1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 ROGER B. HOPKINS AND SANDY No. 2:25-cv-00030-JAM-AC HOPKINS, 10 Plaintiffs, 11 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ v. MOTION TO REMAND 12 FORD MOTOR COMPANY; and DOES 13 1 through 10, inclusive, 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Roger and 17 Sandy Hopkins’ motion to remand. ECF No. 13-1, Plaintiffs’ 18 Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Mot.”). Defendant Ford 19 Motor Company filed an opposition (ECF No. 16 (“Opp’n”)); 20 Plaintiffs did not reply. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ 21 motion is denied.1 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 In 2024, Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit in Yolo County 24 Superior Court, arising out of their 2018 purchase of a Ford 25 Explorer (the “Subject Vehicle”), which they claim is defective. 26 See generally Mot. at 1-2; Opp’n at 2. Defendant then removed 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 28 oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g); see also ECF No. 17. 1 the matter to this Court, based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 2 1446, alleging the parties were diverse and the amount in 3 controversy exceeded $75,000. ECF 1. Specifically, Defendant 4 alleged the Plaintiffs are California citizens and the Defendant 5 is a Delaware citizen. Id. Defendant also averred the removal 6 was timely, because it was made within 30 days of the dismissal 7 of other defendants that shared California citizenship. Id. 8 II. OPINION 9 A. Legal Standard 10 Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction 11 over civil actions between parties with diverse citizenship 12 where “the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of or value of 13 $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1332(a). Such an action may be removed to federal court under 15 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). It is well-established that “[r]emoval 16 statutes are strictly construed, and any doubt about the right 17 of removal requires resolution in favor of remand. This rule of 18 narrow construction both recognizes the limited jurisdiction of 19 federal courts and protect[s] the jurisdiction of state courts.” 20 Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024) 21 (citing and quoting Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 22 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) and Harris v. Bankers Life & 23 Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal citations 24 and quotations removed). 25 “The presumption against removal means that the defendant 26 always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” 27 Casola, 98 F.3d at 954 (quoting Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244) 28 (quotations removed). Indeed, when removal is challenged based 1 on whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, “‘the 2 removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a 3 preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 4 exceeds’ the jurisdictional threshold,” unless it is clear from 5 the face of the state court complaint. Urbino v. Orkin Services 6 of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2013) 7 (quoting Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 8 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit defines the “amount in 9 controversy as the amount at stake in the underlying litigation, 10 [that is,] any result of the litigation, excluding interests and 11 costs, that entails a payment by the defendant. This amount 12 includes, inter alia, damages (compensatory, punitive, or 13 otherwise) and the cost of complying with an injunction, as well 14 as attorneys’ fees awarded under fee shifting statutes.” 15 Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 16 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing and quoting Theis Research, Inc. v. 17 Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005) and Guglielmino 18 v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007) 19 (internal quotations, citations, and brackets removed)). 20 In assessing whether the defendant has met its burden, a 21 court “may consider allegations in the complaint and in the 22 notice of removal, as well as summary-judgment-type evidence 23 relevant to the amount in controversy.” Chavez v. JPMorgan 24 Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Kroske v. 25 U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005)). 26 B. Analysis 27 Plaintiffs contest jurisdiction by claiming Defendant did 28 not establish the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 1 generally Mot. As correctly noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs do 2 not dispute this matter was timely removed, nor do they dispute 3 complete diversity. Opp’n at 2. 4 The parties agree it is not apparent from the face of the 5 complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (see 6 Mot. at 5-6 and Opp’n at 4); accordingly, Defendant bears the 7 burden of establishing by a preponderance that the amount in 8 controversy exceeds $75,000. See Urbino, 726 F.3d 1118. Only 9 Defendant has presented evidence for the Court to consider in 10 determining the amount in controversy here. See ECF No. 16-1– 11 16-5. 