Roe v. Colorado Judical Department

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: June 16, 2026
• Docket: 25-1264
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 16, 2026 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court JANE ROE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-1264 (D.C. No. 1:24-CV-03400-STV) COLORADO JUDICAL (D. Colo.) DEPARTMENT, a division of the State of Colorado; BRIAN D. BOATRIGHT, individually & officially, Chief Judge of the Colo. S. Ct.; BRYON M. LARGE, individually & officially, Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Colo. S. Ct.; JESSICA E. YATES, Esq., individually & officially, Attorney Regulation Counsel of the Colo. S. Ct.; JACOB M. VOS, individually & officially, Asst. Regulation Counsel of the Colo. S. Ct.; RHONDA WHITE MITCHELL, individually & officially, Sr. Asst. Regulation Counsel of the Colo. S. Ct.; CHERYL STEVENS, individually & officially, Clerk of the Colo. S. Ct.,

Defendants - Appellees. Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 2

_________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, MORITZ, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Plaintiff-Appellant appeals the district court’s denial of her request to

proceed in her lawsuit while using a pseudonym. Exercising jurisdiction

under the collateral order doctrine, see Xingfei Luo v. Wang, 71 F.4th 1289,

1291 n.2 (10th Cir. 2023), we affirm.

I

Appellant previously held a Colorado law license. As alleged in her

complaint, Colorado attorney regulators first found her disabled from the

practice of law and then disbarred her. The Colorado Supreme Court later

precluded her from representing herself in Colorado courts. She then filed

this pro se federal civil action against the Colorado Judicial Department

*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.

2 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 3

and officials involved in the disability and disciplinary proceedings, alleging

those proceedings were discriminatory and unlawful in numerous ways. 1

Appellant filed her complaint using the pseudonym Jane Roe instead

of her real name. A magistrate judge concluded the use of the pseudonym

made her complaint deficient under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 10(a)

and 17(a) and ordered that “[i]f Plaintiff wishes to proceed using a

pseudonym, she must seek permission of the Court and demonstrate that

she has an important privacy interest that should allow her to use this

unusual procedure.” R. at 52.

Appellant filed an amended complaint, again using a pseudonym. She

disclosed her name in a notice made available to the court and defendants,

but she moved to restrict public access to that notice and her identity. Non-

parties the Colorado Freedom of Information Coalition (CFIC) and Eugene

Volokh filed an objection to her motion to restrict. 2 After receiving a

response to that objection from Appellant, a second magistrate judge denied

1 We ordinarily give a liberal construction to pro se parties’ filings,

but we need not do so where the party is an attorney. See Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). Our decision in this appeal would not be any different, whether or not we give Appellant’s filings a liberal construction.

2 CFIC and Volokh objected without moving to intervene. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(d) (providing that the district court will publish public notice when parties move to restrict access to court filings, and that “[a]ny person may file an objection” to such motions). 3 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 4

her request to proceed under a pseudonym. 3 The magistrate judge

concluded “Plaintiff’s allegations are entirely too vague and too conclusory

to overcome the presumptive right of public access to court filings and

proceedings and to warrant restriction.” R. at 203. The court ordered

Appellant to file an amended complaint using her real name if she wished

to proceed.

Appellant objected to the magistrate judge’s order. The district court

overruled her objections and ordered that if she did not file an amended

complaint using her real name the action would be dismissed. Appellant

challenges that order in this appeal. See Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at 1291 n.2

(“Orders denying motions to proceed anonymously are immediately

appealable under the collateral order doctrine.” (brackets and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

II

“There is no court rule or statute permitting pseudonymous pleading.”

Id. at 1296. “Rather, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires the

names of all parties to appear in the caption of a complaint, and the title of

all other pleadings must name the first party on each side.” Id. We have

observed that “‘[l]awsuits are public events’ and ‘there is no legal right in

3 The first magistrate judge recused after Appellant disclosed her identity. 4 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 5

parties to be allowed anonymity.’” Id. (ellipsis omitted) (quoting M.M. v.

Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998)). “‘Ordinarily, those using the

courts must be prepared to accept the public scrutiny that is an inherent

part of public trials.’” Id. (quoting Femedeer v Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246

(10th Cir. 2000)).

We have therefore recognized a “general presumption of open trials—

including identification of parties . . . by their real names.” M.M., 139 F.3d

at 803 (internal quotation marks omitted). A party seeking to use a

pseudonym has the burden “to overcome the public’s presumptive right to

know her identity,” Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at 1292, and “the need for party

anonymity must outweigh the presumption of openness,” id. at 1296

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff should be

permitted to proceed anonymously only in those exceptional cases involving

matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical

harm, or where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of

the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity.” Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1246

(internal quotation marks omitted). “The risk that a plaintiff may suffer

some embarrassment is not enough.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

“This court reviews a district court’s order denying leave to proceed

under a pseudonym for an abuse of discretion.” Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at

5 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 6

1296. “When a district court has exercised its discretion, we will reverse

only upon a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear

error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the

circumstances.” Id. at 1297 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A

Appellant fails to show the district court abused its discretion in

denying her request to use a pseudonym. Although she argues her case

presents all three kinds of circumstances we have held support the use of a

pseudonym, we cannot agree.

