Rogers v. Baum

234 A.D.2d 685, 650 N.Y.S.2d 452, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12337
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedDecember 5, 1996
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 234 A.D.2d 685 (Rogers v. Baum) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rogers v. Baum, 234 A.D.2d 685, 650 N.Y.S.2d 452, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12337 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

—Cardona, P. J.

Appeal (transferred to this Court by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Donovan, J.), entered June 22, 1995 in Westchester County, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Mt. Pleasant denying petitioner’s request for an area variance.

In May 1989, petitioner purchased two adjacent parcels of land on Cedar Avenue in the Town of Mt. Pleasant, Westchester County, known as lots 4 and 5. On lot 5, petitioner built a single-family residence. Lot 4, the subject of this proceeding, was not developed. Lot 4 was rendered a legal nonconforming parcel of land by a change of zone when the Town amended its zoning ordinance in 1958. Although the subject parcel exceeded by more than 50% the required lot size of 20,000 square feet [686]*686and conformed to all other lot size restrictions, it measured 22 feet less than the 150-foot mean depth requirement. Sometime in 1994, petitioner applied for a building permit to construct a single-family residence and a one-car garage. Following the denial of his application, petitioner appealed to the Town Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter the ZBA) for a mean depth variance. Following a hearing, the ZBA denied petitioner’s application.

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the ZBA’s determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition finding that the ZBA had correctly considered the applicable statutory criteria and that its determination was rational and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Petitioner appeals.

Initially, we reject petitioner’s claim that as the owner of a lot rendered substandard by the adoption of the 1958 zoning ordinance, he is entitled to an area variance as a matter of right (see, Matter of Van Perlstein v Oakley, 203 AD2d 853; Matter of Ewers v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 165 AD2d 873). The Court of Appeals has recently refused to recognize a common-law right to such an exemption (see, Matter of Khan v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 87 NY2d 344, 350). In rejecting the need for a common-law rule to protect landowners the Court observed, "A municipality may in the reasonable exercise of its police powers change its zoning to control land use and development. A municipality that chooses to make such changes may, but need not, exempt existing owners of substandard lots from the changes’ more onerous effects” (supra, at 350). Although petitioner argues in his brief that the Town’s zoning ordinance automatically exempts owners of existing building lots rendered substandard by passage of the Town’s zoning ordinance, he does not document this claim in the record before us by reference to specific language exempting substandard lots from minimum area restrictions, nor does he demonstrate that lot 4 would qualify for such an exemption.

It is settled law that "a Zoning Board’s determination must be upheld if it is rational and supported by substantial evidence” (Matter of Khan v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, supra, at 351). The consideration of " 'substantial evidence’ ” is limited to determining "whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the rationality of the Board’s determination” (Matter of Sasso v Osgood, 86 NY2d 374, 384, n 2). Furthermore, "we may not substitute our judgment for that of [the ZBA] so long as [its] determination is rational and not arbitrary and capricious” (Verstandig’s Florist v Board of Appeals, 229 AD2d 851, 852).

[687]*687The standard of review for an area variance is now codified in Town Law § 267-b (3) (see, L 1991, ch 692, § 3, eff July 1, 1992). The statute lists five factors to be considered by a Zoning Board in determining whether to grant the variance

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Bluebook (online)
234 A.D.2d 685, 650 N.Y.S.2d 452, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12337, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rogers-v-baum-nyappdiv-1996.