12 1. Actual Damages 13 In the body of their complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages 14 under the Song-Beverly Act, including “the entire contract 15 price,” “reimbursement of the price paid for the vehicle,” 16 offset by the Plaintiffs use prior to the alleged problems 17 manifesting, “any ‘cover’ damages,” and incidental, 18 consequential, and general damages. Opp’n, Exh. A (“Compl.”) 19 ¶¶ 17–22, 35. Plaintiffs also sue Defendant for “Fraudulent 20 Inducement-Concealment,” and repeat in their prayer for relief 21 requests for “general, special, and [] actual damages,” 22 “restitution,” and “consequential and incidental damages.” 23 Id. ¶¶ 50-62 and pg. 11-12. 24 Defendant provides the Retail Installment Sales Contract 25 (“RISC”) for the Subject Vehicle. See Opp’n, Exh. B. Defendant 26 also provides a declaration; this evidence demonstrates the 27 purchase price of the subject vehicle was $80,176.19 without 28 financing, $84,873.84 with. Id. Defendant submits evidence 1 from its “Analytical Warranty System [] Standard Claims List 2 Report,” and a corresponding repair order. Id., Exhs. C and D. 3 Using this evidence, Defendant offers a detailed analysis of a 4 proposed mileage offset which provides a more favorable 5 calculation of actual damages for the Plaintiffs. See Opp’n at 6 3-4, 6-8.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 ROGER B. HOPKINS AND SANDY No. 2:25-cv-00030-JAM-AC HOPKINS, 10 Plaintiffs, 11 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ v. MOTION TO REMAND 12 FORD MOTOR COMPANY; and DOES 13 1 through 10, inclusive, 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Roger and 17 Sandy Hopkins’ motion to remand. ECF No. 13-1, Plaintiffs’ 18 Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Mot.”). Defendant Ford 19 Motor Company filed an opposition (ECF No. 16 (“Opp’n”)); 20 Plaintiffs did not reply. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ 21 motion is denied.1 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 In 2024, Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit in Yolo County 24 Superior Court, arising out of their 2018 purchase of a Ford 25 Explorer (the “Subject Vehicle”), which they claim is defective. 26 See generally Mot. at 1-2; Opp’n at 2. Defendant then removed 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 28 oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g); see also ECF No. 17. 1 the matter to this Court, based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 2 1446, alleging the parties were diverse and the amount in 3 controversy exceeded $75,000. ECF 1. Specifically, Defendant 4 alleged the Plaintiffs are California citizens and the Defendant 5 is a Delaware citizen. Id. Defendant also averred the removal 6 was timely, because it was made within 30 days of the dismissal 7 of other defendants that shared California citizenship. Id. 8 II. OPINION 9 A. Legal Standard 10 Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction 11 over civil actions between parties with diverse citizenship 12 where “the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of or value of 13 $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1332(a). Such an action may be removed to federal court under 15 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). It is well-established that “[r]emoval 16 statutes are strictly construed, and any doubt about the right 17 of removal requires resolution in favor of remand. This rule of 18 narrow construction both recognizes the limited jurisdiction of 19 federal courts and protect[s] the jurisdiction of state courts.” 20 Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024) 21 (citing and quoting Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 22 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) and Harris v. Bankers Life & 23 Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal citations 24 and quotations removed). 25 “The presumption against removal means that the defendant 26 always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” 27 Casola, 98 F.3d at 954 (quoting Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244) 28 (quotations removed). Indeed, when removal is challenged based 1 on whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, “‘the 2 removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a 3 preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 4 exceeds’ the jurisdictional threshold,” unless it is clear from 5 the face of the state court complaint. Urbino v. Orkin Services 6 of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2013) 7 (quoting Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 8 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit defines the “amount in 9 controversy as the amount at stake in the underlying litigation, 10 [that is,] any result of the litigation, excluding interests and 11 costs, that entails a payment by the defendant. This amount 12 includes, inter alia, damages (compensatory, punitive, or 13 otherwise) and the cost of complying with an injunction, as well 14 as attorneys’ fees awarded under fee shifting statutes.” 15 Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 16 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing and quoting Theis Research, Inc. v. 17 Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005) and Guglielmino 18 v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007) 19 (internal quotations, citations, and brackets removed)). 