First, we are not persuaded this case involves “matters of a highly

sensitive and personal nature” to any degree that outweighs the

presumption of openness. Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at 1299. Appellant’s brief

does not clearly identify what “highly sensitive and personal” matters she

seeks to shield. Past cases in which plaintiffs have been allowed to use a

pseudonym have commonly required them to “divulge[] personal

information of the utmost intimacy,” or “admit that they either had violated

state laws . . . or wished to engage in prohibited conduct.” Coe v. U.S. Dist.

Ct. for Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411, 416 (10th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation

marks omitted). But neither is true here.

Appellant acknowledges her identity was made public in the

underlying disbarment proceeding but argues disclosing it in this case

6 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 7

“would expand stigma.” Op. Br. at 12. 4 However, her own “embarrassment”

regarding the disability and disbarment proceedings “is not enough” to

support her use of a pseudonym. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1246 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In Coe, for example, a doctor brought a federal complaint seeking to

enjoin public medical disciplinary proceedings that arose from “charges of

sexual or immoral improprieties.” 676 F.2d at 412. We upheld the denial of

his request to use a pseudonym, concluding his “privacy interest [did] not

outweigh the public’s interest,” given “the right of the public to know all of

the facts surrounding the formal [medical disciplinary] proceedings.” Id. at

418. We reach the same result here, where Appellant likewise challenges

professional licensing proceedings and – so far as her brief reveals – the

underlying facts are less sensitive than in Coe.

Second, Appellant has not shown she faces “real dangers of physical

harm.” Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at 1296. She claims there are “concrete risks

of retaliation and stigma.” Op. Br. at 11. But this assertion is conclusory.

4 Appellant also argues that she should be allowed to use a pseudonym

so court filings will not be used to advance “private spite and public scandal.” Op. Br. at 11. This argument relies on Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978), which relates to “the right to inspect and copy judicial records,” rather than use of a pseudonym. But Appellant did not ask to seal specific sensitive documents but instead to use a pseudonym in all public filings.

7 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 8

She does not explain how public disclosure of her identity would place her

in danger of suffering harm. 5

Third, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that “[t]he very

harm at issue – retaliation by judicial actors – would be aggravated by

disclosure” of her identity. Op. Br. at 9. The use of a pseudonym may be

appropriate “where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a

result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity.” Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at

1299 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, it is not required when

a plaintiff is “not suing . . . to prevent the disclosure,” but instead “for

compensation for disclosure that has already happened.” Id. at 1300

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant claims defendants had discriminatory motives for the

disability and disciplinary proceedings and conducted them unlawfully. The

injury she is litigating against is not the disclosure of her identity, but

alleged improprieties in the proceedings and particularly their result,

5 Our cases have referred to “dangers of physical harm.” Xingfei Luo,

71 F.4th at 1296 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have also inquired more broadly “whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the party seeking to proceed anonymously or even more critically, to innocent non-parties.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Appellant has not shown disclosure of her identity would present any risk of either physical or mental harm sufficient to warrant use of a pseudonym. 8 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 9

namely the termination of her law license. To the extent her claims relate

to identity disclosure, they seek relief for “a previous alleged defamation

and disclosure,” not to prevent an injury that would “be incurred because of

the disclosure of her identity in this case.” Id.

Appellant has therefore not shown her case presents “exceptional

circumstances” that warrant the use of a pseudonym. Femedeer, 227 F.3d

at 1246. And she has not otherwise shown the district court abused its

discretion. She argues defendants would not be prejudiced because they and

the court know her identity, and that “keeping [her] name out of the public

would keep the focus on the merits” of her legal claims. Op. Br. at 9. But

these arguments – which might be raised in almost any lawsuit – fail to

show her case is “exceptional,” or that the “unusual procedure” of using a

pseudonym is appropriate. Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at 1296 (internal quotation

marks omitted). 6 Appellant also argues CFIC and Volokh have improper

motives for advocating public filing. We see no improper motive. And in any

event, it was Appellant’s burden to overcome the presumption of openness.

6 In Xingfei Luo, we discussed prejudice to the defendant where the

district court had evaluated such prejudice as part of its ruling. See 71 F.4th at 1294-95. The district court’s ruling here did not address potential prejudice. So, the issue does not help Appellant show an abuse of discretion on the record in this case.

9 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 10

See id. Whatever CFIC and Volokh’s motives may be, she has not carried

that burden.

