IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON ______________________________________________
ROGER BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant, FILED C.A. No. 02A01-9803-CV-00069 Vs. Shelby Circuit No. 76743-7 T.D. October 22, 1998 CITY OF MEMPHIS, Cecil Crowson, Jr. Defendant-Appellee. Appellate C ourt Clerk ____________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE SHELBY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT THE HONORABLE ROBERT A. LANIER, JUDGE
Thomas K. McAlexander of Jackson For Plaintiff
Robert L. J. Spence, Jr., City Attorney Elbert Jefferson, Jr., Sr. Assistant City Attorney For Defendant
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Opinion filed:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
Plaintiff, Roger Brown, appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment
to Defendant, City of Memphis.
The facts are not disputed. This suit stems from an on-the-job injury suffered by Brown on May 12, 1995. The City employed Brown as a backhoe operator at the M. C. Stiles Sewage
Treatment Plant. One of Brown’s duties was to move a sled back and forth across a sludge pond.
Originally, a crane was used to move the sled; however, at some time prior to the accident the
crane had broken down. The employees at the sewage treatment plant were forced to improvise
by using bulldozers and a pulley arrangement. Brown operated one of these bulldozers with a
large pulley attached to its side. A cable ran through this pulley and across a sludge pond to
another bulldozer located on the opposite side. The sled moved between the bulldozers and
across the pond by means of the cable.
While operating the bulldozer on May 12, 1995, the cable became jammed in the pulley
system. In an attempt to free the cable, Brown climbed down from the bulldozer and stood in
the sludge pond. After several hours of trying to free the cable, another employee attempted to
break the cable free with the bulldozer on the opposite side of the pond. When the employee
started the bulldozer and began the attempt, the cable jerked and severely lacerated Brown’s leg.
To make matters worse, Brown was standing in raw sewage when the injury occurred. The raw
sewage seeped into Brown’s wound causing severe complications and worsening the injury.
The City is not covered by the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act.1 The City does
have an “on the job injury” (OJI) program designed to compensate injured employees for lost
wages and medical bills. Pursuant to the OJI, the City paid Brown in excess of $150,000 for lost
wages and medical bills as a result of his injury.
On March 12, 1996, Brown filed suit against the City under the Governmental Tort
Liability Act (GTLA).2 Brown alleged that the City was negligent in operation of the M. C.
Stiles Sewage Treatment Plant, and that this negligence caused Brown’s injuries. The City filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the trial court to determine that Brown would not
be entitled to damages because the payment of $150,000 under the OJI program exceeded the
1 T.C.A. § 50-6-106(5) allows counties and municipal corporations to “opt-in” to the Workers’ Compensation statute. However, the City decided against filing the required written acceptance, and instead began the OJI program of it’s own design. 2 In a derivative action, Brown’s wife, Elizabeth, filed suit against the City for loss of consortium. After the trial judge granted the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Elizabeth Brown’s suit went to trial. The judge found that the City had provided Brown with unsafe machinery with which to complete his work, and that the City knew that the machinery was unsafe. Therefore, the trial court found the City negligent and awarded Mrs. Brown $25,000 as damages for loss of consortium.
2 $130,000 limit under the GTLA. The trial judge granted the City’s motion, and dismissed
Brown’s action. Brown appeals, and the issue presented for review is whether the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to the City.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the
burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d
618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Id. In Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d
208 (Tenn. 1993), our Supreme Court stated:
Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must then demonstrate, by affidavits or discovery materials, that there is a genuine, material fact dispute to warrant a trial. In this regard, Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon his pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Id. at 211 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn
from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26
(Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness
regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our
review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court.
Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).
A s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , t h e f a c ts a r e n o t d i s p u te d . A l t h o u g h t h e p r o v i s io n s o f t h e O J I p r o g r a m a r e n o t i n
e v i d e n c e , th e p a r t i e s a p p a r e n t l y s t i p u l a te d t o i t s e x i s te n c e a s s h o w n i n t h e a p p e n d i x t o a p p e l l e e ’ s b r ie f . T h e y f u r th e r
stip u la te d th a t B r o w n w a s p a id in e x c e s s o f $ 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 p u r s u a n t to t h e p r o g r a m . U n d e r t h i s s c e n a r i o , w e m u s t
d e t e r m i n e f r o m t h e p r o v i s io n s o f t h e G T L A a n d t h e O J I p r o g r a m w h e t h e r th e c i t y i s e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t a s a m a t t e r
o f la w .
