Roe v. Shanahan
This text of 359 F. Supp. 3d 382 (Roe v. Shanahan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Leonie M. Brinkema, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Richard Roe ("Roe") and Victor Voe ("Voe")1 are members of the United States Air Force who have been diagnosed with the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") and who face imminent separation from service. Roe and Voe-together with plaintiff OutServe-SLDN, Inc. ("OutServe"), an organization representing the interests of veterans, active-duty servicemembers, and civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense ("DoD") who are LGBTQ+ or HIV positive-bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the DoD. Plaintiffs' complaint contains five counts. Count I, asserted against all defendants, alleges that defendants' policies with respect to the deployment and separation of HIV-positive servicemembers, on their face and as applied to Roe and Voe, violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Counts II and III, which are asserted only against the Secretary of the Air Force, *392allege that the decisions to separate Roe and Voe were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Finally, Counts IV and V allege that several of defendants' policies "are based on outdated thinking that does not comport with the current state of HIV medical science" and that defendants' failure to update those policies amounts to an independent violation of the APA.2
Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary injunction preventing Roe and Voe, along with similarly situated servicemembers, from being discharged3 because of deployment restrictions due to their HIV status. Plaintiffs argue that injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the status quo pending final disposition of their constitutional and administrative law claims. Defendants oppose plaintiffs' motion and have moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that plaintiffs' claims are premature and nonjusticiable; that plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief; and that the scope of any relief granted must be limited to Roe and Voe.4 The parties have fully briefed and argued their motions.5 For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied, and plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 6
1. Richard Roe
Roe enlisted in the Air Force in 2012. Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief [Dkt. No. 1] ("Compl.") ¶ 57. He enjoyed early signs of success, including being promoted to Senior Airman ahead of schedule and successfully testing for Staff Sergeant, a noncommissioned officer rank, on his first try. Id. ¶ 58. Roe hoped to make the Air Force his lifelong career and one day commission as an officer. Id. ¶ 74.
Roe's upward trajectory was halted in October 2017, when he was diagnosed with HIV while on active duty. Compl. ¶ 59. He began antiretroviral treatment immediately. Id. That treatment requires him to take one pill per day; the pills are stored in an *393ordinary pill bottle, and his prescription is refilled every 90 days. Id. Ever since he began treatment, Roe's "viral load"-the number of copies of the HIV virus per milliliter of his blood-has registered as "undetectable."7 Id. ¶¶ 51, 59. He alleges that because of his successful treatment, he remains physically and mentally capable of continuing to serve in the Air Force. See id. ¶¶ 72-75.
Because Roe had tested positive for HIV, Air Force regulations required that he "undergo [a] medical evaluation for the purpose of determining [his] status for continued military service." Air Force Instruction ("AFI") 44-178, § 2.4, at A298-99.8 In late November 2017, he received a Duty Limiting Condition Report restricting his deployability pending a Medical Evaluation Board's ("MEB") determination of his fitness for duty. A568. The MEB was convened in January 2018. A554. Roe's commanding officer submitted an impact statement to the MEB affirming that despite Roe's diagnosis, he could "perform all duties without work-arounds, restrictions or limitations." A556. The commanding officer's recommendation was unambiguous: "[Roe] is a valued team member. Recommend retention." A557. The commanding officer made clear that his recommendation would not change even if Roe were to be put on an assignment limitation code that could restrict his deployability. Id. Several other servicemembers likewise submitted letters on Roe's behalf. A562-66. Also before the MEB was a physician assistant's report prepared in January 2018 after a physical examination of Roe. The physician assistant wrote that although Roe would require ongoing antiretroviral treatment, he was asymptomatic and complication-free. A586-88. In response to a question asking whether "any of [Roe's] HIV-related illnesses or complications affect his ... ability to work," the physician assistant selected "No." A588. An earlier report by an Air Force physician, also part of the record before the MEB, recommended that Roe be returned to active duty. A574.
The MEB did not order Roe retained and returned to duty. Instead, it opted to refer Roe's case to an Informal Physical Evaluation Board ("IPEB"). A554. The IPEB issued its findings and recommendation on February 22, 2018. A549. Although the IPEB's report "acknowledge[d] the commander's recommendation for retention and statement that [Roe] is able to perform his daily in-garrison duties," it also asserted that Roe's condition "is subject to sudden and unpredictable progression"9 and would "result in deployment restrictions that prevent him from being fully worldwide qualified." A550. As a result, the IPEB concluded that Roe's HIV status was "unfitting" and "[in]compatible with the fundamental expectations of military service." Id. The IPEB recommended that Roe be discharged from the Air Force. A549.
Roe appealed the IPEB's decision to the Formal Physical Evaluation Board ("FPEB"). Compl. ¶ 65. As part of the formal record of his appeal, Roe submitted a letter from the director of the HIV
*394medical evaluation unit and infectious disease service at a military medical center. In the letter, the director opined that Roe "has no physical limitation that would prevent him from conducting his duties" and recommended that he be returned to active duty. A484. Roe also submitted letters from fellow servicemembers in support of his retention, a recent fitness report reflecting good scores, and commendations he had received during his time in service. See A482-548. A formal hearing was held before the FPEB in early April 2018. A481. The hearing lasted less than 30 minutes, and the FPEB affirmed the IPEB's decision roughly three hours later. Compl. ¶¶ 66-67. The FPEB, like the IPEB before it, recognized that Roe was successfully being treated and was asymptomatic. A481.
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Leonie M. Brinkema, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Richard Roe ("Roe") and Victor Voe ("Voe")1 are members of the United States Air Force who have been diagnosed with the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") and who face imminent separation from service. Roe and Voe-together with plaintiff OutServe-SLDN, Inc. ("OutServe"), an organization representing the interests of veterans, active-duty servicemembers, and civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense ("DoD") who are LGBTQ+ or HIV positive-bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the DoD. Plaintiffs' complaint contains five counts. Count I, asserted against all defendants, alleges that defendants' policies with respect to the deployment and separation of HIV-positive servicemembers, on their face and as applied to Roe and Voe, violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Counts II and III, which are asserted only against the Secretary of the Air Force, *392allege that the decisions to separate Roe and Voe were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Finally, Counts IV and V allege that several of defendants' policies "are based on outdated thinking that does not comport with the current state of HIV medical science" and that defendants' failure to update those policies amounts to an independent violation of the APA.2
Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary injunction preventing Roe and Voe, along with similarly situated servicemembers, from being discharged3 because of deployment restrictions due to their HIV status. Plaintiffs argue that injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the status quo pending final disposition of their constitutional and administrative law claims. Defendants oppose plaintiffs' motion and have moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that plaintiffs' claims are premature and nonjusticiable; that plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief; and that the scope of any relief granted must be limited to Roe and Voe.4 The parties have fully briefed and argued their motions.5 For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied, and plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 6
1. Richard Roe
Roe enlisted in the Air Force in 2012. Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief [Dkt. No. 1] ("Compl.") ¶ 57. He enjoyed early signs of success, including being promoted to Senior Airman ahead of schedule and successfully testing for Staff Sergeant, a noncommissioned officer rank, on his first try. Id. ¶ 58. Roe hoped to make the Air Force his lifelong career and one day commission as an officer. Id. ¶ 74.