B

Appellant next argues the district court violated her constitutional

rights by reviewing her complaint before issuing any summons or requiring

defendants to respond or answer. 7 The district court acted pursuant to its

Local Civil Rule 8.1(a), which authorizes early judicial review of pro se

7 We address Appellant’s arguments under Local Rules 8.1(a) and 7.2(d) to the extent she challenges the validity of the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s denial of her request to use a pseudonym. That order is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. See Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at 1291 n.2. To any extent she seeks to more broadly challenge the constitutionality of the district court’s rules or procedures, we lack jurisdiction because no final order or judgment has entered. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 10 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 11

complaints and tolls the time for defendants to answer until that screening

is complete. 8

This court has upheld the constitutionality of the sua sponte review

and dismissal of complaints filed by plaintiffs who proceed in forma

pauperis, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278,

1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[S]ua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that

cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not

infringe the right of access to the courts”). Appellant does not explain how

the review of her complaint was materially different from review under

§ 1915(e)(2), which the District of Colorado conducts under the same local

rule.

8 The rule reads:

A judicial officer designated by the Chief Judge shall review the pleadings of a pro se party or a party who is allowed to proceed without prepayment of filing fees to determine whether the pleadings should be dismissed summarily. The designated judicial officer may use the assistance of the Pro Se Division in making the determination. A judicial officer may request additional facts or documentary evidence necessary to make this determination. The time for filing an answer or response shall be tolled until the designated judicial officer determines that the pleadings should not be dismissed summarily at which time the judicial officer shall issue an order directing service of the order and the pleadings on the defendant(s) or respondent(s). A party who seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of filing fees shall use the procedures, forms, and instructions available on the court’s website or from the office of the clerk. D.C.COLO.LCivR 8.1(a).

11 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 12

We find no constitutional violation. A magistrate judge reviewed

Appellant’s complaint and ordered her to correct identified deficiencies. A

second magistrate judge reviewed her amended complaint and denied her

request to use a pseudonym. When she objected, a district judge reviewed

and adopted that ruling. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

Appellant has not shown this procedure violated her rights. See Curley,

246 F.3d at 1284. We are also unpersuaded by her claim that review under

Local Rule 8.1(a) “produced delay, unequal treatment, and denial of notice

and an opportunity to be heard.” Op. Br. at 12. After she asked to proceed

pseudonymously, the non-parties objected, Appellant responded, and the

district court ruled on her request. She disagrees with its ruling but was

not denied the opportunity to present her arguments. And she offers no

argument showing the district court would have either acted more quickly

or ruled differently if it had used other procedures.

C

Last, Appellant also argues the district court erred by allowing and

considering CFIC and Volokh’s objection to her motion to restrict. We do not

find reversible error.

Appellant first contends the non-parties engaged in the unauthorized

practice of law. See Op. Br. at 17. But contrary to her arguments, their

objection was authorized by the district court’s rules, and their lawyer did

12 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 13

not need a Colorado license. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(d) (allowing “[a]ny

person” to object to a party’s motion to restrict public access to court filings);

D.C.COLO.LAttyR 3(a) (allowing admission to the court’s bar by lawyers

licensed in other states). We also disagree with her characterization that

their objection improperly went beyond challenging the motion to restrict.

And even if there were problems with the objection, she has not shown why

that would be a reason to reverse. It was Appellant’s burden to overcome

the presumption of public filing, even if no objection had been filed. See

Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at 1304; D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(d) (“The absence of

objection alone shall not result in the granting of the motion [to restrict].”).

Finally, Appellant argues the district court’s reliance on Local Civil

Rule 7.2(d) was “unconstitutional, because it allowed an objection to be filed

by a non-party with no standing,” Op. Br. at 16–17, and “the district court

lacked Article III jurisdiction to consider [the non-parties’] objection,” id.

at 19. But on the record before us, we see no Article III defect. See U.S.

ex rel. Hernandez v. Team Fin., L.L.C., 80 F.4th 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2023)

(“Alleged violations of the public right to access judicial records and

proceedings and to gather news are cognizable injuries-in-fact sufficient to

establish standing.”); see also Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at 1295 (recognizing

Volokh’s intervention “for the limited purpose of challenging the restriction

of access”).

13 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 14

III

For the reasons above, we affirm the district court’s order requiring

Appellant to file an amended complaint using her real name.

We rule on the several pending motions as follows:

We deny CFIC and Volokh’s motion to intervene on appeal (Doc. #3).

See Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 407 F.3d 1091, 1103 (10th

Cir. 2005) (“When intervention was not sought below . . . intervention on

appeal will be permitted only in an exceptional case for imperative reasons.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

We deny Appellant’s motion to strike the entry of appearance filed by

CFIC and Volokh (Doc. #19).

We deny Appellant’s motion to maintain her opening brief under seal

(Doc. #31). Appellant has not overcome the presumptive right of public

access to judicial records. See Xingfei Luo, 71 F.4th at 1304. The clerk will

unseal her brief (Doc. #28).

We deny as moot CFIC and Volokh’s motion to unseal Appellant’s

opening brief (Doc. #36).

14 Appellate Case: 25-1264 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 15

We grant Appellant’s motion to proceed without prepayment of costs

or fees (Doc. #26).

Entered for the Court

Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge