when the Bell 47D-1 helicopter she was piloting crashed near the Rancho Murieta Airport. Among others, Rogers sued the helicopter’s manufacturer, defendant Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Bell), for negligence. Rogers’s claim against Bell was based on an allegedly defective maintenance manual that improperly instructed on balancing the helicopter’s tail rotor blades. The helicopter had been in operation since 1951, and the maintenance manual was issued in 1969 and was last revised in 1975.

Bell filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence that the maintenance manual was defective and caused the accident, arguing Rogers’s claim was barred as a matter of law by an 18-year federal statute of repose, the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (Act) (Pub.L. No. 103-298 (Aug. 17, 1994) 108 Stat. 1552, as amended by Pub.L. No. 105-102, § 3(e) (Nov. 20, 1997) 111 Stat. 2215; printed at 49 U.S.C. § 40101, note; further undesignated section references are to the Act). 1

The trial court granted the motion, agreeing with Bell that the maintenance manual was a “part” of the helicopter and was last revised in 1975, rejecting Rogers’s argument that the Act did not apply because the manual was not a part of the helicopter. Bell then successfully moved for a nonsuit based on the lack of admissible evidence against it. Rogers appeals from the resulting judgment against her.

We conclude the maintenance manual here was not a “part” of the helicopter, and therefore the trial court erred in granting Bell’s motion in limine and motion for nonsuit.

DISCUSSION

“The proper interpretation of a statute, and its application to undisputed facts, is a question of law that we review de novo.” (California Forestry Assn. v. California Fish & Game Commission (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1544 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 391].) In this de novo review, we begin with the words of the statute. (Id. at pp. 1544-1545.)

With exceptions not applicable here, the Act reads as follows:

“(a) ... no civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation *1406 aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred—
“(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on—
“(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or
“(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft; or
“(2) with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or other part which replaced another component, system, subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death, injury, or damage, after the applicable limitation period beginning on the date of completion of the replacement or addition.” (§ 2(a).)

For purposes of the Act, “the term ‘limitation period’ means 18 years with respect to general aviation aircraft and the components, systems, subassemblies, and other parts of such aircraft. . . .” (§ 3(3).)

Thus, the Act provides three different triggers for the 18-year limitations period on actions against manufacturers of the “parts” of general aviation aircraft, depending on the nature of the “part” involved. One, for any part that was “originally in” the aircraft, the limitations period runs from the date the aircraft was delivered, either to its first purchaser or lessee (if delivered directly from the manufacturer) or to a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft. Two, for any part that was “added to” the aircraft, the limitations period runs from “the date of completion of the . . . addition.” And three, for any part that “replaced another . . . part” of the aircraft—whether the part replaced was “originally in, or . . . added to” the aircraft—the limitations period runs from “the date of completion of the replacement.”

With this understanding of the Act in mind, we turn to the issue here— whether the allegedly defective maintenance manual was a “part” of the helicopter for purposes of the Act.

The Act does not define the term “part.” In common usage, a “part” is “an essential portion or integral element.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Diet. (11th ed. 2006) p. 903, col. 1.) In turn, an “element” is “a distinct part of a composite device.” (Id. at p. 402, col. 2.)

*1407 More helpful is the context in which the term appears in the Act. As we have noted, the 18-year limitations period in the Act is triggered by the delivery of the aircraft when an original “part” of the aircraft is at issue, the date of completion of the addition when an added “part” is at issue, and the date of completion of the replacement when a replacement “part” is at issue. Thus, the Act contemplates that the aircraft will be delivered with all of its original parts, although other parts may be added later, and original or added parts may be replaced later.

The concept of delivery is central to Rogers’s contention a maintenance manual was not a “part” of the aircraft. Among other things, she argues a maintenance manual is not required to be sold with the aircraft or even to be inside the aircraft. She contrasts it to a flight manual, which is required to be sold with the aircraft, “kept in the airplane and utilized by the pilot to fly the aircraft.”

In support of her position, Rogers cites Caldwell v. Engstrom Helicopter Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 230 F.3d 1155 (Caldwell). There, a helicopter crashed 10 minutes from its destination because the pilot was unaware the last two gallons of gasoline in the helicopter’s fuel tank were unusable. (Id. at p. 1156.) The plaintiffs sued the helicopter manufacturer for negligence, contending the flight manual was defective because it did not warn that the last two gallons of gasoline would not bum. (Ibid) The manufacturer moved to dismiss the action, arguing the Act barred the plaintiffs’ claims because the “part,” i.e., the flight manual, was more than 18 years old. (Caldwell, at p. 1156.) The plaintiffs argued that the flight manual, which was revised several times in the preceding 18 years, was a new system or other part that fell within the Act’s rolling provision extending the limitation period with respect to any new part that replaced another part. (Caldwell, at p. 1156.)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the revised flight manual was a part of the helicopter. (Caldwell, supra, 230 F.3d at p.

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Bluebook (online)
185 Cal. App. 4th 1403, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rogers-v-bell-helicopter-textron-inc-calctapp-2010.