I n 1 9 7 3 , t h e T e n n e s s e e s ta t e l e g i s l a t u r e p a s s e d t h e G T L A . P r io r t o t h e p a s s a g e o f t h e G T L A , t h e d o c tr i n e o f
3 3 s o v e r e ig n i m m u n i ty “ p r o t e c t e d t h e s t a t e a n d i t s p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s f r o m t o r t l i a b i l i t y . ” Cruse v. City of
Columbia, 9 2 2 S . W . 2 d 4 9 2 , 4 9 5 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 6 ) . “ I n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f i t s g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s , t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y
i s a n a r m o r a g e n t o f t h e S t a t e a n d e n j o y s t h e s a m e i m m u n i t y u n d e r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n . ” City of Lavergne
v. Southern Silver, Inc., 8 7 2 S . W . 2 d 6 8 7 , 6 9 0 ( T e n n . A p p .
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON ______________________________________________
ROGER BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant, FILED C.A. No. 02A01-9803-CV-00069 Vs. Shelby Circuit No. 76743-7 T.D. October 22, 1998 CITY OF MEMPHIS, Cecil Crowson, Jr. Defendant-Appellee. Appellate C ourt Clerk ____________________________________________________________________________
FROM THE SHELBY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT THE HONORABLE ROBERT A. LANIER, JUDGE
Thomas K. McAlexander of Jackson For Plaintiff
Robert L. J. Spence, Jr., City Attorney Elbert Jefferson, Jr., Sr. Assistant City Attorney For Defendant
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Opinion filed:
W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
Plaintiff, Roger Brown, appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment
to Defendant, City of Memphis.
The facts are not disputed. This suit stems from an on-the-job injury suffered by Brown on May 12, 1995. The City employed Brown as a backhoe operator at the M. C. Stiles Sewage
Treatment Plant. One of Brown’s duties was to move a sled back and forth across a sludge pond.
Originally, a crane was used to move the sled; however, at some time prior to the accident the
crane had broken down. The employees at the sewage treatment plant were forced to improvise
by using bulldozers and a pulley arrangement. Brown operated one of these bulldozers with a
large pulley attached to its side. A cable ran through this pulley and across a sludge pond to
another bulldozer located on the opposite side. The sled moved between the bulldozers and
across the pond by means of the cable.
While operating the bulldozer on May 12, 1995, the cable became jammed in the pulley
system. In an attempt to free the cable, Brown climbed down from the bulldozer and stood in
the sludge pond. After several hours of trying to free the cable, another employee attempted to
break the cable free with the bulldozer on the opposite side of the pond. When the employee
started the bulldozer and began the attempt, the cable jerked and severely lacerated Brown’s leg.
To make matters worse, Brown was standing in raw sewage when the injury occurred. The raw
sewage seeped into Brown’s wound causing severe complications and worsening the injury.
The City is not covered by the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act.1 The City does
have an “on the job injury” (OJI) program designed to compensate injured employees for lost
wages and medical bills. Pursuant to the OJI, the City paid Brown in excess of $150,000 for lost
wages and medical bills as a result of his injury.
On March 12, 1996, Brown filed suit against the City under the Governmental Tort
Liability Act (GTLA).2 Brown alleged that the City was negligent in operation of the M. C.
Stiles Sewage Treatment Plant, and that this negligence caused Brown’s injuries. The City filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the trial court to determine that Brown would not
be entitled to damages because the payment of $150,000 under the OJI program exceeded the
1 T.C.A. § 50-6-106(5) allows counties and municipal corporations to “opt-in” to the Workers’ Compensation statute. However, the City decided against filing the required written acceptance, and instead began the OJI program of it’s own design. 2 In a derivative action, Brown’s wife, Elizabeth, filed suit against the City for loss of consortium. After the trial judge granted the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Elizabeth Brown’s suit went to trial. The judge found that the City had provided Brown with unsafe machinery with which to complete his work, and that the City knew that the machinery was unsafe. Therefore, the trial court found the City negligent and awarded Mrs. Brown $25,000 as damages for loss of consortium.