Roe's upward trajectory was halted in October 2017, when he was diagnosed with HIV while on active duty. Compl. ¶ 59. He began antiretroviral treatment immediately. Id. That treatment requires him to take one pill per day; the pills are stored in an *393ordinary pill bottle, and his prescription is refilled every 90 days. Id. Ever since he began treatment, Roe's "viral load"-the number of copies of the HIV virus per milliliter of his blood-has registered as "undetectable."7 Id. ¶¶ 51, 59. He alleges that because of his successful treatment, he remains physically and mentally capable of continuing to serve in the Air Force. See id. ¶¶ 72-75.
Because Roe had tested positive for HIV, Air Force regulations required that he "undergo [a] medical evaluation for the purpose of determining [his] status for continued military service." Air Force Instruction ("AFI") 44-178, § 2.4, at A298-99.8 In late November 2017, he received a Duty Limiting Condition Report restricting his deployability pending a Medical Evaluation Board's ("MEB") determination of his fitness for duty. A568. The MEB was convened in January 2018. A554. Roe's commanding officer submitted an impact statement to the MEB affirming that despite Roe's diagnosis, he could "perform all duties without work-arounds, restrictions or limitations." A556. The commanding officer's recommendation was unambiguous: "[Roe] is a valued team member. Recommend retention." A557. The commanding officer made clear that his recommendation would not change even if Roe were to be put on an assignment limitation code that could restrict his deployability. Id. Several other servicemembers likewise submitted letters on Roe's behalf. A562-66. Also before the MEB was a physician assistant's report prepared in January 2018 after a physical examination of Roe. The physician assistant wrote that although Roe would require ongoing antiretroviral treatment, he was asymptomatic and complication-free. A586-88. In response to a question asking whether "any of [Roe's] HIV-related illnesses or complications affect his ... ability to work," the physician assistant selected "No." A588. An earlier report by an Air Force physician, also part of the record before the MEB, recommended that Roe be returned to active duty. A574.
The MEB did not order Roe retained and returned to duty. Instead, it opted to refer Roe's case to an Informal Physical Evaluation Board ("IPEB"). A554. The IPEB issued its findings and recommendation on February 22, 2018. A549. Although the IPEB's report "acknowledge[d] the commander's recommendation for retention and statement that [Roe] is able to perform his daily in-garrison duties," it also asserted that Roe's condition "is subject to sudden and unpredictable progression"9 and would "result in deployment restrictions that prevent him from being fully worldwide qualified." A550. As a result, the IPEB concluded that Roe's HIV status was "unfitting" and "[in]compatible with the fundamental expectations of military service." Id. The IPEB recommended that Roe be discharged from the Air Force. A549.
Roe appealed the IPEB's decision to the Formal Physical Evaluation Board ("FPEB"). Compl. ¶ 65. As part of the formal record of his appeal, Roe submitted a letter from the director of the HIV
*394medical evaluation unit and infectious disease service at a military medical center. In the letter, the director opined that Roe "has no physical limitation that would prevent him from conducting his duties" and recommended that he be returned to active duty. A484. Roe also submitted letters from fellow servicemembers in support of his retention, a recent fitness report reflecting good scores, and commendations he had received during his time in service. See A482-548. A formal hearing was held before the FPEB in early April 2018. A481. The hearing lasted less than 30 minutes, and the FPEB affirmed the IPEB's decision roughly three hours later. Compl. ¶¶ 66-67. The FPEB, like the IPEB before it, recognized that Roe was successfully being treated and was asymptomatic. A481. It also acknowledged the commanding officer's recommendation that Roe be retained as well as Roe's "record of performance during his five years of military service and the numerous letters of support for his retention." Id. Nonetheless, the FPEB stated that under military regulations, Roe's HIV status was "disqualifying for deployment" to the Central Command ("CENTCOM") area of responsibility,10 which "would have [a] significant effect on his career progression and place [an] increased burden on others within his career field." Id. Accordingly, the FPEB concluded that Roe's condition "is unfitting for continued military service" and reaffirmed that he should be discharged. A480-81 (emphasis in original).
Roe appealed the FPEB's findings and recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force, arguing that his condition "is simple to manage and does not place an undue burden on the Air Force." A471. He also argued that the FPEB's analysis was inconsistent with applicable Air Force regulations, which provide that "HIV seropositivity alone is not grounds for medical separation" and that HIV-positive servicemembers "who are able to perform the duties of their office, grade, rank and/or rating ... may not be separated solely on the basis of laboratory evidence of HIV infection."11 Id. Finally, he challenged the assertion that his condition rendered him nondeployable, asserting that under the applicable regulations, HIV renders a servicemember nondeployable only "with the presence of progressive clinical illness or immunological deficiency"12 -both of which he claimed were absent in his case. A471-72. Counsel was also appointed to represent Roe before the Secretary. Roe's counsel argued that the IPEB and the FPEB were "feign[ing] fealty to the DoD (and by extension Air Force) policy on retaining HIV [-] infected members, but us[ing] the bludgeon of world-wide qualification to effectively bash the policy aside." A465.
The deputy director of the Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council ("SAFPC"), acting on authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force, rejected Roe's appeal on November 7, 2018. The decision, which refers to Roe as "the member," states in relevant part:
[Roe's] case was considered by the Air Force Personnel Board (AFPB), which made a recommendation regarding its disposition. The following rationale is provided for the final decision in this *395case. The Board considered the member's contention that he is fit and should be returned to duty. The Board noted the member has been compliant with all treatment, is currently asymptomatic, and has an undetectable [HIV] viral load. Additionally, he is able to perform all in[-]garrison duties, has passed his most recent fitness assessment without any component exemptions, and his commander strongly supports his retention. However, the Board noted the member's condition precludes him from being able to deploy world-wide without a waiver and renders him ineligible for deployment to the [CENTCOM] Area..., where the majority of Air Force members are expected to deploy. Deployability is a key factor in determining fitness for duty and the Board recognized the member belongs to a career field with a comparatively high deployment rate/tempo. Therefore, based on his inability to deploy and considering his current career point, the Board determined he is unfit for continued military service and shall be discharged with severance pay.
A460. Roe was advised that he had the "right to pursue further appeal" by applying to the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records ("AFBCMR"). A462. He has not done so.
Roe is scheduled to be discharged from the Air Force on March 28, 2019. Pls.' Memo. Ex. A [Dkt. No. 44] ¶ 7. His term of service had been set to expire in mid-2018 but was twice extended as he underwent the medical evaluation and administrative appeals process. Compl. ¶ 74. But for his impending discharge date, Roe's term of service (considering the extensions he received) would have expired on June 25, 2019. Pls.' Memo. Ex. A [Dkt. No. 44] ¶ 6. He alleges that he intended to reenlist for an additional term of service but was prevented from doing so because of the separation process. Id.
