Rodriguez v. State

• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
• Decided: June 1, 2023
• Docket: 1530/21
• Status: Published

Opinion

Hector Rodriguez v. State of Maryland, No. 1530, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Getty, Joseph M., J. HEADNOTES: CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – FOURTH AMENDMENT – WARRANTLESS SEARCHES – SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST – ARIZONA V. GANT Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), allows police, without a warrant, to “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” When the State relies on the second part of the exception—where it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest—the police may search the glove compartment after a defendant has been arrested for stolen tags because it is reasonable to believe that the compartment will contain motor vehicle records—such as a registration card—which would be relevant to the offense of arrest. CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – FIFTH AMENDMENT – MIRANDA V. ARIZONA – CUSTODY Miranda warnings are required when a suspect is in custody and is being interrogated. Miranda warnings are not required when an officer approaches a suspect in a shopping center parking lot and asks two questions—whether a vehicle belongs to the suspect and how the suspect obtained the license plate on the vehicle—because the suspect is not in custody under those circumstances. Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No. C-02-CR-21-000839

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND*

No. 1530

September Term, 2021

______________________________________

HECTOR MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Reed, Albright, Getty, Joseph M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ. ______________________________________

Opinion by Getty, J. ______________________________________ Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Filed: June 1, 2023 2023-06-02 09:18-04:00

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

*At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. This appeal involves two issues. The first issue is the permissible scope of the

search incident to arrest exception under Arizona v. Gant that allows “a search incident to

a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest

might be found in the vehicle.’” 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United

States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)). Specifically, we must determine whether a police officer

may search the glove compartment of the defendant’s vehicle for additional evidence

without a warrant after arresting the defendant for theft of license plates.

The second issue involves whether an officer’s failure to give Miranda1 warnings

to the defendant requires the defendant’s statements to be suppressed. We must consider

whether an officer must provide Miranda warnings before asking the defendant two

questions—about the vehicle and the stolen license plates—during a brief encounter in a

shopping center parking lot.

Appellant Hector Rodriguez appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress

a regulated handgun found in his vehicle’s glove compartment during a warrantless search

and to suppress statements that he made to the arresting police officer. While preserving

his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress, Rodriguez proceeded to trial on an

agreed statement of facts in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and was convicted

of possession of a regulated firearm by a person under the age of 21.

Rodriguez now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and presents one

question for review: “Did the circuit court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress?”

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Rodriguez argues that the circuit court erred in finding the warrantless search of his

vehicle justified. He contends that the police officer was not looking for additional

evidence of the crime of his arrest—for stolen license plates—but for evidence of a

different crime altogether—theft of a vehicle. Thus, Rodriguez asserts that the warrantless

search of his vehicle was not justified as a search incident to arrest.

In response, the State maintains the police officer had reason to believe that the

vehicle contained additional evidence of the crime for which Rodriguez was arrested. One

of the stolen license plates was visibly located on the floorboard of Rodriguez’s front

passenger seat. The State’s first argument is that this license plate allowed the officer to

seize the license plate and search the remainder of the passenger compartment of the

vehicle. Alternatively, the State argued that it was reasonable to believe that a registration

card would be stored in the glove compartment of Rodriguez’s vehicle and that a

registration card is additional evidence of the crime for which Rodriguez was arrested.

On the second issue, Rodriguez asserts that his answer to the officer’s question

about the license plates should have been suppressed because he was not administered

Miranda warnings. Rodriguez argues that he was in custody at the time the officer

questioned him because the officer had probable cause to arrest him prior to the

questioning. The State counters that Miranda warnings were not required because

Rodriguez was not in custody for purposes of Miranda.

For the reasons set forth below, the suppression hearing judge did not err in denying

the motion to suppress. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne

Arundel County.

-2- FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Corporal John McGroarty (“Cpl. McGroarty”) of the Anne Arundel County Police

Department was on patrol on the morning of May 7, 2020, in a marked police vehicle

equipped with an automated license plate recognition system (“ALPR”). He was traveling

on Laurel Fort Meade Road when his vehicle passed a 2002 Volkswagen GTI proceeding

from the opposite direction, which caused the ALPR to alert to its rear license plate as

stolen. After the alert, Cpl. McGroarty verified with the National Crime Information

Center that the rear license plate was stolen.

By then, the Volkswagen GTI had turned onto Red Clay Road and disappeared.

After a five-to-seven-minute search, Cpl. McGroarty located the vehicle parked and

unoccupied near the Target store in the Corridor Marketplace shopping plaza. Cpl.

McGroarty, who was in full uniform, parked his marked patrol car in the aisle of the parking

lot past the Volkswagen GTI in a manner that, according to the officer, did not box it in.

There was no one in the vehicle when Cpl. McGroarty walked up to the Volkswagen

GTI and initially confirmed that this was the same vehicle and license plate that caused the

ALPR to alert. He then started walking toward the front of the vehicle but noticed that the

matching license plate was located inside the vehicle on the floor of the front passenger

seat instead of being mounted on the front of the vehicle.

