1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 JOHN ROE JB 65, Case No.: 24-cv-02349-AJB-MSB
14 Plaintiff, ORDER 15 v. (Doc. Nos. 6; 9; 11) 16 DOE 1, et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 Before the Court are three motions filed by Defendant Doe 1 (the “Church”), seeking 20 to ensure the privacy of Plaintiff John Roe JB 65 (“Plaintiff”). (Doc. Nos. 6; 9; 11.) For the 21 reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS the Church’s second motion to seal (Doc. 22 No. 9), GRANTS its motion to strike (Doc. No. 11), and STRIKES the initial Notice of 23 Removal and the first motion to seal (Doc. Nos. 1; 6). 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of San Diego, 26 asserting multiple counts of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 27 sexual abuse of a minor, all stemming from Plaintiff’s allegations of having been abused 28 in 1978 by a bishop of the Church. (Doc. No. 1-3.) On December 16, 2024, the Church 1 filed a notice removing the instant action to federal court on the basis of diversity 2 jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 18, 2024, the Church filed a motion to file 3 portions of the Notice of Removal under seal (Doc. No. 6) and lodged the corresponding 4 documents (Doc. No. 7). However, identifying that the redaction in the Notice of Removal 5 were incomplete, the Church subsequently filed a motion to strike the initial Notice of 6 Removal (Doc. No. 11), an Amended Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 8), a second motion to 7 seal regarding information redacted in the Amended Notice (Doc. No. 9), and lodged the 8 corresponding unredacted documents (Doc. No. 12). 9 II. MOTION TO SEAL 10 As resolution of the Church’s motion to strike is dependent on the Court finding that 11 redaction of Plaintiff’s personal identifying information is proper, the Court first turns to 12 the second motion to seal. 13 A. Legal Standard 14 “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public 15 records and documents, including judicial records and documents,’” which is “justified by 16 the interest of citizens in ‘keep[ing] a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.’” 17 Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 598 (1978)). “Unless a particular 19 court record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is 20 the starting point.” Id. (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 21 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). In order to overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to 22 seal a judicial record must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual 23 findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring 24 disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process.” Id. at 1178– 25 79 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 26 “Despite this strong preference for public access,” the Ninth Circuit has “carved out 27 an exception” for when the underlying motion is not “more than tangentially related to the 28 merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097, 1101 1 (9th Cir. 2016). In such circumstances, “the presumptive ‘compelling reasons’ standard” is 2 eschewed for “good cause.” Id. at 1097. “Good cause” requires a “particularized showing” 3 that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips v. Gen. 4 Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Phillips”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated 6 reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th 7 Cir. 1992). If a court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information 8 to the public, then “the court must conscientiously balance the competing interests of the 9 public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Kamakana, 447 10 F.3d at 1179 (cleaned up); see also Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211. 11 B. Discussion 12 As a threshold matter, the instant motion seeks to seal limited information provided 13 in support of the Church’s notice of removal. Moreover, the redactions are limited to 14 materials provided to support the Church’s assertion that this Court has diversity 15 jurisdiction, which is an issue sufficiently attenuated from the merits of the action to qualify 16 for the good cause exception to the compelling reasons standard. 17 Turning to substance, the Church seeks to file under seal redactions of Plaintiff’s 18 name, address, and other identifying information that appear in domicile-related 19 documentation and a deposition transcript. (Doc. No. 9.) The redactions of Plaintiff’s name 20 in its entirety mirrors Plaintiff’s decision to file his complaint under a fictitious name to 21 protect his privacy. (See Doc. No. 8-3 (Complaint), at ¶ 3.) 22 Generally, in federal court, a “[p]laintiff[’s] use of [a] fictitious name[] runs afoul of 23 the public’s common law right of access to judicial proceedings and Rule 10(a)’s command 24 that the title of every complaint ‘include the names of all the parties.’” Does I thru XXIII 25 v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (first citing Nixon v. 26 Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1978) and EEOC v. Erection Co., 27 Inc., 900 F.2d 168, 169 (9th Cir.1990); then quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)). However, “a 28 party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances 1 when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the 2 public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile 3 Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). 4 Here, the Church seeks narrowly tailored redactions of Plaintiff’s name, address, and 5 other identifying information to preserve Plaintiff’s privacy as he pursues allegations that 6 he was sexually abused as a child. (Doc. No. 9 at 3–4.) Considering that Plaintiff’s 7 allegations are highly sensitive and personal in nature, the Court finds that Plaintiff has a 8 demonstrated need for anonymity. See Doe v. Steele, No. 20-CV-1818-MMA-MSB, 2020 9 WL 6712214, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2020) (finding that a plaintiff asserting claims of 10 sex-trafficking had “a high need for anonymity”) (collecting cases). Second, the Court 11 notes that it is the Church who moves to file Plaintiff’s personal identifying information 12 under seal. Considering that the Church already knows Plaintiff’s true identity and is the 13 movant, the Court finds no prejudice in allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously. See Al 14 Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 WL 6541446, at *6 (S.D. 15 Cal. Dec.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 JOHN ROE JB 65, Case No.: 24-cv-02349-AJB-MSB
14 Plaintiff, ORDER 15 v. (Doc. Nos. 6; 9; 11) 16 DOE 1, et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 Before the Court are three motions filed by Defendant Doe 1 (the “Church”), seeking 20 to ensure the privacy of Plaintiff John Roe JB 65 (“Plaintiff”). (Doc. Nos. 6; 9; 11.) For the 21 reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS the Church’s second motion to seal (Doc. 22 No. 9), GRANTS its motion to strike (Doc. No. 11), and STRIKES the initial Notice of 23 Removal and the first motion to seal (Doc. Nos. 1; 6). 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of San Diego, 26 asserting multiple counts of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 27 sexual abuse of a minor, all stemming from Plaintiff’s allegations of having been abused 28 in 1978 by a bishop of the Church. (Doc. No. 1-3.) On December 16, 2024, the Church 1 filed a notice removing the instant action to federal court on the basis of diversity 2 jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 18, 2024, the Church filed a motion to file 3 portions of the Notice of Removal under seal (Doc. No. 6) and lodged the corresponding 4 documents (Doc. No. 7). However, identifying that the redaction in the Notice of Removal 5 were incomplete, the Church subsequently filed a motion to strike the initial Notice of 6 Removal (Doc. No. 11), an Amended Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 8), a second motion to 7 seal regarding information redacted in the Amended Notice (Doc. No. 9), and lodged the 8 corresponding unredacted documents (Doc. No. 12). 9 II. MOTION TO SEAL 10 As resolution of the Church’s motion to strike is dependent on the Court finding that 11 redaction of Plaintiff’s personal identifying information is proper, the Court first turns to 12 the second motion to seal. 13 A. Legal Standard 14 “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public 15 records and documents, including judicial records and documents,’” which is “justified by 16 the interest of citizens in ‘keep[ing] a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.’” 17 Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 598 (1978)). “Unless a particular 19 court record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is 20 the starting point.” Id. (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 21 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). In order to overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to 22 seal a judicial record must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual 23 findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring 24 disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process.” Id. at 1178– 25 79 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 26 “Despite this strong preference for public access,” the Ninth Circuit has “carved out 27 an exception” for when the underlying motion is not “more than tangentially related to the 28 merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097, 1101 1 (9th Cir. 2016). In such circumstances, “the presumptive ‘compelling reasons’ standard” is 2 eschewed for “good cause.” Id. at 1097. “Good cause” requires a “particularized showing” 3 that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips v. Gen. 4 Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Phillips”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated 6 reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th 7 Cir. 1992). If a court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information 8 to the public, then “the court must conscientiously balance the competing interests of the 9 public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Kamakana, 447 10 F.3d at 1179 (cleaned up); see also Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211. 