2. Victor Voe
Voe enlisted in the Air Force in 2011. Compl. ¶ 77. He has served in several countries overseas and in 2014 was deployed to the Middle East. Id. ¶ 78. Like Roe, Voe is dedicated to service in the Air Force. Indeed, after his first period of service in the Middle East, Voe voluntarily cut short the "dwell time" between deployments so that he could return for a second tour ahead of schedule. Id.
Voe was diagnosed with HIV in March 2017. Compl. ¶ 79. He immediately began antiretroviral treatment, and since August 2017 his viral load has remained undetectable. Id. Voe takes two pills, at the same time, per day; those pills are stored in ordinary pill bottles and are refilled every 90 days. Id. ¶ 80. Voe claims that because of the treatment, he is asymptomatic and wishes to continue serving.
After his diagnosis, Voe's case proceeded in lockstep with Roe's. Voe's deployability was restricted, and his case was referred to an MEB for initial evaluation. See A768. Voe's commanding officer prepared an impact statement for the MEB in which she stated that Voe was "fully capable of performing any activity/function" necessary for his career field. A763. The commanding officer endorsed Voe unreservedly: "Member superiorly performs all primary duties and has also volunteered with enthusiasm for several on/off base organizations/ function[s]. He is overall a valuable [Air Force] asset. Retain." A764. The commanding officer indicated that her recommendation would not change even if Voe were to be placed on an assignment limitation code that could limit his deployability. Id.
The MEB found that Voe's HIV status made his "qualifications ... for worldwide duty questionable" and referred his case to *396an IPEB. A761. The IPEB acknowledged the recommendation of Voe's commanding officer but found that Voe's
medical condition prevents him from reasonably performing the duties of his office, grade, rank or rating; represents a medical risk to the health of [Voe] or the health/safety of others with continued service; is subject to progression; requires frequent follow-up with a medical specialist; and limits [Voe's] ability to meet mobility requirements.
A758.13 Accordingly, the IPEB concluded that Voe's condition was "unfitting" and "incompatible with the rigors of military service" and recommended that he be discharged. A757-58.
Voe appealed to an FPEB. His formal hearing before the FPEB lasted only twenty minutes. Compl. ¶ 84. Less than an hour after the hearing had concluded, the FPEB affirmed the IPEB's recommendation that Voe be discharged. Id. The FPEB acknowledged that Voe's "condition is welled [sic] controlled" and that he was asymptomatic. A756. But the FPEB found that because Voe would need "frequent follow-up[s] with a specialist"14 and had been classified as nondeployable, his HIV condition made him "unfitting for continued military service." Id. (emphasis in original).
Voe appealed to the SAFPC, which (acting on authority delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force) rejected the appeal on November 7, 2018-the same day Roe's appeal was rejected.15 A748. The reasons given for denying Voe's appeal were identical to those provided in Roe's case:
[Voe's] case was considered by the Air Force Personnel Board (AFPB), which made a recommendation regarding its disposition. The following rationale is provided for the final decision in this case. The Board considered the member's contention that he is fit and should be returned to duty. The Board noted the member has been compliant with all treatment, is currently asymptomatic, and has an undetectable [HIV] viral load. Additionally, he is able to perform all in[-]garrison duties, has passed his most recent fitness assessment without any component exemptions, and his commander strongly supports his retention. However, the Board noted the member's condition precludes him from being able to deploy world-wide without a waiver and renders him ineligible for deployment to the [CENTCOM] Area ..., where the majority of Air Force members are expected to deploy. Deployability is a key factor in determining fitness for duty and the Board recognized the member belongs to a career field with a comparatively high deployment rate/tempo. Therefore, based on his inability to deploy and considering his current career point, the Board determined he is unfit for continued military service and shall be discharged with severance pay.
A747. Voe was advised of the right to appeal to the AFBCMR, A749, but has not done so.
Voe's term of service was set to expire in early 2018 but was extended during the *397pendency of his physical evaluation and administrative appeals process. Compl. ¶ 88. Voe has been unable to apply for reenlistment for another term of service, id., and is set to be discharged from the Air Force on February 25, 2019, Pls.' Memo. Ex. B [Dkt. No. 44-7] ¶¶ 20-21. But for Voe's impending discharge, his term of service (taking into account the extensions he received) would extend until June 2019. Id. ¶ 20.
3. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
HIV epidemiology has undergone drastic changes since the disease first came to the public's attention in the 1980s. Compl. ¶ 49. The first sea change involved the means of treatment. Beginning in the mid-1990s, antiretroviral medications were developed that, if taken consistently, can effectively reduce a patient's viral load to zero. Id. ¶¶ 50-51. Those medications have negligible side effects and can prevent the type of immunological deficiencies and opportunistic infections typically associated with HIV and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). Id. ¶¶ 51-52. HIV remains incurable but is no longer a death sentence. When diagnosed promptly and treated appropriately, it "is a chronic, manageable condition" that does not substantially reduce a person's life expectancy. Id. ¶ 53.
Another major development in the science and study of HIV relates to methods of transmission. HIV is not as easily transmitted as many people believe. For example, the highest-risk sexual activity-engaging in an act of receptive anal sex with an untreated HIV-positive person without using a condom or other means of prophylaxis-carries a risk of transmission of only 1.38%. Compl. ¶ 54. Other sexual activities pose transmission risks ranging from 0% to 0.08%. Id. Apart from sexual activities, only sharing needles, blood transfusions, and perinatal exposure pose a noneligible risk of transmission. Id. ¶ 55. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), HIV transmission through other means such as biting or accidental contact with bodily fluids "is technically possible but unlikely and not well documented." Id. Moreover, when an individual's viral load has been effectively suppressed by antiretroviral treatment, the risk of transmission is essentially reduced to zero. Id. ¶¶ 54-55.
B. Regulatory and Administrative Background
An intricate web of regulations, policies, and procedures govern the Armed Forces's treatment of servicemembers diagnosed with HIV. Understanding how those sources interact is crucial to analyzing the parties' arguments in this litigation.
1. DoD Regulations
Department of Defense Instruction ("DoDI") 6490.07 is designed to ensure that servicemembers "are medically able to accomplish their duties in deployed environments." DoDI 6490.07, § 1, at A87. The instruction sets out standards governing under what circumstances a medical condition will restrict a servicemember's deployability:
DoD personnel with existing medical conditions may deploy ... if all of these conditions are met:
(1) The condition is not of such a nature or duration that an unexpected worsening or physical trauma is likely to have a grave medical outcome or negative impact on mission execution.
(2) The condition is stable and reasonably anticipated by the pre-deployment medical evaluator not to worsen during the deployment in light of physical, *398physiological, psychological, and nutritional effects of the duties and location.