2 $130,000 limit under the GTLA. The trial judge granted the City’s motion, and dismissed
Brown’s action. Brown appeals, and the issue presented for review is whether the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to the City.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the
burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d
618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Id. In Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d
208 (Tenn. 1993), our Supreme Court stated:
Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must then demonstrate, by affidavits or discovery materials, that there is a genuine, material fact dispute to warrant a trial. In this regard, Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon his pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Id. at 211 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn
from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26
(Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness
regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our
review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court.
Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).
A s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , t h e f a c ts a r e n o t d i s p u te d . A l t h o u g h t h e p r o v i s io n s o f t h e O J I p r o g r a m a r e n o t i n
e v i d e n c e , th e p a r t i e s a p p a r e n t l y s t i p u l a te d t o i t s e x i s te n c e a s s h o w n i n t h e a p p e n d i x t o a p p e l l e e ’ s b r ie f . T h e y f u r th e r
stip u la te d th a t B r o w n w a s p a id in e x c e s s o f $ 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 p u r s u a n t to t h e p r o g r a m . U n d e r t h i s s c e n a r i o , w e m u s t
d e t e r m i n e f r o m t h e p r o v i s io n s o f t h e G T L A a n d t h e O J I p r o g r a m w h e t h e r th e c i t y i s e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t a s a m a t t e r
o f la w .
I n 1 9 7 3 , t h e T e n n e s s e e s ta t e l e g i s l a t u r e p a s s e d t h e G T L A . P r io r t o t h e p a s s a g e o f t h e G T L A , t h e d o c tr i n e o f
3 3 s o v e r e ig n i m m u n i ty “ p r o t e c t e d t h e s t a t e a n d i t s p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s f r o m t o r t l i a b i l i t y . ” Cruse v. City of
Columbia, 9 2 2 S . W . 2 d 4 9 2 , 4 9 5 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 6 ) . “ I n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f i t s g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s , t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y
i s a n a r m o r a g e n t o f t h e S t a t e a n d e n j o y s t h e s a m e i m m u n i t y u n d e r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n . ” City of Lavergne
v. Southern Silver, Inc., 8 7 2 S . W . 2 d 6 8 7 , 6 9 0 ( T e n n . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) ( c i t i n g Scates v. Board of Comm'rs of
Union City, 1 9 6 T e n n . 2 7 4 , 2 6 5 S . W . 2 d 5 6 3 ( 1 9 5 4 ) ) . T h e G T L A i s p r e m i s e d e x p l i c i t l y o n t h e a b s o l u t e i m m u n i t y
o f g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s . Id. T h e c o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s g e n e r a l i m m u n i t y s t a t e s :
E x c e p t a s m a y b e o th e r w is e p ro v i d e d in th is c h a p t e r, a ll g o v e r n m e n ta l e n titie s s h a l l b e i m m u n e f r o m s u it f o r a n y i n j u r y w h i c h m a y r e s u l t f r o m t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f s u c h g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s w h e r e in s u c h g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s a r e e n g a g e d i n t h e e x e rc is e a n d d is c h a rg e o f a n y o f th e ir f u n c tio n s , g o v e rn m e n ta l o r p r o p r ie ta ry .
T . C . A . § 2 9 - 2 0 - 2 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 9 8 0 & 1 9 9 7 S u p p . ) . T h e G T L A c o d i f i e d t h e l o n g h e l d d o c t r in e o f s o v e r e ig n i m m u n i ty , y e t
r e m o v e d g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y i n a f e w l i m i t e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Cruse, 9 2 2 S . W . 2 d a t 4 9 6 .
T h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s , inter alia, t h a t “ [ i ] m m u n i t y f r o m s u i t o f a l l g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s i s r e m o v e d f o r i n j u r y
p r o x i m a te ly c a u s e d b y a n e g l ig e n t a c t o r o m i s s i o n o f a n y e m p l o y e e w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f h is e m p l o y m e n t . . . .” T .C .A .
