Roesel v. DAM Management LLC

District Court, N.D. Ohio·Decided July 10, 2025·No. 5:23-cv-01584·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

MARK ROESEL, et al. ) CASE NO. 5:23-cv-01584-JRA ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) JUDGE JOHN ADAMS )

DAM MANAGEMENT LLC d/b/a ) LANNING’S ) ORDER AND DECISION )

Defendant. )

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Court-Authorized Notice to Potential Opt-in Plaintiffs. Doc. 40. Plaintiffs seek authorization from the Court to issue notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs in this collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as well as O.R.C. § 4111.14(K). Defendant DAM Management, LLC, DBA Lanning’s has opposed the motion. Doc. 45. The matter is fully briefed. Having reviewed the briefing, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion. I. Procedural History On August 14, 2023, Plaintiffs Mark Roesel and Jerry Hernandez, servers at Lanning’s restaurant, filed the instant Collective Action Complaint, asserting violations of Ohio’s minimum wage laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Doc 1. On February 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their unpaid minimum wage claim, leaving the amount of damages as the only remaining genuine issue of material fact. Doc. 20. On that same day, Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiffs were paid above federal minimum wage at all times relevant to the lawsuit. Doc. 20. On September 12, 2024, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendant withheld more than is permissible from Plaintiffs’ tips, thus violating the FLSA and Ohio’s minimum wage laws. Doc. 39. On September 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their motion for Court-authorized notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs, seeking to notify all of Defendant’s tipped employees including servers,

bartenders and bussers of this action. Doc. 40. On October 8, 2024, Defendant moved for reconsideration of this Court’s grant of summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. Doc. 41. On October 17, 2024, Defendant opposed Plaintiffs’ motion for court-authorized notice, asserting that servers, bussers, and bartenders are not substantially similar positions1. Doc. 45. Both matters were fully briefed. On January 23, 2025, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for reconsideration, affirming its conclusion that Defendant improperly withheld money from Plaintiffs’ tips. Doc. 48. II. Law and Analysis The FLSA provides that plaintiffs may litigate federal minimum wage and overtime claims on their own behalf and on the behalf of other “similarly situated” employees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

The overall goal of proceeding as a collective action is to promote “efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged discriminatory activity.” Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989). The Supreme Court made clear in Hoffmann-La Roche that the court’s facilitation of notice must not “in form or function” resemble “the solicitation of claims.” Id. at 174. And notice sent to employees who are not, in fact, eligible to join the suit amounts to solicitation of those employees to bring suits of their own. Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Ctr., LLC, 68 F.4th 1003, 1011 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Swales v.

1 Defendant also reiterates its argument that its withholding was permissible and lawful and that it had filed its motion for reconsideration of this Court’s order ruling otherwise. Doc. 45, p. 2. However, the Court has since ruled on this motion, declining to reconsider its order and reaffirming that Defendant violated the FLSA. KLLM Transport Services, L.L.C., 985 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 2021)). To the extent practicable, therefore, court-approved notice of the suit should be sent only to employees who are in fact similarly situated. Id. at 10. The Sixth Circuit has held that for a district court to facilitate notice of an FLSA suit to

other employees, the plaintiffs must show a “strong likelihood” that those employees are similarly situated to the plaintiffs themselves. Id. at 1011. The “strong likelihood” “standard requires a showing greater than the one necessary to create a genuine issue of fact, but less than the one necessary to show a preponderance.” Id. “The strong-likelihood standard. . . would confine the issuance of court-approved notice. . . to employees who are in fact similarly situated; and it would strike the same balance that courts have long struck in analogous circumstances.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs contend that there is a “strong likelihood” that the proposed potential opt- in plaintiffs, other servers, bartenders, and bussers, are “similarly situated” to the named Plaintiffs because they were all subject to the same unlawful tip withholding policy. This Court agrees. “Plaintiffs are similarly situated when their claims are ‘unified by common theories of

defendants’ statutory violations,’ such as ‘a single, FLSA-violating policy[.]’ Gifford v. Northwood Healthcare Grp., LLC, No. 2:22-CV-4389, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146707, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2023) quoting O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 585 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016). Though some proof may be individualized, proof of the policy or conduct in conformity with the policy should prove a violation as to all plaintiffs. Id. The cause of action for all similarly situated employees will have “accrued in approximately the same manner as those of the named plaintiff.” Lewis v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 789 F.Supp. 2d 863. 867 (S.D. Ohio 2011). The circumstances of the consent plaintiffs must be similar to that of the original plaintiff but need not be identical. Id.; Foley v. Wildcat Invs., LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120278, 2023 WL 4485571 (S.D. Ohio July 12, 2023). “Whether other employees are similarly situated for the purpose of joining an FLSA suit typically depends on whether they performed the same tasks and were subject to the same policies as the original plaintiffs were.” Clark, 68 F.4th at 1010.

At issue in this case is Defendant’s credit card processing fee deduction policy. Defendant explains that “pursuant to this policy, Defendant deducts five percent from all tips paid [by] customers using credit cards. The five percent deduction is used by Defendant solely to recoup a small portion of the credit card processing fees paid by Defendant to the credit card merchants.” Doc. 21-1, p. 4. This policy was in effect before Defendant purchased the restaurant in December of 2020 through at least January of 2024. Doc. 21-1; Doc. 21-2, p. 17 (conceding that the policy was still in the effect as of the date of the co-owner’s January 2024 deposition). Defendant concedes that this policy applies to all its tipped employees. Specifically, the five percent is deducted from the credit card tip that the server receives. After that deduction, 20 percent of the remaining tip is given to the bussers. After tipping out the bussers, 10 precent of the remaining tip

goes to the bartender. Defendant provided the following example: A. It’s a sliding scale, however. Q. Okay. What do you mean by that? A. So if a server has a $100 tip, the first 5 percent goes to the house. Q. Okay. A. Once that is deducted the next 20 percent goes to the bussers.

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Related

Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling
493 U.S. 165 (Supreme Court, 1990)
O'BRIEN v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc.
575 F.3d 567 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Lewis v. Huntington National Bank
789 F. Supp. 2d 863 (S.D. Ohio, 2011)
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez
577 U.S. 153 (Supreme Court, 2016)