20 In assessing whether the defendant has met its burden, a 21 court “may consider allegations in the complaint and in the 22 notice of removal, as well as summary-judgment-type evidence 23 relevant to the amount in controversy.” Chavez v. JPMorgan 24 Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Kroske v. 25 U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005)). 26 B. Analysis 27 Plaintiffs contest jurisdiction by claiming Defendant did 28 not establish the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 1 generally Mot. As correctly noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs do 2 not dispute this matter was timely removed, nor do they dispute 3 complete diversity. Opp’n at 2. 4 The parties agree it is not apparent from the face of the 5 complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (see 6 Mot. at 5-6 and Opp’n at 4); accordingly, Defendant bears the 7 burden of establishing by a preponderance that the amount in 8 controversy exceeds $75,000. See Urbino, 726 F.3d 1118. Only 9 Defendant has presented evidence for the Court to consider in 10 determining the amount in controversy here. See ECF No. 16-1– 11 16-5. 12 1. Actual Damages 13 In the body of their complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages 14 under the Song-Beverly Act, including “the entire contract 15 price,” “reimbursement of the price paid for the vehicle,” 16 offset by the Plaintiffs use prior to the alleged problems 17 manifesting, “any ‘cover’ damages,” and incidental, 18 consequential, and general damages. Opp’n, Exh. A (“Compl.”) 19 ¶¶ 17–22, 35. Plaintiffs also sue Defendant for “Fraudulent 20 Inducement-Concealment,” and repeat in their prayer for relief 21 requests for “general, special, and [] actual damages,” 22 “restitution,” and “consequential and incidental damages.” 23 Id. ¶¶ 50-62 and pg. 11-12. 24 Defendant provides the Retail Installment Sales Contract 25 (“RISC”) for the Subject Vehicle. See Opp’n, Exh. B. Defendant 26 also provides a declaration; this evidence demonstrates the 27 purchase price of the subject vehicle was $80,176.19 without 28 financing, $84,873.84 with. Id. Defendant submits evidence 1 from its “Analytical Warranty System [] Standard Claims List 2 Report,” and a corresponding repair order. Id., Exhs. C and D. 3 Using this evidence, Defendant offers a detailed analysis of a 4 proposed mileage offset which provides a more favorable 5 calculation of actual damages for the Plaintiffs. See Opp’n at 6 3-4, 6-8. Since the first repair occurred after Plaintiffs 7 drove approximately 28,986 miles, according to the Defendant’s 8 calculated Song-Beverly offset, this mileage, divided by 120,000 9 and multiplied by the purchase price, results in a $20,501.28 10 deduction, totaling $64,372.56 in actual damages. Id. Without 11 the financing included in the purchase price, the deduction is 12 $19,366.56, totaling $60,809.63 in actual damages. Id. at 7-8. 13 Plaintiffs claim these numbers are “purely speculatory,” 14 “lack a supporting evidentiary basis,” and arbitrarily self- 15 serving. Mot. at 8-10. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs have 16 not provided any alternative proposal for the Court regarding 17 their actual damages. Plaintiffs did not file a reply, nor did 18 they present any evidence for the Court to consider otherwise. 19 The evidence and calculations before the Court are 20 uncontroverted. Accord Carrington Stonemasons, Inc. v. Ford 21 Motor Company, No. 24-cv-00080, 2024 WL 1745038 at *3 (N.D. Cal 22 Apr. 22, 2024) (“Because [Plaintiff] has not filed a reply, 23 [Defendant]’s calculation of the use offset and actual damages 24 is undisputed.”). 25 Although Plaintiffs rely on a number of cases to support 26 their argument that Defendant failed to meet its evidentiary 27 burden here, they are distinguishable. See Mot. at 5-11. For 28 example, in Steeg, the defendant simply relied on the 1 allegations in the complaint and the vehicle’s MSRP 2 (manufacturer’s suggested retail price). Steeg v. Ford Motor 3 Company, No. 19-cv-05833, 2020 WL 2121508 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 4 2020). The defendant did not present other evidence, including 5 the actual sales price, and the court found defendant failed to 6 demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. 7 Id. Similarly, defendants in Schneider and Limon-Gonzalez 8 relied on the claimed damages in the plaintiffs’ complaints of 9 at least $25,000, argued this number would be doubled if civil 10 penalties were included, and made general claims about 11 attorneys’ fees. See Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 441 F. Supp. 12 3d 909 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020); Limon-Gonzalez v. Kia Motos 13 America, Inc., No. CV 20-4381, 2020 WL 3790838 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 14 7, 2020). Both courts granted plaintiffs’ motions to remand 15 because defendants failed to meet their burden. Id. Unlike 16 these cases, and the many others cited by Plaintiffs, Defendant 17 presented evidence of the actual damages at issue here, 18 supported by the RISC, Analytical Warranty System Standard 19 Claims List Report, and a repair order; Defendant did not simply 20 rely on the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint and make vague 21 claims about possible damages. Cf. Edwards v. Jaguar Land Rover 22 N. Am. LLC, No. 21-cv-05061, 2022 WL 854515 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 23 2022) (motion to remand granted because defendant relied on 24 allegations in complaint, civil penalties doubling the claimed 25 amount of damages and general arguments about attorneys’ fees, 26 and did not present evidence to meet its burden); Echemendia v. 27 Subaru of America, Inc., No. 20-cv-09243, 2020 WL 7311348 (C.D. 28 Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (defendant provided sales contract, but no 1 other evidence or analysis to “allow the Court to reliably 2 estimate actual damages”); Chajon v. Ford Motor Company, No. 3 2:18-cv-10533, 2019 WL 994019 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 8, 2019) 4 (defendant failed to meet its burden establishing requisite 5 amount in controversy because it relied on MSRP, did not provide 6 other evidence or an offset calculation, and speculated about 7 penalties and attorneys’ fees). 8 “District courts within the Ninth Circuit disagree whether 9 . . . the ‘use offset’ or the ‘mileage offset[]’ should be 10 considered when determining the amount in controversy for 11 purposes of jurisdiction.” Carrington, 2024 WL 1745038 at *2. 12 Without the offset, Defendant has demonstrated by a 13 preponderance that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 14 based on the RISC, containing the actual purchase price, and 15 Plaintiffs request for actual damages to include “the entire 16 contract price,” under the Song-Beverly Act, alone. 17 Considering the mileage offset and assuming the most 18 favorable calculation to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs baseline 19 damages would still be at least $60,809.63. See Opp’n at 8. 20 Accordingly, the Court turns to the parties’ arguments regarding 21 penalties. 22 2. Civil Penalties 23 Plaintiffs seek a statutory civil penalty of twice 24 Plaintiffs’ actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act, punitive 25 damages, prejudgment interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. See 26 Compl. at pg. 11-12. The parties disagree about the appropriate 27 way to include and calculate civil penalties here, citing a 28 number of cases supporting their respective positions. See Mot. 1 at 11-14; Opp’n at 8-10. Plaintiffs argue Defendant’s 2 assumption that Plaintiffs will recover the penalty authorized 3 by the Song-Beverly act is unsupported; since Defendant has 4 failed to meet its burden, which Plaintiffs claim requires proof 5 of a willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act, civil penalties 6 should not be included in the amount in controversy calculation. 7 Mot. at 11-14. Plaintiffs rely on a number of cases that 8 include underlying complaints requesting civil penalties “up to 9 twice the amount of [] actual damages,” which are unlike 10 Plaintiffs’ complaint and moving papers that repeatedly aver 11 Plaintiffs are “entitled” to a civil penalty twice the amount of 12 their underlying, actual damages. Compare, e.g., Echemendia, 13 2020 WL 7311348 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (“Plaintiff’s sole 14 allegation remotely inferring willfulness is that Subaru 15 misrepresented it would cure the Vehicle’s defects”) with Compl. 16 ¶¶ 30, 36, 39 (containing descriptions of Defendant’s “willful” 17 failure to comply with the Song-Beverly Act and repeated claim 18 that “Plaintiffs are entitled to a civil penalty of two times 19 Plaintiffs’ actual damages”) and ECF No. 10, Joint Status 20 Report, at pg. 4 (stating if the standard double civil penalty 21 under the Song-Beverly Act does not apply, “Plaintiffs will 22 [otherwise] seek a penalty in the amount of two times [their] 23 damages.”). The Court is persuaded by Carrington and the 24 Verastegui cases cited by the Defendant, which support the 25 inclusion of a civil penalty doubling the actual damages in the 26 amount in controversy calculation; these cases are more 27 analogous to the claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the 28 evidence before this Court than any cited by the Plaintiffs. —e——e mm EIEN ON IERIE IRI EE IE Om EE OSI IE OS III EE
1 See Carrington, 2024 WL 1745038 at *3-4 (relying on Sanchez v. 2 Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 1996) and 3 Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2018) to 4 support the application of the civil penalty in determining the 5 amount in controversy); Verastegui v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-cv- 6 | 04806, 2020 WL 598516, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2020) 7 (recognizing “courts in this district have varying views as to 8 whether the maximum civil penalties should be considered when 9 | deciding the amount in controversy,” but finding the penalty 10 doubling the actual damages applied because “it is what 11 Plaintiff put in controversy.”). Using the underlying actual 12 damages calculation most favorable to Plaintiffs, $60,809.63, 13 the inclusion of the civil penalty Plaintiffs claim they are 14 entitled to brings the amount in controversy to nearly $122,000. 15 This number well exceeds the requisite jurisdictional threshold, 16 | without considering attorneys’ fees or other damages requested 17 by Plaintiffs. Based on the evidence before the Court, 18 Defendants have met their burden establishing by a preponderance 19 the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 20 Til. ORDER 21 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES 22 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: September 30, 2025 25 HN A. MENDEZ. 26 Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE 27 28