§ 2 9 - 2 0 - 2 0 5 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . B r o w n ’ s s u i t f it s t h i s c a te g o r y a n d i s p r o p e r l y f i l e d p u r s u a n t to t h e G T L A .
W h i l e a l l o w i n g s u i ts a g a i n s t l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s , t h e G T L A d o e s l i m i t t h e a m o u n t o f r e c o v e r y . A t p r e s e n t, a
p l a i n t i f f s u in g i n t o r t f o r t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f c it y e m p l o y e e s u n d e r t h e G T L A m a y o n l y r e c o v e r a m a x i m u m o f $ 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 .
T .C .A . § 2 9 - 2 0 -3 1 1 ( 1 9 8 0 ) p r o v id e s :
29-20-311. Judgment over limits of insurance policy prohibited. - N o j u d g m e n t o r a w a r d r e n d e r e d a g a i n s t a g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y m a y e x c e e d th e m i n i m u m a m o u n t s o f i n s u ra n c e c o v e r a g e f o r d e a th , b o d i l y i n j u r y a n d p r o p e r t y d a m a g e l i a b i l i t y s p e c i f i e d i n § 2 9 - 2 0 - 4 0 3 4, u n l e s s s u c h g o v e rn m e n ta l e n tity h a s s e c u re d in s u ra n c e c o v e ra g e in e x c e s s o f sa id m in im u m r e q u ir e m e n ts , in w h ic h e v e n t th e ju d g m e n t o r a w a rd m a y n o t e x c e e d th e a p p li c a b le li m i t s p ro v i d e d in t h e in s u ra n c e p o l i c y .
T h e C ity c h o s e n o t to o p e ra te u n d e r th e W o r k e rs ’ C o m p e n s a tio n la w a s a llo w e d u n d e r § 5 0 - 6 - 1 0 6 ( 5 ) o f th e
s t a t u t e . T h e C i t y d i d e s ta b l i s h a n O J I p r o g r a m . T h e O J I p r o g r a m c o v e r s a ll p e r m a n e n t , f u l l - t i m e e m p l o y e e s a n d
p r o v i d e s th e f o ll o w i n g b e n e f it s :
III. PROCEDURES
A . P a y m e n ts
1. M ed ical E xp en se
3 The existence of sovereign immunity is established in Article 1, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution: “Suits may be brought against the State in such a manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.” 4 T.C.A. § 29-20-403 (1998 Supp.) sets the minimum amount of insurance coverage at $130,000.00, and it is implicitly stipulated that there is no other applicable insurance.
4 a . T h e C i t y w i l l p a y n e c e s s a r y m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s , in c l u d i n g p h y s i c i a n f e e s , h o s p i ta l b i l l s , a n d c e r t a i n o t h e r a n c i l l a r y e x p e n s e s w h e n a n O J I c l a i m i s a c c e p t e d b y t h e C i ty . T h i s i s s u b j e c t t o a n o v e r a l l m a x i m u m o f $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 p e r i n j u r y o r i l l n e s s . A m o u n t s c a n b e i n c r e a s e d o n l y b y a c t i o n o f th e C i t y C o u n c i l .
b . M e d i c a l e x p e n s e p a y m e n t s o n l y a r e c o n t in u e d f o r a p e r i o d o f u p t o 3 y e a r s i n c a s e s o f lin e -o f- d u ty d isa b ility re tire m e n t, o r e lig ib ility fo r to ta l a n d p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f it s u n d e r S o c i a l S e c u r i t y , o r th e e m p l o y e e r e c e iv e s b e n e f it s u n d e r th e L o n g T e rm D is ab ility In c o m e P la n .