11 B. Discussion 12 As a threshold matter, the instant motion seeks to seal limited information provided 13 in support of the Church’s notice of removal. Moreover, the redactions are limited to 14 materials provided to support the Church’s assertion that this Court has diversity 15 jurisdiction, which is an issue sufficiently attenuated from the merits of the action to qualify 16 for the good cause exception to the compelling reasons standard. 17 Turning to substance, the Church seeks to file under seal redactions of Plaintiff’s 18 name, address, and other identifying information that appear in domicile-related 19 documentation and a deposition transcript. (Doc. No. 9.) The redactions of Plaintiff’s name 20 in its entirety mirrors Plaintiff’s decision to file his complaint under a fictitious name to 21 protect his privacy. (See Doc. No. 8-3 (Complaint), at ¶ 3.) 22 Generally, in federal court, a “[p]laintiff[’s] use of [a] fictitious name[] runs afoul of 23 the public’s common law right of access to judicial proceedings and Rule 10(a)’s command 24 that the title of every complaint ‘include the names of all the parties.’” Does I thru XXIII 25 v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (first citing Nixon v. 26 Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1978) and EEOC v. Erection Co., 27 Inc., 900 F.2d 168, 169 (9th Cir.1990); then quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)). However, “a 28 party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances 1 when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the 2 public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile 3 Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). 4 Here, the Church seeks narrowly tailored redactions of Plaintiff’s name, address, and 5 other identifying information to preserve Plaintiff’s privacy as he pursues allegations that 6 he was sexually abused as a child. (Doc. No. 9 at 3–4.) Considering that Plaintiff’s 7 allegations are highly sensitive and personal in nature, the Court finds that Plaintiff has a 8 demonstrated need for anonymity. See Doe v. Steele, No. 20-CV-1818-MMA-MSB, 2020 9 WL 6712214, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2020) (finding that a plaintiff asserting claims of 10 sex-trafficking had “a high need for anonymity”) (collecting cases). Second, the Court 11 notes that it is the Church who moves to file Plaintiff’s personal identifying information 12 under seal. Considering that the Church already knows Plaintiff’s true identity and is the 13 movant, the Court finds no prejudice in allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously. See Al 14 Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 WL 6541446, at *6 (S.D. 15 Cal. Dec. 20, 2017) (finding no prejudice where the defendants knew the plaintiffs’ true 16 identities and filed a notice of non-opposition). Finally, any interest the public has in the 17 specific identity of Plaintiff is too trivial to outweigh Plaintiff’s asserted need. The limited 18 redactions proposed by the Church in the instant motion to seal and by Plaintiff in filing 19 his complaint under a fictious name do not affect the resolution of the claims in this action, 20 which will be in full view of the public.” See N.A. v. Jaddou, No. 23-CV-01634-AJB-BGS, 21 2023 WL 6238007, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2023) (quoting Nielsen, 2017 WL 6541446, 22 at *6). 23 C. Conclusion 24 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Church’s second motion to 25 seal (Doc. No. 9) and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to file under seal the documents 26 currently lodged at Docket Number 12. 27 /// 28 /// 1 MOTION TO STRIKE 2 Recognizing that both the initial motion to seal and the initial Notice of Removal 3 || included instances in the deposition transcript where Plaintiffs name was not redacted, the 4 ||Church seeks to strike both filings. (Doc. No. 11 (seeking to strike Doc. Nos. 1, 6).) 5 || Because the Court has found that allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously is appropriate 6 || and, as such, sealing instances where Plaintiff is named, the Court exercises its discretion 7 |jand GRANTS the Church’s motion to strike. (Doc. No. 11.) See Fujikura Composite 8 || America, Inc. v. Dee, et al., No. 24-CV-00782 JLS-MSB, 2024 WL 4994346, at *3 (S.D. 9 || Cal. Dec. 5, 2024). 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court hereby: 12 1. GRANTS the Church’s second motion to seal (Doc. No. 9); 13 2. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to file under seal the documents 14 currently lodged at Docket Number 12; 15 3. GRANTS the Church’s motion to strike (Doc. No. 11); and 16 4. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to STRIKE the documents currently 17 filed at Docket Numbers | and 6. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: December 23, 2024 © 20 Hon. Anthony J. attaglia 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28