(3) Any required, ongoing health care or medications anticipated to be needed for the duration of the deployment are available in theater within the Military Health System. Medication must have no special handling, storage, or other requirements (e.g., refrigeration, cold chain, or electrical power requirements). Medication must be well tolerated within harsh environmental conditions (e.g. heat or cold stress, sunlight) and should not cause significant side effects in the setting of moderate dehydration.
(4) There is no need for routine evacuation out of theater for continuing diagnostics or other evaluations. (All such evaluations should be accomplished before deployment.) ...
Id. § 4(b), at A89. A trained healthcare provider, in assessing whether a servicemember is deployable under these guidelines, must consider whether the condition "would put the individual at increased risk of injury or illness" or would be "likely to significantly worsen in the deployed environment." Id. enclosure 2, § 2, at A93.
DoDI 6490.07 also identifies certain medical conditions that categorically prevent individuals from deploying unless a waiver is granted. DoDI 6490.07, § 4(c), at A89. The listed conditions are divided into several types, including those that affect a servicemember's ability to receive immunizations or wear protective equipment, id. enclosure 3, § a, at A96; those that would require ongoing care or impair duty performance in a manner inconsistent with the nature or duration of the deployment, id. § b, at A96-97; those that cause sudden incapacitation, id. § c, at A97; pulmonary, sensory, cardiovascular, and mental-health disorders, id. §§ d, f-h, at A97-98; and infectious diseases, which are defined to include "[a]ctive tuberculosis or known blood-borne diseases that may be transmitted to others in a deployed environment" and "[a] diagnosis of human immunodeficiency (HIV) antibody positive with the presence of progressive clinical illness or immunological deficiency." Id. § e, at A97.
DoDI 6485.01 establishes the DoD's policies and procedures for "the identification, surveillance, and management of members of the Military Services infected with HIV." DoDI 6485.01, § 1, at A79. HIV-positive individuals are ineligible "for appointment, enlistment, pre-appointment, or initial entry training for military service." Id. § 3(a). Each military department must screen servicemembers periodically for evidence of HIV infection. Id. § 3(b). Active-duty servicemembers who test positive for HIV must be "referred for appropriate treatment and a medical evaluation of fitness for continued service in the same manner as a Service member with other chronic or progressive illnesses," and anyone "determined to be fit for duty will be allowed to serve in a manner that ensures access to appropriate medical care." Id. enclosure 3, § 2(c), at A85. Those found to be unfit for duty must be "separated or retired" pursuant to the Disability Evaluation System ("DES"). See id. § 2(e).
DoDI 1332.18 governs the DES, which is a multilevel system under the supervision of the secretary of each of the military departments. DoDI 1332.18, enclosure 3, § 1(a), at A15. The DES comprises (i) the MEB, a board of two or more physicians responsible for reviewing "all available medical evidence" and referring servicemembers with conditions "that will prevent them from reasonably performing the duties of their office, grade, rank, or rating" to the physical evaluation board process, id. § 2(a)-(b), (d), at A16; (ii) the IPEB, which is composed of two to three military personnel and which is responsible *399for making "initial findings and recommendations," id. § 3(a)-(b), (d)(1), at A18-19; and (iii) the FPEB, which is composed of (at minimum) a military officer, a medical officer, and a line officer, and which is responsible for conducting a formal hearing16 in the event a servicemember challenges the IPEB's determinations, id. § 3(c), (d)(2). The instruction also requires each military department to provide appellate review of the FPEB's findings and recommendation. Id. § 3(l ), at A21.
Finally, DoDI 1332.45-sometimes referred to as the "deploy or get out," or "DOGO," instruction,17 e.g., Compl. ¶ 41-establishes the Armed Forces-wide policy that "[t]o maximize the lethality and readiness of the joint force, all Service members are expected to be deployable." DoDI 1332.45, § 1.2(a), at A62. Servicemembers who are deemed nondeployable for more than 12 consecutive months will be evaluated for retention, referral into the DES, or processing for administrative separation. Id. § 1.2(b). DoDI 1332.45 tempers this seemingly categorical rule in several ways. It gives the secretary of each military department the discretion to retain nondeployable servicemembers if doing so is found to be "in the best interest of the Military Service." Id. § 2.4(b)(1), at A64.18 Additionally, "Service members with a medical condition that requires additional medical screening, or Combatant Command approval prior to deployment outside the continental United States, will be categorized as Deployable with Limitations." Id. § 3.3, at A66. Medical conditions triggering the "deployable with limitations" classification include those "referred to in DoDI 6490.07," id.-which, as discussed above, identifies conditions, including HIV under certain circumstances, that preclude deployment without a waiver.19
2. Air Force Regulations
Each military department has its own set of regulations and policies with respect to the treatment of HIV-positive servicemembers. The Air Force's main policy is set out in AFI 44-178, which implements DoDI 6485.01 with respect to the "identification, surveillance, and administration" of Air Force members diagnosed with HIV. A294. HIV-positive individuals may not enlist in the Air Force. AFI 44-178, § 2.2.1, at A298. Active-duty servicemembers who *400contract HIV after enlisting "must undergo medical evaluation for the purpose of determining status for continued military service." Id. § 2.4. Testing positive for HIV does not automatically trigger discharge: "HIV seropositivity alone is not grounds for medical separation or retirement." Id. § 2.4.1, at A299. But servicemembers living with HIV are limited to assignment within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or Puerto Rico, and may not be deployed beyond those territorial limits absent a waiver. See id. § 2.4.2.
Attachment 9 to AFI 44-178 sets out the Air Force's policy on the retention or separation of servicemembers diagnosed with HIV. It echoes the instruction's clear mandate, providing that servicemembers "who are able to perform the duties of their office, grade, rank and/or rating ... may not be separated solely on the basis of laboratory evidence of HIV infection." Id. § A9.1.1, at A329. Instead, HIV-positive servicemembers are evaluated for retention or separation in accordance with the Air Force's DES. See id. § A9.2.1. Those who are retained are given an appropriate assignment limitation code and are returned to duty. Id. § A9.1.2.
The Air Force has released additional guidance documents on the treatment of HIV-positive servicemembers. For years, "nearly all cases of asymptomatic HIV resulted in a return to duty." A416. That changed in 2017, when the Air Force issued a memorandum stating that any asymptomatic HIV-positive servicemember would be medically evaluated and possibly referred to the DES. A341. The memorandum reiterates AFI 44-178's policy that "[a]symptomatic HIV alone is not unfitting for continued service." Id. The Air Force reaffirmed that policy in a memorandum issued in June 2018, A338, and provided that all HIV-positive members would be evaluated for continued service in the same manner "as any Airman with a chronic and/or progressive disease," id. Under the terms of the 2018 memorandum, no servicemember may be referred into the DES unless specific criteria are met. Id. Those criteria are set out in DoDI 1332.18:
[M]edical authorities will refer eligible Service members into the DES who:
(1) Have one or more medical conditions that may, individually or collectively, prevent the Service member from reasonably performing the duties of their office, grade, rank, or rating ...;
(2) Have a medical condition that represents an obvious medical risk to the health of the member or the health or safety of other members; or
(3) Have a medical condition that imposes unreasonable requirements on the military to maintain or protect the Service member.
DoDI 1332.18, enclosure 3, app. 1, § 2(a), at A26. Most recently, in September 2018, the Air Force reemphasized that servicemembers with asymptomatic HIV are to be "retained or separated on a case by case basis" based on the factors listed in DoDI 1332.18. A339.
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. First, they argue that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering this lawsuit premature. Second, they contend that plaintiffs' claims raise nonjusticiable questions of military policymaking committed solely to the discretion of the executive branch. Finally, they argue that the plaintiffs lack standing to seek relief.
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an action must be dismissed if the court lacks subject *401matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, as the party asserting jurisdiction, bears the ultimate burden of proving such jurisdiction. Adams v. Bain,
A. Exhaustion of Remedies
Defendants first argue that in failing to appeal to the AFBCMR before filing their complaint, plaintiffs have attempted to "bypass" intraservice remedies "to obtain premature review in federal court." Defs.' Memo. & Opp'n 7. Generally, plaintiffs seeking to challenge military policy or decisions must exhaust "available intraservice corrective measures." Williams v. Wilson,
At the outset, it must be emphasized that defendants do not rely on an explicit statutory exhaustion requirement.20 Instead, they rely on a judge-made *402doctrine developed in response to the unique nature of claims involving military policy. That distinction is significant. Where Congress has adopted an explicit exhaustion regime, courts may not "add unwritten limits onto the[ ] rigorous textual requirements." Ross v. Blake, --- U.S. ----,
Although defendants cite several cases to support their exhaustion argument, plaintiffs correctly point out that those cases are distinguishable insofar as they involved parties who sought access to federal court at the first sign of disagreement with a military decision. See Guerra v. Scruggs,
Those concerns are diminished to the vanishing point in this case. Roe and Voe did not seek judicial review without having given the Air Force a meaningful opportunity to examine its policies and decisions. To the contrary, they presented their claims to a complex, tiered administrative review process-one that involved medical evaluations, written submissions, and formal hearings-culminating in an extensive administrative record and final written decisions by the SAFPC. See A460 ("The following rationale is provided for the final decision in this case."); A747 (same); see also AFI 36-3212, §§ 5.1-.9 (setting out procedures for the SAFPC's "final review and disposition" of a servicemember's appeal (capitalization altered) ). Indeed, an official whose affidavit defendants submitted characterized the SAFPC "as the decision authority for a wide array of personnel decisions made by the Air Force" and "as, effectively, the final appeal authority for Airmen evaluated by the DES prior to their separation from Active Duty." A420. Thus, Roe and Voe substantially exhausted the administrative review mechanisms available to them, a fact which undercuts defendants' argument that this lawsuit is premature.
*403Although Roe and Voe stopped short of applying to the AFBCMR, plaintiffs have persuasively demonstrated that requiring appeals to the AFBCMR as a prerequisite to pursuing this lawsuit would be inappropriate. First, the AFBCMR's ambit is relatively limited; it serves to interpret "the content and effect of military regulations" and decide "whether [a] military tribunal's decision was in error or unjust." Navas v. Gonzalez Vales,
Additional considerations weigh in favor of excusing Roe and Voe from having to appeal to the AFBCMR before proceeding in federal court. Parties may be exempt from judicially imposed exhaustion requirements upon showings of futility or irreparable injury. See McDonald v. Centra, Inc.,
Further, under Air Force regulations, the AFBCMR may only issue nonbinding recommendations, AFI 36-2603, §§ 2.1, 4.10, and it is the Secretary of the Air Force (or her designee) who must decide whether to act, see
Finally, an appeal to the AFBCMR may take as long as 18 months, see
Deciding whether exhaustion is required is a matter of discretion. It requires a careful balancing between respect for internal administrative decisionmaking processes on the one hand and an individual's ability to protect his rights in federal court on the other. Under the circumstances of this case, no further exhaustion of intraservice remedies is required.
B. Military Controversy
Defendants next argue that plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed for failure to present a justiciable controversy. Defendants contend that under the balancing framework established by the Fifth Circuit in Mindes,
"The military is a specialized society separate from civil society with laws and traditions of its own [developed] during its long history." Schlesinger v. Councilman,
*405To accommodate this tension between deference and judicial review, courts developed a balancing framework designed to capture under what circumstances it is appropriate to adjudicate claims related to military policies. Under that framework, the court must first be satisfied that the plaintiff has appropriately exhausted intraservice remedies and has alleged a violation of the Constitution, applicable statutes, or military regulations. Mindes,
1. The nature and strength of the plaintiff's challenge to the military determination....
2. The potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused.
3. The type and degree of anticipated interference with the military function. Interference per se is insufficient since there will always be some interference when review is granted, but if the interference would be such as to seriously impede the military in the performance of vital duties, it militates strongly against relief.
4. The extent to which the exercise of military expertise or discretion is involved. Courts should defer to the superior knowledge and experience of professionals in matters such as promotions or orders directly related to specific military functions.
Guerra,
To begin, it is unclear whether the Mindes balancing test remains good law. In a recent decision, a panel of the Fourth Circuit called its viability into question. See Aikens v. Ingram,
Nonetheless, even assuming the Mindes test remains good law and applies to this dispute,24 it does not require dismissal *406here. To be sure, whether a servicemember is fit for continued military service is a question that implicates military discretion, and one in which courts have little expertise. Yet other factors weigh heavily in favor of finding this dispute to be justiciable. For one, plaintiffs' claims are not weak. At this preliminary stage, they have made a strong showing that defendants' policies are irrational, based on a flawed understanding of HIV epidemiology, and inconsistently applied. Although Roe and Voe advance as-applied claims limited to the application of the military's polices in their cases, they (along with OutServe) also seek relief on behalf of a broader class of HIV-positive servicemembers, all of whom are now confronted with the polices that plaintiffs claim are unlawful. The far-reaching nature of these claims surely counsels in favor of judicial review. For the reasons explained below, plaintiffs have also made a strong demonstration that they face imminent, serious cognizable injuries because of defendants' policies. This is not one servicemember's protest of a technical glitch in the military's decisionmaking process; it is a challenge claiming that HIV-positive servicemembers, who wish to serve their country on equal terms with others, are being irrationally and arbitrarily swept from the ranks. Finally, the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that they have not been evaluated in the personalized, case-by-case manner guaranteed by the applicable regulations, but rather face discharge because of an untailored determination that they are not deployable beyond the continental United States. By requesting only that military decisionmakers evaluate whether they are fit for service with more careful attention to their individual characteristics, plaintiffs give significant breathing space to "the exercise of military expertise [and] discretion," Guerra,
C. Standing
The federal judicial power extends only to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must have standing-that is, he must have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Warth v. Seldin,
*407The test for Article III standing is well established:
Th[e] "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing requires: (1) that the plaintiff have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) that it will be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Bennett v. Spear,
Defendants' argument that plaintiffs lack standing is, as is often the case, a matter of characterization. In their view, the Article III injury on which plaintiffs rely is that "they have been prevented from continuing to serve in the Air Force." Defs.' Memo. & Opp'n 14. Defendants argue that because "Roe and Voe have both completed their terms of enlistment," both would have to reenlist to continue to serve. Id. at 11, 14. They conclude that this is fatal to plaintiffs' standing, both in terms of injury-in-fact and redressability, because there is no guaranteed right to reenlist in the Air Force and because reenlistment "is a separate process independent of both the medical evaluation and the underlying regulations challenged by" plaintiffs. Id. at 14-15. Plaintiffs label this argument a "Catch-22," arguing that Roe's and Voe's "terms have expired only because Defendants' illegal policies forced them into the medical discharge process and prevented them from reenlisting." Pls.' Opp'n & Reply 15.25
The key fact with respect to Roe's and Voe's standing to sue is that although their terms of service were originally set to expire in 2018, they were extended through June 2019. Compl. ¶¶ 74, 88; see Pls.' Memo. Ex. A [Dkt. No. 44] ¶¶ 6-7; id. Ex. B [Dkt. No. 44-7] ¶¶ 20-21. But as a result of defendants' policies, Voe and Roe are now set to be discharged on February 25 and March 29, 2019, respectively. That both named plaintiffs will be separated-and thus deprived of the economic, medical, and nonpecuniary benefits associated with active-duty service-earlier than as provided by the extensions they received amounts to classic injury-in-fact sufficient to support Article III standing.
Although it is true that if the Court were to grant Roe and Voe the relief they seek,26 they could conceivably *408again be ordered discharged for different reasons, that remote possibility does not make their injuries nonredressable. The burden imposed by the redressability requirement "is not onerous," and "[p]laintiffs need not show that a favorable decision will relieve [their] every injury." Deal v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
Additionally, even if defendants were correct that the expiration of Roe's and Voe's terms of service deprives them of standing, defendants' argument would still fail because OutServe has standing separate from and independent of the named plaintiffs. Although OutServe does not allege any injury to itself qua institutional entity, it may
bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n,
Defendants concede that OutServe meets the requirements for associational standing but argue that because the complaint contains allegations only about Roe and Voe, OutServe's standing must be coterminous with Roe's and Voe's. Defs.' Memo. & Opp'n 16. Yet OutServe has identified several additional members who face imminent separation for similar reasons as Roe and Voe but whose terms of service have not yet expired. Pls.' Opp'n & Reply 17; see Pls.' Memo. Ex. C [Dkt. No. 40] ¶¶ 8-27.
Defendants protest that those OutServe members are not mentioned in the complaint, arguing that "parties cannot amend their complaints through briefing or oral advocacy." Defs.' Memo. & Opp'n 16 n.5 (quoting S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC,
In sum, plaintiffs filed a timely lawsuit after Roe and Voe, and others like them, had proceeded through a lengthy administrative appeals process culminating in a final decision on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force; plaintiffs' claims present a justiciable controversy subject to judicial review; and both the named plaintiffs and OutServe have a sufficient Article III stake in the outcome of this litigation to advance those claims. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) will be denied.
III. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Having resolved defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court now turns to plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction preventing Roe and Voe, along with other similarly situated servicemembers, from being separated because of their HIV status. "A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy intended to protect the status quo and prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit." Di Biase v. SPX Corp.,
In light of the "strong judicial policy against interfering with the internal affairs of the armed forces," courts have generally held that "military discharge proceedings should be enjoined only in exceptional circumstances." Chilcott v. Orr,
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits of at least one claim. Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co.,
1. Standards of Review
Count I of plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the decisions to order Roe and Voe discharged, along with the policies that produced those decisions, violate their right to equal protection. "[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' " Schneider v. Rusk,
The right to equal protection under the law serves "to secure every person ... against intentional and arbitrary discrimination." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,
*411Counts II and III of the complaint invoke the judicial review provisions of the APA, which authorize courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions" determined to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
The standards governing Counts I, II, and III substantially overlap because "rational-basis [r]eview of an equal protection claim in the context of agency action is similar to that under the APA." Cooper Hosp./Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Burwell,
*412Goldman v. Weinberger,
2. Analysis
Plaintiffs have challenged the determinations, made as part of the Air Force's retention and disability evaluation system, that Roe and Voe should be separated from service. Those discharge determinations were entirely dependent on the antecedent findings that Roe and Voe were subject to deployment restrictions. Defendants have recognized as much, arguing that Roe and Voe are to be discharged not because they are HIV positive, but rather because their condition makes them ineligible for deployment to an area of operation where servicemembers of their rank and responsibilities are frequently deployed. The deployment policy is thus the driving factor and must be analyzed first.
i. The Deployment Policy
DoDI 6490.07 is the Armed Forces-wide instruction intended to provide "baseline guidance on medical deployability for the DoD." See A424. It states that a servicemember is not subject to deployment restrictions so long as his medical condition is stable, not subject to sudden worsening, not reliant on medication with special handling or storage requirements, and not dependent on routine evacuation for ongoing treatment or evaluation. DoDI 6490.07, § 4(b), at A89. Roe and Voe appear to satisfy all of section 4(b)'s requirements. Defendants do not contest, and no evidence in the record contradicts, plaintiffs' assertions that Roe and Voe are asymptomatic and that their viral loads are suppressed, meaning that their conditions are stable and not subject to sudden worsening so long as they maintain their course of treatment. Although they require daily medication, there is no evidence in the record contradicting plaintiffs' description of that medication as requiring "no special handling, storage, or other requirements" and causing no "significant side effects,"
Section 4(c) of the instruction identifies certain conditions that bar a servicemember from deploying without a waiver. DoDI 6490.07, § 4(c), at A89. Although HIV is listed, the instruction provides the caveat that a waiver is required for HIV only "with the presence of progressive *413clinical illness or immunological deficiency."
The Court recognizes that an altogether different standard governs deployment to CENTCOM, the "theater-level Unified Combatant Command with responsibility for military operations across North Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East." A423. Under Modification Thirteen to USCENTCOM Individual Protection and Individual-Unit Deployment Policy ("MOD 13"), "[c]onfirmed HIV infection is disqualifying for deployment." See A425. Kevin Cron ("Cron"), CENTCOM's primary waiver action officer, submitted a declaration in support of defendants stating that servicemembers who deploy to CENTCOM "must be medically, dentally and psychologically fit" and cannot have medical conditions "requiring highly specialized medical personnel, treatments, or medications." A424-25. Otherwise disqualified servicemembers may deploy to CENTCOM if they secure a waiver; however, Cron has "n[ever] granted a deployment waiver for a[n] HIV-positive Service member," having concluded in every case "that the risks of deploying a[n] HIV-positive Service member were too great to justify waiver approval." A426-27 ("It is highly unlikely that either ... Roe or Voe would be granted a waiver to deploy to the CENTCOM [area]."). In essence, then, the rule that prohibits HIV-positive servicemembers from deploying to CENTCOM is a categorical one. See A460 (the SAFPC stating that being HIV positive "precludes [a servicemember] from being able to deploy world-wide without a waiver and renders him ineligible for deployment to [CENTCOM]" (emphasis added) ).
This rule fails to pass muster under even the most deferential form of scrutiny. Because of advances in medicine and science, HIV is no longer a progressive, terminal illness. A study published in 2015 in a peer-reviewed journal under the auspices of the DoD recognized as much, finding that HIV "has gone from an untreatable disease marked by inexorable clinical progression through extreme debility to death to a treatable disease"-one "that is compatible with active service throughout a full career in the U.S. military." Pls.' Memo. 14 (quoting John F. Brundage et al., Durations of Military Service After Diagnoses of HIV-1 Infections Among Active Component Members of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1990-2013, 22 Med. Surveillance Monthly Rep. 9, 12 (2015) ). It is thus unsurprising that until very recently, "nearly all cases of asymptomatic HIV resulted in a return to duty." A416. Roe and Voe are cases in point: Their commanding officers have unreservedly supported their retention, stating that despite being HIV positive they are physically and mentally capable of performing all duties required of them.
To be sure, HIV remains incurable, and Roe and Voe must take daily medication to ensure that their viral loads remain suppressed.
*414But that fact does not justify the categorical prohibition at issue here. Although HIV-positive individuals who suddenly stop antiretroviral treatment are vulnerable to "viral rebound," A444, appreciable physical effects are not immediate. According to Dr. Hardy, it "often takes weeks" for an individual's viral load to return to clinically significant levels, and even then, the virus "enters a period of clinical latency that can last years," often with no "symptoms or negative health outcomes." Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 11, 14. What is more, plaintiffs have identified several serious medical conditions treated with daily medication that do not subject servicemembers to the same categorical denial of deployability to CENTCOM. These include dyslipidemia,35 which (unlike HIV) does not preclude an individual from enlisting or deploying provided the condition is under "medical management" with "no medication side effects," see DoDI 6130.03, § 5.24(n); hypertension, which is listed as a disqualifying condition only where it is "not controlled with medication" or "requires frequent monitoring," DoDI 6490.07, enclosure 3, § g(l), at A98; and asthma, which does not preclude deployment unless it persists "despite appropriate therapy," requires frequent hospitalization, or requires "daily systemic (not inhalational) steroids,"
Defendants also suggest that their policy is justified by the fact that HIV-positive individuals may require checkups every few months. But as plaintiffs' expert Dr. Craig W. Hendrix explains, those checkups do not require "highly specialized medical personnel," A425, and are consistent with deployment in a forward area; all that is needed is a blood sample, which may be shipped to a laboratory if none is available on site. Pls.'
*415Memo. Ex. F [Dkt. No. 40-7] ("Hendrix Decl.") 11.37 Dr. Hendrix also explains that point-of-care viral load testing "is becoming increasingly prevalent and cost efficient."
Nor do other considerations supply the critical missing link in defendants' chain of reasoning. Defendants do not dispute that antiretroviral treatment is highly "effective[ ] in preventing HIV transmission." A374. Uncontroverted evidence from another of plaintiffs' experts, Dr. Carlos del Rio, demonstrates that when an individual's viral load is suppressed, he cannot transmit the virus to another. Pls.' Memo. Ex. D [Dkt. No. 40-5] ("Del Rio Decl.") 8 (citing a 2017 "Dear Colleague" letter from the CDC).38 The expert evidence presented by plaintiffs supports the conclusion that even in the case of a sustained disruption in treatment long enough for the viral load to rebound to clinically significant levels, an individual's risk of transmitting HIV during military service remains vanishingly low. Defendants have not identified a single recorded case of accidental transmission of HIV on the battlefield, which is unsurprising given the uncontroverted evidence that even without effective treatment, the risk of transmission through nonintimate contact such as blood splash is negligible. See
Defendants respond by pointing to another potential risk: that of transmitting HIV through a "battlefield blood transfusion." Defs.' Memo. & Opp'n 25. But defendants' argument compares apples to oranges. The risk they identify is that a servicemember unaware he is HIV positive might donate blood. See A429 (explaining that this possibility was one of the main impetuses for the military's decision to start screening servicemembers for HIV in the 1980s). That concern fades from view after a servicemember has been diagnosed with HIV and thus knows that he cannot give blood, especially if he has been subject to disruptions in his antiretroviral treatment. Defendants have not argued that every deployed servicemember must be able to donate blood. Nor could they: Many servicemembers cannot give blood for various reasons, including blood type and allergies, but are not barred from *416deploying to CENTCOM or elsewhere. Instead, they are simply issued medical alert tags. Pls.' Memo. 17-18; Pls.' Opp'n & Reply 27.
Defendants have not offered any cogent response to plaintiffs' experienced medical experts, all of whom persuasively explain why the effectively categorical rule declaring all HIV-positive servicemembers ineligible for deployment to CENTCOM is inconsistent with the state of science and medicine and with the way the military treats other chronic but manageable conditions. Indeed, rather than attempting to respond to plaintiffs' experts, defendants rely only on conclusory assertions about their "professional military and medical judgment," Defs.' Memo. & Opp'n 27, and on circular restatements of their policies. For example, defendants argue that "[a]s explained in DoD's 2014 Report to Congress, HIV infection has the potential to undermine a Service member's medical fitness and the readiness of the force."
ii. The Discharge Decisions
In addition to arguing that the deployment policy is irrational, plaintiffs also argue that the decisions to discharge Roe were arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on this argument as well.
First, that Roe and Voe were even referred for a separation determination in the first place is arguably inconsistent with defendants' own policies. DoDI 1332.45 establishes that servicemembers classified as "nondeployable" for more than 12 consecutive months-or whose nondeployability would not change within the 12-month period-would be evaluated for retention, referred into the DES, or processed for separation. See DoDI 1332.45, § 1.2(b), at A62;
*417Defendants concede that "[t]he Air Force did not apply DoDI 1332.45." Defs.' Memo. & Opp'n 22. Instead, they claim to have followed DoDI 6485.01, which states that active-duty servicemembers diagnosed with HIV must be "referred for ... a medical evaluation for fitness for continued service in the same manner as a Service member with other chronic or progressive illnesses." DoDI 6485.01, enclosure 3, § 2(c), at A85. They claim that under this "case by case" medical evaluation process, A339, Roe and Voe were fairly found to be unfit for duty and therefore must be discharged.
The process to which Roe and Voe were subjected does not comport with even the minimal requirements of the APA. Applicable Air Force regulations make clear that "HIV seropositivity alone is not grounds for medical separation." AFI 44-178, § 2.4.1, at A299; accord
Nonetheless, Roe and Voe-along with the four OutServe members-were found unfit for duty and ordered discharged. The reason given in all six cases was identical: The servicemember "belongs to a career field with a comparatively high deployment rate/tempo" to the CENTCOM area, but being HIV positive "precludes him from being able to deploy world-wide without a waiver and renders him ineligible for deployment to [CENTCOM]." A460; accord A747; Pls.' Memo. Exs. C1-C4 [Dkt. Nos. 40-1 to -4]; see also Defs.' Memo. & Opp'n 26-27 (stating that Roe and Voe were ordered "discharged for a combination of having HIV and being in a career field where they would have a high deployment tempo to CENTCOM, rendering it impossible for them to fully perform their duties").40
*418The Court has already explained why the policy declaring all HIV-positive servicemembers categorically ineligible for deployment to CENTCOM is irrational and arbitrary. Defendants' reliance on that policy renders the decisions to discharge Roe and Voe contrary to the APA for two reasons. First, although the SAFPC purported to engage in an individualized determination as to Roe's and Voe's fitness for duty, in fact its decisions were completely dependent on the across-the-board deployability policy. The failure to consider the issues with that policy or to analyze whether Roe and Voe could in fact be deployable to CENTCOM-let alone to any other location beyond the continental United States-despite their condition renders the decisions to discharge them arbitrary and capricious.41 Moreover, because the categorical deployment limitation is not rationally related to any legitimate interest, that limitation applies to Roe and Voe solely because they have been diagnosed with HIV. By attempting to discharge them because of that limitation, the SAFPC violated agency policy mandating that HIV status alone is not a permissible ground for separation. A decision in direct conflict with the agency's own standards, and one based on a failure to consider key aspects of the problem, cannot stand under the APA.42
B. Irreparable Harm
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must make a clear showing of "actual and imminent" irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. Direx Isr., Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp.,
*419(citation omitted), aff'd,
One point of clarification is necessary at the outset. Defendants argue that Sampson v. Murray,
Plaintiffs have made a clear showing that they likely face irreparable, actual harm. Under normal circumstances, termination of employment does not constitute irreparable injury because of the "possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date." Sampson,
C. Remaining Equitable Factors
Finally, to be entitled to the preliminary injunctive relief they seek, plaintiffs must show that the balance of equities tips in their favor and that an injunction is in the public interest. Where, as here, the injunctive relief is sought against the federal government and implicates a matter of great public interest, these two factors overlap and may be considered together. Nken v. Holder,
The equities weigh heavily in plaintiffs' favor. Although the impact of defendants' policies on servicemembers like Roe and Voe is potentially immense, defendants can scarcely be said to face any serious consequences stemming from the issuance of appropriately tailored injunctive *421relief, given that HIV-positive individuals make up such a miniscule percentage of active-duty servicemembers-0.027%, by one calculation. Pls.' Memo. 29. Defendants do not attempt to argue that retaining HIV-positive servicemembers would be prohibitively expensive or burdensome. Instead, they focus on a different sort of institutional harm: that granting relief here will encourage a deluge of cases challenging discharge determinations and undermine the principle of military independence. Defendants' concerns are overstated. Plaintiffs' claims are not of the sort that worried the Fourth Circuit in Guerra-namely, individualized or procedural challenges with little or no general applicability. Nor is the relief sought by plaintiffs likely to entangle the Court in "complex, subtle, and professional decisions" in a way that would cause symbolic or actual harm to the Armed Forces. Plaintiffs ask only that defendants adhere to their stated policies and make nonarbitrary, personalized determinations about each individual's fitness for service. That sort of request does not do violence to the notion of military independence, but rather enforces it.
The public interest also decisively favors granting injunctive relief. The military is a branch of the federal government and ultimately bears a responsibility to the American public at large. The public undoubtedly has an interest in seeing its governmental institutions follow the law and treat their employees in reasonable, nonarbitrary ways. More concretely, the public benefits from the security provided by military departments populated with individuals dedicated to the notion of service. Roe and Voe, along with similarly situated HIV-positive members of the Air Force, have been serving-and want to continue serving-their country. They have carried out their responsibilities in a creditable manner, earning trust on the part of their commanding officers and fellow servicemembers. It is in the public interest to prevent their discharge for apparently arbitrary and indefensible reasons, at least until the Court can definitively decide the merits of plaintiffs' claims.
D. Scope of Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are entitled to injunctive relief. The remaining question is what form that relief should take. "Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it presents." Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, --- U.S. ----,
First, any relief granted must be "limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established." Lewis v. Casey,
Next, defendants have argued that if injunctive relief of any kind is to be granted, it must be limited to Roe and Voe. Such a limitation would be inappropriate for several reasons. For one, plaintiff OutServe has the right to assert associational standing and seek relief on behalf of its members who face imminent and irreparable injury due to defendants' policies. There are at least four active-duty Air Force members who are members of OutServe and who are identically situated to Roe and Voe. Because of the longstanding stigma and discrimination facing those living with HIV, it may be difficult to identify potential plaintiffs in a case of this nature. Granting relief to all similarly situated servicemembers is thus the only way to ensure uniform, fair, rational treatment of individuals who belong to a vulnerable, and often invisible, class. Moreover, plaintiffs' entitlement to injunctive relief in this civil action is not so much dependent on characteristics peculiar to Roe and Voe; rather, it flows from defendants' reliance on an arbitrary, across-the-board determination that HIV-positive servicemembers must be deemed ineligible to deploy to CENTCOM, regardless of each servicemember's actual physical condition. That determination is flawed, and its uncritical application will be equally flawed no matter whether the servicemember is named Roe or Doe or whether he hails from Portland, Oregon or Portland, Maine. This case deals with national institutions, national policies, and national interests; it is thus unsurprising that the appropriate scope of relief should be national as well. Servicemembers who enlist in the Air Force do so with the expectation that they will fly under one flag and answer to one Department. They serve the country at large, and there are no relevant regional or localized facts that would counsel in favor of limiting the scope of the injunction to the named plaintiffs.47
*423Although plaintiffs have at times suggested that they seek relief on behalf of all members of the Armed Forces, the relief granted will be limited to active-duty members of the Air Force. The record reveals that there are meaningful differences in the way each military department has approached the issue of HIV-positive servicemembers, and the Court does not discount the possibility that another department's policies could be supported by a rational basis and applied in a manner consistent with the APA. Similarly uncertain is whether the foregoing analysis would apply to HIV-positive servicemembers who are on restricted duty of one kind or another. Without a firmer basis in evidence, any broader relief would be inappropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
The military is an institution like no other in our system of government. It has unique institutional interests and experience. The decisions it makes are thus entitled to deference from the coordinate branches, and particularly from the judicial branch, whose officers are largely shielded from the exigencies of military life. Nonetheless, the military remains a branch of government and so is bound to follow the Constitution and laws of the United States. And the judiciary's responsibility remains to enforce those laws and protect the rights of individuals vulnerable to arbitrary exercises of governmental authority. Courts must examine questions of military policy with care and humility-but examine them they must.
Here, plaintiffs have made a strong preliminary showing that the Air Force's approach to servicemembers living with HIV is irrational, inconsistent, and at variance with modem science. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction will be granted in part and denied in part, and defendants' motion to dismiss denied, by an appropriate Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion.
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