Cpl. McGroarty returned to his car where he observed an individual, later identified

as Hector Miguel Rodriguez, walk towards the Volkswagen GTI and unlock the doors

using the key fob. Exiting his marked police vehicle, Cpl. McGroarty met Rodriguez at

the rear corner of the vehicle on the driver’s side. Cpl. McGroarty asked Rodriguez if he

-3- owned the vehicle and how he obtained the license plates. Rodriguez responded that he

did own the vehicle and that he had bought the license plates from a friend in Riverdale.

Cpl. McGroarty then handcuffed Rodriguez and placed him under arrest but did not

administer Miranda warnings during this encounter.

After placing Rodriguez under arrest, Cpl. McGroarty searched the vehicle. He

retrieved the license plate from the front passenger floorboard. He also searched the front

passenger glove compartment where he seized a silver Hopkins and Allen Special Police

.32-caliber revolver that was unloaded. Rodriguez was 20 years old and did not have a

permit to carry a handgun. Therefore, he was charged with theft of the license plates,

possession of a regulated firearm by a person under the age of 21, and transporting a

handgun in a vehicle.

Before trial, Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress the handgun found in the glove

compartment and his statement that he had bought the license plates from a friend. At the

suppression hearing, the court denied the motion, stating,

[Corporal McGroarty] waited by the vehicle, spoke to Mr. Rodriguez, who had voluntarily walked to his parked car. He asked him the two questions: one, whether or not he owned the car; and then also . . . where he received the license plates from. The conversation was very short. He pulled his marked patrol vehicle and parked in a manner which would not preclude Mr. Rodriguez from leaving. He also didn’t initiate any emergency lights or any other emergency equipment. So based on all of that, I find that the Corporal’s actions up to the time moment [sic], including the questioning, amounted to an accosting and not a Terry stop or an arrest, as there was no physical force or show of authority used. The court continued,

-4- So moving on to the search of the vehicle as it related to going into the glove compartment and finding the handgun, so with respect to an automobile search following a valid arrest, the police may search the passenger compartment of the car as a search incident to arrest, but only if—and the one that is applicable here—of course, there’s two, but I’m going to focus on the second one—the police have reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence relevant to the crime for which the individual was arrested. And as you know, that’s the Arizona v. Gant case. So the police, again, may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle incident to the recent arrest if the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest. Here, Corporal McGroarty testified that he searched the car, looking for—after arresting Mr. Rodriguez and after Mr. Rodriguez was arrested for possession of stolen tags—for additional evidence related to that arrest. That is proper under the case law. As a result, I find that that search was proper.

Rodriguez waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded in a bench trial with a plea

of not guilty to an agreed statement of facts on the condition that he preserved his right to

appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The court found Rodriguez guilty of possession

of a regulated firearm by a person under the age of 21. The State entered a nolle prosequi

on the remaining charges. The court sentenced Rodriguez to three years, suspended, with

two years of supervised probation. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we are

“limited to the record developed at the suppression hearing.” Moats v. State, 455 Md. 682,

694 (2017). “We review the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party.” Thornton v. State, 465 Md. 122, 139 (2019). As a

“mixed question of law and fact[,]” we accept “the hearing court’s findings of fact unless

they are clearly erroneous” but “review the hearing judge’s legal conclusions de novo[.]”

-5- Id. (citations omitted). Thus, we independently evaluate without deference to the circuit

court whether a police officer’s conduct violated the constitutional rights of the defendant.

Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350, 362 (2017).

SEIZURE OF HANDGUN

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV.2 State-conducted searches and seizures,

without a warrant, “are presumptively unreasonable and, thus, violative of the Fourth

Amendment.” Thornton, 465 Md. at 141. The State bears the burden of proving that a

warrantless search or seizure is reasonable. Id. Evidence obtained in violation of the

Fourth Amendment “will ordinarily be inadmissible in a state criminal prosecution

pursuant to the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 140.

“A warrantless search . . . is presumptively unreasonable,” Henderson v. State, 416

Md. 125, 148 (2010), but “may be deemed reasonable if the circumstances fall within ‘a

few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Pacheco v. State, 465 Md.

311, 321 (2019) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Two such

exceptions are relevant to this case: the search incident to arrest exception and the

2 Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights also protects Marylanders against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court of Maryland has generally held that the protections of the two provisions are co-extensive. E.g., Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 319–22 (1981). In any event, Rodriguez has not made an argument based on Article 26, so our decision is based on the federal provision only.

-6- automobile exception. The State primarily relies on the search incident to arrest exception

to justify the warrantless search of Rodriguez’s vehicle.

A. Search Incident to Arrest Exception

The search incident to arrest exception “derives from interests in officer safety and

evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” Gant, 556 U.S. at

338. In Gant, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that the exception “permit[s] an officer

to conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or

it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 346.

The Supreme Court of Maryland3 described the historical progression of the search

incident to arrest exception in Taylor v. State, 448 Md. 242 (2016). The Court noted that

“Gant was intended to clarify the scope of that exception in the context of a motor vehicle

search.” Id. at 246. The Court explained that prior to Gant, the search incident to arrest in

the vehicular context was governed by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and New

York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Id. Chimel “limited the scope of a warrantless search

incident to an arrest to the arrestee’s person and the area within his or her ‘immediate

control’—the area ‘from within which he [or she] might gain possession of a weapon or

destructible evidence.’” Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).

3 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. We will use the term “Supreme Court” when referring to decisions from the former Court of Appeals and the term “U.S. Supreme Court” when referring to decisions from the United States Supreme Court.

-7- In Belton, the U.S. Supreme Court created a bright-line rule in the automobile

context that “when an officer lawfully arrests the occupant of an automobile, the officer,

as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, may search the passenger compartment of the

car and any containers therein.” Id. at 247. Many courts throughout the country had

“widely understood [Belton] to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent

occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the

time of the search.” Id. at 247 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 341). The Gant Court rejected

this interpretation. Id. Instead, it explained that “the Chimel rationale authorizes police to

search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured

and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”

Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (footnote omitted).

The Gant holding expands the exception stating that, “although it does not follow

from Chimel, ‘circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a

lawful arrest when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest

might be found in the vehicle.”’” Taylor, 448 Md. at 248 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).

Thus, from Gant, the search incident arrest exception has come to allow police to “search

a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching

distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe

the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.

It is the second part of the exception—the reasonableness of believing the vehicle

contains evidence of the offense of arrest—on which the State relies in Rodriguez’s case.

In White v. State, 248 Md. App. 67, 97–98 (2020), this Court explained how this part of

-8- the exception is both similar and dissimilar to the automobile exception (or Carroll4

doctrine):

Like the Carroll Doctrine, it authorizes the search of an automobile for evidence of crime upon a likelihood that such evidence is present in the car. Whereas the Carroll Doctrine requires that the likelihood satisfy the probable cause standard, the Arizona v. Gant special exception lowers the bar of likelihood to one of reasonable suspicion. The Arizona v. Gant exception, on the other hand, does insist, unlike the Carroll Doctrine that the likelihood occurs in conjunction with an arrest. Whereas the Carroll Doctrine permits a search of the entire car including the trunk, the Arizona v. Gant exception limits the search to the passenger compartment. Whereas the Carroll Doctrine places no limits on the character of the suspected evidence, the Arizona v. Gant exception limits the predicate for the search to “evidence of the offense of arrest.”

The Gant Court noted that the search incident to arrest exception is narrower than the

automobile exception, which “authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the

evidence might be found.” See Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 (citing United States v. Ross, 456

U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982)).

The Supreme Court of Maryland most recently considered the search incident to

arrest exception in Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311 (2019). There, the Court considered

whether the possession of a joint and the odor of marijuana in the post-decriminalization

era could justify the search of a person under the search incident to arrest exception. Id. at

320. The Court dealt primarily with the “condition precedent” of probable cause to make

4 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The automobile exception “authorize[s] the warrantless search of a vehicle if, at the time of the search, the police have developed ‘probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.’” Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 321 (2019) (quoting Johnson v. State, 458 Md. 519, 533 (2018)).

-9- the arrest before police could conduct a warrantless search of the individual. Id. at 323. It

explained that “before a person can be lawfully arrested and searched incident thereto the

focus must be on the likelihood of the ‘guilt of the arrestee[.]’” Id. at 325 (citation omitted).

It emphasized that “the officers must have possessed, before the search, probable cause to

believe that [the defendant] was committing a felony or a misdemeanor in their presence.”

Id. at 330.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that police officers’ observations of a marijuana

joint and the presence of marijuana odor did not rise to the level of probable cause to

believe an individual possessed a criminal amount of marijuana. Id. at 330–33.

Accordingly, there was no probable cause to justify an arrest, and thus, the police could

not conduct a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at 333.5

5 The Court did, however, decide that the marijuana joint and odor would justify a warrantless search under the automobile exception because the marijuana, while decriminalized, still constituted contraband. Pacheco, 465 Md. at 330. According to the Court, this result is justified in part by “the diminished expectation of privacy” in one’s vehicle compared to one’s person. Id. at 325–26.

During the 2023 legislative session, the General Assembly addressed this issue in the context of the legalization of marijuana and enacted House Bill 1071, effective July 1, 2023, which became law without the Governor’s signature. H.B. 1071, 2023 Leg., 445th Sess. (Md. 2023) (“H.B. 1071”); Press Release, Governor Moore Issues 2023 Legislative Session Vetoes, The Office of Governor Wes Moore (May 19, 2023), https://governor.maryland.gov/news/press/pages/Governor-Moore-Issues-2023- Legislative-Session-Vetoes.aspx [https://perma.cc/J4KB-9HG3]. The “bill prohibits a law enforcement officer from (1) initiating a stop or search of a person, motor vehicle, or vessel based solely on specified types of cannabis-related evidence and (2) conducting a search of specified areas of a motor vehicle or vessel during an investigation of a person solely for driving a motor vehicle or vessel while impaired by or under the influence of cannabis.” Dep’t Leg. Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note: Third Reader – Revised, H.B. 1071, at 1 (2023 Session). Specifically, an “officer may not initiate a stop or a search of a person, a motor

-10- Considering these cases together, a clearer picture of the search incident to arrest

exception emerges. Pacheco reminds us that, for the exception to apply, there must first

exist probable cause to arrest before conducting the search. Taylor demonstrates that two

scenarios will trigger the application of the search incident to arrest exception: where an

arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle and where the police have reason to

believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest. Finally, White clarifies the

distinct rules and requirements of the exception in the vehicular context. First, there must

be an arrest in conjunction with the search, and, as Pacheco reiterated, this arrest must be

supported by probable cause. Second, the part of the exception allowing a search for

evidence of the crime of arrest applies only to vehicular searches. Third, the exception

requires the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, that the

vehicle contains evidence of the crime. Fourth, the search incident to arrest must be limited

to the passenger compartment. Fifth, the search is limited to evidence of the offense for

which the defendant is arrested.

1. Parties’ Contentions

Rodriguez argues that the circuit court incorrectly determined that the warrantless

search of his vehicle was justified by the second Gant rationale—where “it is reasonable

vehicle, or a vessel based solely on one or more of the following: (1) the odor of burnt or unburnt cannabis; (2) the possession or suspicion of possession of cannabis that does not exceed the personal use amount, as defined under § 5-601 of the Criminal Law Article; or (3) the presence of cash or currency in proximity to cannabis without indicia of an intent to distribute.” H.B. 1701.

-11- to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.

Rodriguez contends that the court erred because Cpl. McGroarty was not looking for

additional evidence of the crime for which he was arrested—the theft of the license plates.

Instead, according to Rodriguez, Cpl. McGroarty was looking for evidence that the vehicle

was stolen—a separate crime from the crime for which he was arrested.

To support this contention, Rodriguez points to Cpl. McGroarty’s testimony at the

suppression hearing. When asked by the prosecutor what additional evidence he was

looking for in the search of the vehicle, the follow exchange took place:

[State:] You’re inside the car. You had retrieved the one license plate. What else are you looking for? [McGroarty:] Additional evidence. [State:] Additional evidence for what? [McGroarty:] Of the crime. [State:] Of the crime of stolen license tag? [McGroarty:] Stolen license plates. Yes, sir. [State:] Okay. And you haven’t—I mean, is there anything that you can think of that you might find that would encompass that? [McGroarty:] At that point, I wasn’t able to confirm the vehicle was stolen or not. So just—there could be other, you know, evidence of a crime at that point. Rodriguez argues that this exchange demonstrates that Cpl. McGroarty improperly

searched his glove compartment because he was looking for evidence of a stolen vehicle,

instead of stolen license plates. He maintains that the search should have ended when Cpl.

McGroarty had seized the stolen license plates because, at that point, he could not have

expected to find additional evidence of that crime.

-12- The State disagrees on the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest and

maintains that the circuit court did not err. The State argues that where there is reason to

believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime for which a defendant is arrested, the

police may search the passenger compartment and containers therein for such evidence.

The State contends that Cpl. McGroarty’s search of Rodriguez’s vehicle was justified

because the front license plate was located on the floorboard of the vehicle, thus giving

him reason to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the crime for which Rodriguez was

being arrested. The State disagrees with Rodriguez that the search of the glove

compartment was distinct from the officer seizing the front license plate. In the State’s

view, once Cpl. Rodriguez had reason to believe the stolen front license plate was in the

vehicle, he was permitted to search the passenger compartment and its containers,

including the glove compartment.

Alternatively, the State argues that the additional evidence in the glove compartment

that Cpl. McGroarty sought was the vehicle registration card. As argued by the State at the

suppression hearing, the vehicle’s registration card would provide additional evidence

whether the license plates did or did not belong to the Rodriguez vehicle. The State proffers

that this would satisfy the requirement that Cpl. McGroarty had reason to believe additional

evidence of the crime was located in the glove compartment.

2. Analysis

At trial, the case proceeded upon an agreed statement of facts, and there were no

material disputes regarding the relevant facts. Rodriguez concedes that Cpl. McGroarty

had probable cause to arrest him for the stolen license plates once he knew the car belonged

-13- to Rodriguez. The issue is purely one of law: whether the officer’s search of the car

incident to arrest for stolen plates was permissible under the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding

in Arizona v. Gant and could “reasonably lead to an expectation that further evidence of

that offense may be found in the passenger compartment.” See Taylor, 448 Md. at 248.

“[T]he Arizona v. Gant exception limits the predicate for the search to ‘evidence of

the offense of arrest.’” White, 248 Md. App. at 97–98. In Taylor, the Supreme Court

considered whether an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol justified a search

under Gant. Taylor, 448 Md. at 248. There, the Court said that there must be “some basis

in fact” to support the officer’s suspicion that the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of

arrest. Id. at 250. The Court declined to conclude that certain offenses would generate a

per se right to search under Gant but did comment that “in most cases of an arrest for

driving under the influence, there is likely to be, a basis in fact . . . which can be articulated,

of finding open containers or other evidence related to the offense inside the passenger

compartment.” Id. at 250–51. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that “[i]t is

a solid part of ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ law that reasonable suspicion may be

derived from an officer’s own experience or his or her knowledge of the experience of

other officers.” Id. at 251.

In contrast, this Court held in White that it was not reasonable to search the vehicle

after the defendant’s arrest for a carjacking that had occurred 18 days prior. 248 Md. App.

at 101. The Court reasoned that “there was no indication in this record to suggest . . . that

[the handgun used in the carjacking] was located within the leased vehicle [the defendant]

was driving on the day he was arrested.” Id. In that case, the defendant was arrested

-14- pursuant to a warrant rather than “a summary arrest based on conduct” and supported by

probable cause. Id. at 102. Thus, this Court agreed with the circuit court below that the

search was “both geographically and temporally . . . too attenuated to apply . . . Gant.” Id.

In this case, we accept the State’s narrower justification for conducting a warrantless

search of Rodriguez’s vehicle and conclude that the officer had reason to believe that there

would be evidence of the crime of arrest—for stolen license plates—inside Rodriguez’s

glove compartment. Although Cpl. McGroarty testified at the suppression hearing that he

was looking for evidence of the vehicle being stolen, he also affirmatively stated that he

was searching for additional evidence of the crime of stolen license plates. Additionally,

his inability to articulate the exact object of his search does not diminish the reasonableness

of the search. See United States v. Edwards, 769 F.3d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The

reasonableness of a search does not depend on the officer’s subjective motivations; the

inquiry is, of course, objective.”).

At the suppression hearing, the State made the following argument to the circuit

court judge:

[Corporal McGroarty] has every right to go [into Rodriguez’s vehicle] and look for any other indicia that might indicate that the Defendant—that either the tags are stolen and the Defendant either had more knowledge of it or other knowledge of the stolen tags or the possibility that the car might have been stolen. * * * [T]he State does believe that the officer had every right . . . to then enter the vehicle, take the tags, and then do an additional search. I think if looking for something in the nature of the search, the officer can open any container when he’s inside the vehicle.

-15- Glove box, it’s been deemed to be a container, and that, therefore, he can open that container or the glove box to see. And as the Court well is aware, knows that a lot of times people stick registration and other paperwork inside the glove box. And I think, essentially, that’s what the officer had been looking for, of course, any additional paperwork in the nature of his investigation. Based upon the testimony and argument at the suppression hearing, it is clear that

Cpl. McGroarty had “some basis in fact” for his suspicion that Rodriguez’s vehicle

contained additional evidence of the crime for which he was arrested. See Taylor, 448 Md.

at 250. Rodriguez was arrested for the stolen license plates. Cpl. McGroarty was justified

in entering the vehicle to retrieve the front license plate from the passenger floorboard

because the number matched the plate on the rear of the vehicle, which the officer had

confirmed to be stolen.

Stolen license plates necessarily involve motor vehicle records, which makes

Rodriguez’s motor vehicle documents relevant to his crime of arrest. Just as the Supreme

Court concluded in Taylor that “most cases” involving driving under the influence would

provide reason to believe there is evidence of the crime in the vehicle, 448 Md. at 250–51,

we also conclude that cases involving a stolen license plate will often provide the basis to

search for any motor vehicle records the car may contain. As the State explained in its

brief, a registration card in Maryland contains the vehicle owner’s name and the vehicle’s

registration number assigned by the Motor Vehicle Administration. Md. Code (1977, 2020

Repl. Vol.), Transp. (“TR”) § 13-408. The Maryland motor vehicle statutes require that

vehicles have properly registered license plates and the corresponding registration card.

TR § 13-701(a). The registration card to Rodriguez’s vehicle would establish whether the

-16- license plates did or did not match the registration card within the vehicle, which could

establish knowledge of the crime on the part of Rodriguez. This justifies the officer’s

decision to search for the vehicle’s motor vehicle records related to the license plates it

displayed.

Indeed, an officer’s personal experience or the collective experience of officers

informs the reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle contains additional evidence.

Taylor, 448 Md. at 251. As the State delineated at the suppression hearing, common

practice supports an officer’s instinct to search for additional evidence of stolen license

plates in the glove compartment where vehicle owners often keep their registration card.

See United States v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 789, 795 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he passenger

compartment of a car is ‘by custom and necessity[] a common repository for motor vehicle-

related documents.’”).

Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion under similar circumstances.

In United States v. Edwards, the defendant “was arrested for . . . driving a vehicle without

the owner’s consent.” 769 F.3d at 514 (citing statutory criminal offense). Approving a

search of the vehicle that recovered a sawed-off shotgun, the 7th Circuit reasoned that “it

was entirely reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of driving a vehicle without

the owner’s consent would be found in the [vehicle]” because “registration and title

documents are evidence of ownership and are often kept in a car.” Id. at 515. Similarly,

in United States v. Campbell-Martin, after the defendant was arrested “for providing false

identification information[,]” the officer searched “a backpack on the floor of the front-seat

passenger area.” 17 F.4th 807, 812 (8th Cir. 2021). The 8th Circuit approved the search

-17- under the search incident to arrest exception, concluding that the backpack “was a logical

place to look for identification such as a driver’s license, mail, receipts, credit cards, or

checks.” Id. at 816. Thus, where identification documents are relevant to the crime of

arrest, an officer is justified in searching parts of the vehicle where it is logical for them to

be kept.

The underlying conduct for Rodriguez’s arrest was closely connected to the search

of his vehicle. While we cannot say when the actual theft of the license plates occurred,

this is not a case like White where the lapse of time after the crime reduced the certainty

that there would be evidence in the vehicle. In this case, Rodriguez’s vehicle was actively

displaying the stolen license plates. A vehicle being driven is required to be registered, TR

§ 13-401(b)(1), and may not display inaccurate license plates or a false registration card.

TR § 13-703(f)-(g). Accordingly, Rodriguez’s conduct of displaying stolen license plates

was closely connected to the warrantless search.

We conclude that Cpl. McGroarty’s search of Rodriguez’s vehicle did not exceed

the scope of a permissible search under Gant. The officer had probable cause to arrest

Rodriguez for the stolen license plates. It was also reasonable for the officer to believe

there would be additional evidence of that crime inside Rodriguez’s vehicle. The officer

saw the second stolen license plate on the floorboard of the vehicle. While this second

license plate is additional evidence of the crime, it is not the only additional evidence of

the crime that is likely to be found in the vehicle. We are persuaded that motor vehicle

records which are often stored in the glove compartment are also relevant additional

-18- evidence. For these reasons, Cpl. McGroarty’s search of the glove compartment in

Rodriguez’s vehicle was justified under the second rationale of Arizona v. Gant.

Notwithstanding this holding, we explicitly reject the State’s carte blanche

argument that, after seeing the second license plate on the front passenger floorboard, the

officer was permitted to search the entire passenger compartment of Rodriguez’s vehicle.

As noted above, a search incident to arrest—where there is reason to believe evidence is in

the vehicle—is narrower than a search authorized under the automobile exception. Gant,

556 U.S. at 347. The search incident to arrest exception requires that the officer is looking

for evidence of the crime of arrest and not evidence of other crimes. Id. at 346–47; see

also White, 248 Md. App. at 97–98. In a case involving the automobile exception, the

Supreme Court has clarified that the scope of “[a] lawful search . . . generally extends to

the entire area in which the object of the search may be found[.]” United States v. Ross,

456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982).

Accordingly, in a warrantless search conducted under the search incident to arrest

exception, an officer’s search is limited to the passenger compartment and containers

therein that may contain the evidence of the offense of arrest. Thus, upon seeing some

evidence of the offense of arrest in the vehicle, an officer is not automatically permitted to

search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle, including all containers and

compartments therein. The search must still be limited to containers and compartments

which reasonably could contain the object of the officer’s search—evidence of the crime

of arrest.

-19- B. Automobile Exception

Rodriguez also argues that the search of his vehicle was not justified under the

automobile exception. The State disagrees. Because we conclude that Cpl. McGroarty’s

search of Rodriguez’s glove compartment was proper under Gant, we need not address

whether the search was valid under the automobile exception. We reiterate only that the

exceptions differ in key respects on the level of suspicion required, the need for an arrest,

the scope of the search, and the type of evidence sought, as we explained above, see supra

pp. 8–9, in our discussion of this Court’s prior decision in White v. State. We also

emphasize that “the scope of the search authorized [under the automobile exception] is

broader” than under the search incident to arrest exception, and that both are limited to

“any area of the vehicle in which the evidence [sought] might be found.” Gant, 556 U.S.

at 347.

STATEMENT MADE TO POLICE

A. Applicable Fifth Amendment Principles

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” U.S. Const., amend. V.6 In Miranda v.

Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that “the prosecution may not use statements,

whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the

6 Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights also protects the right against self- incrimination. Rodriguez makes no separate argument under Article 22, however, so our analysis is based exclusively on the federal constitutional provision.

-20- privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Court went on to

describe “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action

in any significant way.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Court proceeded to announce the

requirements which have come to be known as Miranda warnings:

Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Id.

This Court has consistently held that the Miranda protections apply only to a

“custodial interrogation” of a suspect. E.g., State v. Thomas, 202 Md. App. 545, 565

(2011). The burden is on the defendant to “establish two things: (1) custody; and (2)

interrogation.” Id.7 Whether a suspect is in custody is an objective determination based

on “the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” and whether “a reasonable person

[would] have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” J.D.B.

v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,

112 (1995)).

The Supreme Court of Maryland has explained that “[i]n analyzing whether an

individual is in custody for Miranda purposes, we ask, under the ‘totality of the

circumstances’ of the particular interrogation, ‘would a reasonable person have felt he or

7 Since we decide that Rodriguez was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, we need not address the legal contours of the interrogation prong.

-21- she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’” Thomas v. State, 429 Md.

246, 259 (2012) (quoting Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112). Further, the Supreme Court has

outlined a number of non-exhaustive factors as relevant to the analysis of custody:

when and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or as a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got to the place of questioning whether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request or escorted by police officers. Finally, what happened after the interrogation whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning. Id. at 260–61 (quoting Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 429 (2007)).

However, not every restraint on freedom qualifies as being “in custody” for the

purposes of Miranda. Brown v. State, 452 Md. 196, 211 (2017). Instead, the Miranda

protections apply only where “a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree

associated with formal arrest.’” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)).

For example, the Miranda safeguards are not required in the context of traffic stops

unless “a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected

to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes[.]” Id. The U.S. Supreme

Court explained in Berkemer:

Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who lacks probable cause but whose “observations lead him reasonably to suspect” that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to “investigate the

-22- circumstances that provoke suspicion.” United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). “[T]he stop and inquiry must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.’” Ibid. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)])[.] Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond. And, unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released. The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. Id. at 439–40 (footnotes omitted).

Following the reasoning of Berkemer, the Supreme Court of Maryland and this

Court have established that a “brief investigatory stop” does not usually implicate Miranda.

See State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 212 (2003) (“[T]he stop of Rucker was a brief

investigatory stop and had remained so when Rucker told the police he had cocaine.

Rucker was not in custody for purposes of Miranda because he was not restrained to a

degree associated with a formal arrest.”); see also Allen v. State, 158 Md. App. 194, 233

(2004) (declining to find a Miranda violation where the “brief encounters with appellant

were of a limited nature and were made in a public place, during the day, without the use

of any weapons or physical restraints”), aff’d on other grounds, 387 Md. 389 (2005);

Conboy v. State, 155 Md. App. 353, 372 (2004) (relying on the public location, daylight,

duration, presence of only one trooper, and lack of physical restraint to determine that an

“investigatory stop had not evolved into a formal arrest” or a degree of restraint akin to a

formal arrest).

-23- B. Parties’ Contentions

Rodriguez argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that his encounter did not

implicate Miranda because it was a mere accosting. According to Rodriguez, his statement

that he bought the license plates from a friend was the product of custodial interrogation

because he was not free to leave the encounter with Cpl. McGroarty. He relies on the

following factors to support his argument that he was in custody: that the officer was in

uniform, that the officer created an “uncomfortable tight squeeze” with his vehicle, that the

officer impeded his path to his vehicle, and that the officer questioned him about the stolen

license plates.

Rodriguez further argues that the encounter with the officer exceeded an accosting.

Although the initial question about the ownership of Rodriguez’s vehicle was general, the

accusatory nature of the second question—where did Rodriguez obtain the license plates—

elevated the encounter above an accosting. Additionally, Rodriguez contends that the

encounter was custodial and not an accosting because the officer had probable cause to

arrest him when he asked that question.

The State maintains that Rodriguez was not in custody when Cpl. McGroarty asked

him how he obtained the license plates. According to the State, the totality of the

circumstances indicated that Cpl. McGroarty’s encounter with Rodriguez was not the

equivalent of an arrest. Even if the encounter was more than an accosting, the State asserts

that investigatory stops also do not implicate Miranda protections.

-24- C. Analysis

It was Rodriguez’s burden at the suppression hearing to demonstrate that he was

entitled to Miranda warnings, requiring that he prove he was in police custody at the time

he was questioned and that the questions amounted to a police interrogation. Based on the

evidence established at the suppression hearing, we agree with the State that Rodriguez

was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when he told Cpl. McGroarty that he bought

the license plates from a friend. The totality of the circumstances does not rise to the level

of restraint typically associated with a formal arrest.

This Court has previously denoted the various governmental intrusions from

greatest to least amount of intrusion as (1) a stop, search, or arrest, pursuant to a warrant,

(2) a warrantless stop, search, or arrest, (3) a stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968), and (4) an accosting. Reynolds v. State, 130 Md. App. 304, 321 (1999). An

accosting is an “[o]nly minimally intrusive governmental action resulting in no restriction

of movement” and is “permitted as long as inquiry involves no show of authority and

objective circumstances indicate a reasonable person would feel free to leave.” Id.

The suppression court defined the interaction as an accosting and Rodriguez argues

that the court erred in doing so. We do not think it is necessary to base this decision on

whether Cpl. McGroarty’s interaction with Rodriguez was a mere accosting or something

greater. The term “accosting” is most often applied in Fourth Amendment cases analyzing

whether a suspect has been arrested. See Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64, 68 (1957) (“One is

not arrested when he is approached by a police officer and merely questioned as to his

identity and actions. This amounts to no more than an accosting.”); McChan v. State, 238

-25- Md. 149, 157 (1965) (“When one is approached by a police officer and merely questioned

as to his identity and actions, this is only an accosting and not an arrest.”); Mack v. State,

237 Md. App. 488, 494 (2018) (quoting Pyon v. State, 222 Md. App. 412, 421–22 (2015))

(“Fourth Amendment guarantees are not implicated in [an accosting or consensual

encounter] . . . ‘unless the police officer has by either physical force or show of authority

restrained the person’s liberty so that a reasonable person would not feel free to decline

the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’”).

However, our Courts have occasionally used the term when analyzing the

requirements of Miranda. For instance, this Court has said,

Under [the circumstances of an accosting], an individual suspected of committing a crime may be questioned while on the street, and not in an arrest status, without the necessity of first advising him of the constitutional protections afforded him under [Miranda] since that case has no application until “the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Morgan v. State, 2 Md. App. 440, 442 (1967) (citation omitted). Likewise in Duffy v. State,

the Supreme Court stated,

An accosted suspect need not be advised that he has the right to the presence of counsel before the first question can be propounded because such a right does not exist. Nor must the State prove, in order that the response to such a question may come into evidence against the accused in court, that an accosted suspect was first advised that he has the right to remain silent. The exclusion principles enunciated in . . . [Miranda] are not applicable to a confession gleaned from a suspect who is merely accosted by the police, but deal instead with the safeguards which must be provided for an accused who is in police custody. 243 Md. 425, 431–32 (1966).

-26- The Supreme Court and this Court have previously determined that brief

investigatory stops often do not implicate Miranda. Thus, it logically follows that an

accosting—as a lesser governmental intrusion than a Terry stop—will also not usually

implicate Miranda. These classifications may be useful in analyzing Miranda because “the

distinction between formal arrest or its equivalent, on the one hand,” and other stops—such

as an accosting or Terry stop—“on the other hand, is our most prominent criterion for

distinguishing Miranda’s applicability from Miranda’s inapplicability.” Smith v. State,

186 Md. App. 498, 528 (2009). The touchstone analysis, however, remains “whether there

was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a

formal arrest[.]” See Rucker, 374 Md. at 212.8

8 The Rucker Court wrote that “[t]he Supreme Court, and this Court, have declared that brief, investigatory stops are not custodial for purposes of Miranda.” State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 218 (2003). Rucker, however, was later criticized by the Supreme Court of Maryland in Longshore v. State for failing to “accord the trial court finding [about the exchange between the police and defendant] any deference” and failing to “address, or seek to assess ‘how a reasonable [person] . . . would have understood the situation.’” 399 Md. 486, 525 n.9 (2007). Indeed, Berkemer, while determining that traffic stops did not require Miranda warnings, also explained, “It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that this would “mean that the police and lower courts will continue occasionally to have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody.” Id. at 441. Thus, we think it is fairer to say that brief, investigatory stops are usually not custodial for purposes of Miranda, subject as always to the totality of the circumstances analysis.

-27- Considering the facts established at the suppression hearing, the totality of

circumstances does not indicate that Rodriguez was restrained to the degree associated with

a formal arrest such that Cpl. McGroarty was required to provide Miranda warnings. The

encounter occurred in the parking lot of a shopping center during daylight hours. Although

Cpl. McGroarty’s vehicle created a tight squeeze if Rodriguez were to try to leave in one

direction, his vehicle was unimpeded from departure if he turned in the opposite direction.

The encounter occurred on foot and was brief. There was no physical restraint or show of

force by Cpl. McGroarty. There is nothing in these facts that indicates that the encounter

was anything more than a brief, investigative stop. Without more, such a stop does not

implicate Miranda.

Rodriguez argues that he was in custody because, after the officer had confirmed

his ownership of the vehicle, the officer had probable cause to make an arrest, at which

point he was not free to leave. The Supreme Court considered a similar argument in

Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 246 (2012). In that case, the defendant had asked the Court to

“adopt a presumption that an individual is in custody when ‘police have sufficient evidence

to make an arrest prior to questioning; the person knows this before being questioned; and

the questioning then takes place away from public view inside a police station.’” Id. at

267. The Court rephrased his argument as being “that [the defendant] was in custody

because he believed that police had enough evidence to arrest him.” Id. The Court declined

to adopt such a presumption, reasoning that “it is clear that his assumptions regarding the

state of the evidence against him is irrelevant in a Miranda analysis.” Id. Relying on

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), and United States v. Woods, 720 F.2d 1022

-28- (9th Cir. 1983), the Court went further and said that “[w]hether police officers have

sufficient evidence to arrest, or believe they do, is irrelevant to a Miranda determination.”

Thomas, 429 Md. at 268.

Based upon Thomas, it is also irrelevant in this case whether Cpl. McGroarty had

developed, or believed he had developed, probable cause to arrest Rodriguez based only

on his assertion that he owned the vehicle. This is because the custody inquiry is an

objective one, not based upon the subjective views of either the officer or the suspect. Id.

at 267–68. As described above, a brief, investigative stop does not generally require an

officer to administer Miranda warnings, but the circumstances of such a stop may progress

to such a degree that the questioning becomes a custodial interrogation.

In this case, the totality of the circumstances indicate that Rodriguez was not

restrained in a manner that resembled a formal arrest during the initial questions.

Accordingly, Rodriguez was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, and Cpl. McGroarty

was not required to administer Miranda warnings. The circuit court did not err in denying

Rodriguez’s motion to suppress his statement to the officer that he bought the license plates

from a friend.

CONCLUSION

The warrantless search of Rodriguez’s vehicle was justified under the second

rationale of Arizona v. Gant because Cpl. McGroarty had reason to believe the vehicle

contained additional evidence of the crime for which Rodriguez was under arrest.

Additionally, Rodriguez was not in custody for purposes of Miranda during the brief

encounter when he told Cpl. McGroarty that he bought the stolen license plates from a

-29- friend. Therefore, the judge at the suppression hearing did not err in denying the motions

to suppress. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for

Anne Arundel County.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

-30-