2 . L o st- T im e
F u l l s a la r y w i l l b e p a i d f o r a m a x i m u m p e r io d o f 6 m o n t h s (1 8 0 c a l e n d a r d a y s ) t o e m p l o y e e s c o v e re d b y th e O n - T h e - J o b I n j u r y P r o g r a m f o r a s lo n g a s t h e r e is m e d i c a l d o c u m e n ta tio n f r o m th e p h y s ic ia n o f r e c o r d th a t it is m e d i c a lly n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e e m p l o y e e t o r e m a i n o f f w o r k d u e t o t h e o n - th e - jo b i n j u r y o r il l n e s s . N o e m p l o y e e m a y b e o f f a C ity j o b l o n g e r th a n 1 2 c o n s e c u tiv e m o n t h s fr o m th e d a t e t h e e m p l o y e e i s u n a b l e t o w o r k d u e t o d i s a b il i t y f ro m i l l n e s s a n d / o r in j u r y . . . .
I f , a f t e r r e c e i v i n g O J I l e a v e w i th p a y f o r s i x m o n t h s , t h e e m p l o y e e i s m e d i c a l l y u n a b l e t o p e r f o r m t h e d u t i e s r e q u i r e d ,
t h e e m p l o y e e m u s t e x e r c i s e o n e o f t h e o p t io n s p r o v i d e d f o r . ( T h e s e p r o v i s io n s a r e n o t p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i s s u e s b e f o r e t h e
C o u rt.)
A fte r v ie w in g th e O J I p r o g r a m a s a w h o le , a n d in r e la tio n to th e W o r k e rs ’ C o m p e n s a tio n A c t, w e fin d th a t th e
p r o g r a m e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e C i ty w a s i n t e n d e d n o t a s c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f f e l l o w e m p l o y e e s b u t a s a f r i n g e
b e n e f it f o r a n y ty p e o f w o r k - r e la te d a c c id e n t. W h i l e th e p a y m e n ts m a d e u n d e r th e O J I p r o g r a m a r e s i m i l a r t o p a y m e n t s
m a d e u n d e r th e W o r k e rs ’ C o m p e n s a tio n s ta tu te , o n e i m p o r ta n t d if f e r e n c e e x i ts b e t w e e n t h e t w o . T h e W o r k e r s ’
C o m p e n s a t i o n s t a t u t e e x p l i c i t l y e x c l u d e s a l l o t h e r c l a i m s a g a i n s t e m p l o y e r s . See T . C . A . § 5 0 - 6 - 1 0 8 ( a ) . T h e O J I
p r o g r a m h a s n o s u c h e x c lu s iv i t y p r o v i s io n .
T h e G T L A w a s p a s s e d n o t o n ly to c o d if y th e c o m m o n la w d o c tr in e o f s o v e re ig n im m u n ity b u t to a llo w f o r
e x c e p t i o n s t o i t . Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 9 6 0 S . W . 2 d 1 0 , 1 4 ( T e n n . 1 9 9 7 ) . P l a i n t i f f s , s u c h a s B r o w n ,
i n j u r e d b y t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f e m p l o y e e s o f m u n i c i p a l i t i e s w e r e t h e i n t e n d e d b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e l e g i s l a t i o n . See T . C . A .
§ 2 9 - 2 0 - 2 0 5 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e O J I p r o g r a m o u tlin e d in th e e m p lo y e e h a n d b o o k d id n o t in te n d to
c o m p e n s a t e B r o w n o r o t h e r i n j u r e d w o r k e r s f o r t h e n e g l ig e n c e o f t h e C i ty o r e m p l o y e e s .
T h e G T L A w a s e n a c t e d t o a l l o w p l a i n t i f f s to s u e c i ty g o v e r n m e n t s a n d o b t a i n j u d g m e n t s u p t o $ 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 f o r
a c ti o n s i n t o r t . T h e O J I p r o g r a m w a s i n i t i a t e d b y t h e C i ty a s a f r i n g e b e n e f i t t o e m p l o y e e s a n d p r o v i d e s f o r p a y m e n t
t o e m p l o y e e s w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t o r t l i a b i l i t y o f t h e e m p l o y e r . T h e p r o g r a m i s s o m e w h a t a n a lo g o u s to t h e w o r k e r s ’
c o m p e n s a ti o n l a w . T h e p r o g r a m i s a ls o a k in t o a ty p e o f i n s u ra n c e p l a n p a y in g i m m e d ia te b e n e f i t s fo r m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s
a n d l o s t in c o m e .
T h e p r o g r a m p r o v i d e s t h e c i t y w i t h s u b r o g a t io n r i g h t s i f b e n e f i t s a r e p a i d f o r i n j u r i e s c a u s e d b y t h i r d p a r t ie s .
5 S i g n i f i c a n tl y , t h e p r o g r a m d o e s n o t m e n t i o n s u b r o g a t i o n o r c r e d i t i f t h e r e i s a G T L A c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e C i ty . A s n o te d ,
th e p r o g ra m lim its th e C ity ’s lia b ility fo r m e d ic a l e x p e n se s to $ 5 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 a n d lim its th e C ity ’s lia b ility fo r th e
e m p l o y e e ’ s lo s t s a l a r y t o s i x m o n t h s .
T h e c o n s t r u c ti o n o f m u n i c ip a l o r d in a n c e s a n d r e s o l u t i o n s i s g o v e r n e d b y t h e s a m e r u le s th a t c o n t ro l
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e s . Logins v. Lightner, 8 9 7 S . W . 2 d 6 9 8 , 7 0 2 ( T e n n . A p p . 1 9 9 4 ) ; Tennessee
Manufactured Housing Ass’n v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 7 9 8 S . W . 2 d 2 5 4 , 2 6 0 ( T e n n . A p p .
1 9 9 0 ) . T h e p r im a r y p u r p o s e o f s ta t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s to a s c e r t a i n a n d g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t i o n o r p u r p o s e o f
l e g i s l a t i o n a s e x p r e s s e d i n t h e l e g i s l a t i o n . Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. King, 6 7 8 S . W . 2 d 1 9 , 2 3 ( T e n n . 1 9 8 4 ) ,
appeal dismissed 1 0 5 S . C t . 1 8 3 0 , 4 7 0 U . S . 1 0 7 5 , 8 5 L . E d . 2 d 1 3 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . L i k e w i s e , t h e p r i m a r y r u l e o f c o n t r a c t
c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i n t e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s f r o m t h e f o u r c o r n e r s o f t h e c o n t r a c t . A. G. Rogus v. First
Tennessee Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 7 3 8 S . W . 2 d 6 3 5 , 6 3 7 ( T e n n . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) . L e g i s l a t i o n m u s t b e c o n s t r u e d o r
i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o i t s i n t e n d e d p u r p o s e . White v. Cain, 1 7 8 T e n n . 4 6 9 , 1 5 9 S . W . 2 d 9 2 ( 1 9 4 2 ) . “ T h e
l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t o r p u r p o s e i s t o b e a s c e r ta i n e d p r im a r il y f r o m t h e n a t u r a l a n d o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g o f th e l a n g u a g e u s e d
w h e n r e a d in t h e c o n te x t o f t h e e n ti r e s t a t u t e a n d w i t h o u t a n y f o r c e d o r s u b tl e c o n s t r u c t i o n t o l i m i t o r e x t e n d t h e i m p o r t
o f t h e l a n g u a g e . ” City of Caryville v. Campbell County, 6 6 0 S . W . 2 d 5 1 0 , 5 1 2 ( T e n n . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) ; Azbill v.
Azbill, 6 6 1 S . W . 2 d 6 8 2 , 6 8 6 ( T e n n . 1 9 8 3 ) .
C o n s id e r i n g t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d i n t h e O J I a n d t h e i n t e n d e d p u r p o s e o f t h e p r o g r a m , t h e C i t y i n t e n d e d t h a t t h e
m e d i c a l b e n e fi t s a n d s a l a r y a s l i m i t e d i n t h e p r o g r a m w o u l d b e a s e p a r a t e a n d d i s ti n c t f ri n g e b e n e f it t o t h e e m p l o y e e
s u b j e c t o n l y t o t h e r i g h t o f s u b r o g a t i o n s h o u ld t h e i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g i n t h e b e n e f i t b e c a u s e d b y t h e a c t i o n s o f a t h i r d p a r t y .
P a y m e n t s m a d e i n e x c e s s o f th e b e n e f it s p r o v i d e d f o r i n t h e p r o g r a m s h o u ld b e c o n s i d e r e d a s a d v a n c e p a y m e n t s t o w a r d
a n y a l l e g e d l i a b i l i t y f o r w h i c h t h e C i ty m i g h t u l t i m a t e l y b e h e ld l i a b l e . W e b e li e v e th e r e a s o n i n g o f t h i s C o u r t i n
Howard v. Abernathy, 7 5 1 S . W . 2 d 4 3 2 ( T e n n . A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) i s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e a t b a r . I n Howard, p l a i n t i f f
s u s ta i n e d p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s i n a a u to m o b i l e c o ll i s io n w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t. P r io r t o s u it b e i n g f i l e d f o r h i s a l l e g e d p e r s o n a l
i n j u r y , t h e d e f e n d a n t’ s li a b i l i t y i n s u r e r p a i d t h e p l a i n t i f f $ 1 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 , t h e a m o u n t o f p l a i n t i f f ’ s i n c u r r e d m e d i c a l b i l l s .
W h e n s u i t w a s f i le d , th e p l a i n t if f p r e s e n t e d p r o o f o f m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s a s p a r t o f h i s c la i m f o r d a m a g e s . A v e r d i c t w a s
r e tu r n e d i n f a v o r o f t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r $ 7 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 a n d j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d t h e r e o n . T h e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a m o t i o n t o r e d u c e
t h e a m o u n t o f t h e j u d g m e n t b y t h e a m o u n t p r e v i o u s ly p a i d i n a d v a n c e f o r t h e m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s . T h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d
t h e m o t i o n , a n d t h i s C o u r t r e v e r s e d t h e t r ia l c o u r t , g r a n t e d c r e d i t f o r t h e a m o u n t p r e v i o u s l y p a i d , a n d r e d u c e d t h e
j u d g m e n t a c c o r d i n g l y . I n Howard, t h e C o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e a m o u n t r e c e i v e d b y t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r h i s m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s
w a s n o t a l o a n o r a n y o th e r t r a n s a c ti o n t h a t c r e a te d a n o b li g a ti o n o n h i s p a r t . T h e C o u r t s ta t e d : “ T h e m o n e y r e c e i v e d
6 b y p l a i n t i f f w a s a n a d v a n c e p a y m e n t o r p a r t i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e c l a i m o f t h e p l a i n t i f f . ” Id., a t 4 3 4 - 3 5 . T h e C o u r t
n o t e d t h a t t h e m a k i n g o f a d v a n c e p a y m e n t s w a s a h u m a n i t a r ia n p r a c t i c e t h a t s h o u l d b e e n c o u r a g e d a n d c o m m e n d e d .
W e a g r e e w i t h o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e Howard c o u r t . W e f e e l t h a t t h e s a m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s e x i s t i n t h e c a s e a t b a r . I n t h e
i n s t a n t c a s e , th e C i ty , w i th o u t a n y o b l i g a t io n , m a d e t h e p a y m e n t s in e x c e s s o f t h o s e r e q u i r e d b y t h e O J I p r o g r a m a n d
s h o u ld b e a ll o w e d t o c l a i m c r e d i t f o r s u c h p a y m e n t s in a n y p r o c e e d i n g t o e s t a b l i s h le g a l l i a b i l i t y o n t h e p a r t o f t h e C i t y .
S i n c e t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a te s t h a t t h e a m o u n t f o r w h i c h t h e C i t y s h o u l d b e g i v e n c r e d i t i s le s s t h a n t h e m a x i m u m
l i a b i l i t y o f th e C i t y u n d e r th e G T L A , s u m m a r y ju d g m e n t w a s in a p p r o p r i a t e .
T h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r ia l c o u r t i s r e v e r s e d , a n d t h e c a s e is r e m a n d e d t o t h e t r ia l c o u r t f o r s u c h f u r th e r
p r o c e e d i n g s a s m a y b e n e c e s s a r y c o n s is te n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . C o s ts o f t h e a p p e a l a r e a s s e s s e d a g a i n s t t h e a p p e ll e e .
_________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
____________________________________ ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
____________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE