Rodriguez v. Pride Dealer Services Incorporated

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided September 25, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-01955·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2

6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8

9 Mayra Rodriguez, No. CV-23-01955-PHX-ROS 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Pride Dealer Services Inc., a Florida 13 corporation,

14 Defendant. 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 16 (“Motion”) (Doc. 18) seeking $22,832.09 in fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, 17 the Court will grant Plaintiff’s award of fees and costs in a reduced amount of $12,100.11. 18 BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff filed this suit for unpaid wages, overtime, and minimum wages under the 20 Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Arizona Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”), and 21 the Arizona Wage Act (“AWA”). (Doc. 1). Defendant Pride Dealer Services, Inc. was 22 properly served (Doc. 9) but failed to answer or otherwise participate in the action. The 23 Court granted default judgment against Defendant in the amount of $47,639.00. (Doc. 16). 24 ATTORNEYS’ FEES 25 26 I. ENTITLEMENT AND ELIGIBILITY TO FEES Plaintiff requests $22,270.00 in attorneys’ fees and $562.09 in costs in accordance 27 with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Local Rule of Civil Procedure 54.2, and 28 1 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)—the FLSA’s fee-shifting provision that “provides for attorney fees and 2 costs to a successful plaintiff.” Haworth v. State of Nev., 56 F.3d 1048, 1050 n.1 (9th Cir. 3 1995). The Court finds Plaintiff is eligible for, and entitled to, attorneys’ fees. 4 The FLSA requires courts to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to successful 5 plaintiffs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Houser v. Matson, 447 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir. 6 1971) (“[The statute] provides that an award of attorney’s fee ‘shall’ be made to the 7 successful plaintiff. The award of an attorney’s fee is mandatory.”). As the prevailing 8 party in the present FLSA action, (Doc. 16), Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees. 9 Although Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to an award of fees, Plaintiff is not 10 entitled to payment for time spent in preparing the instant Motion. The Ninth Circuit 11 generally permits an award of fees for time expended in preparing a motion for attorneys’ 12 fees. See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 659-60 (9th Cir. 1985) (“In statutory 13 fee cases, federal courts, including our own, have uniformly held that time spent in 14 establishing the entitlement to and amount of the fee is compensable.”); Gary v. Carbon 15 Cycle Ariz. LLC, 398 F. Supp. 3d 468, 479 (D. Ariz. 2019) (citing In re Nucorp, 764 F.2d 16 at 660) (“[I]t would be inconsistent to dilute a fees award by refusing to compensate 17 attorneys for the time they reasonably spent in establishing their rightful claim to the fee.”). 18 However, to receive an award for fees associated with preparing an attorneys’ fees motion, 19 strict compliance with this Court’s Local Rules is required. 20 Local Rule of Civil Procedure 54.2(c)(2) provides: “If the moving party claims 21 entitlement to fees for preparing the motion and memorandum for award of attorneys’ fees 22 and related non-taxable expenses, such party also must cite the applicable legal authority 23 supporting such specific request.” (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff requests fees for 7.4 24 hours billed in preparing the instant Motion and its supporting documents.1 Plaintiff does 25 not, however, cite to any applicable legal authority supporting this request. The Court finds 26 Plaintiff is not entitled to payment for the 7.4 hours spent in preparing this Motion. Thus, 27 1 The Court is referring to four specific time entries between May 13 and May 17, 2024. 28 (See Doc. 18-1, Ex. A at 8-9). These time entries include drafting the Motion, revising it, drafting supporting documents such as declarations, and preparing exhibits. 1 preliminarily, the Court will reduce the fee award by $2,120.00. See Moshir v. Automobili 2 Lamborghini Am. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 789, 803–04 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“[Plaintiff] has failed 3 to specifically cite any applicable legal authority supporting his claim of entitlement to fees 4 for preparing the motion and memorandum for award of attorneys’ fees, as required by 5 LRCiv 54.2(c)(2) .... Accordingly, [Plaintiff] has not shown that he is entitled to recovery 6 for the 22.6 hours of attorney time spent in preparing his motion for fees and costs. The 7 court will reduce the reasonable hours component of the lodestar calculation 8 accordingly.”); see also Croomes v. Stream Glob. Servs.-AZ, Inc., No. CV11-0141-PHX- 9 JAT, 2012 WL 1247021, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 13, 2012) (denying defendant’s request for 10 fees incurred in preparing motion for fees and costs because defendant failed to cite any 11 legal authority supporting request); see also J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Margaillan, No. 12 CIV 13-312-TUC-CKJ, 2014 WL 169801, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2014) (“No authority 13 having been provided for an award for the preparation of the pending motion, the Court 14 will reduce the requested award by $450.00 (2.75 hours), the amount requested for the 15 preparation of the pending motion.”). 16 The Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to recover fees, excluding those incurred in 17 preparing the instant Motion. 18 II. REASONABLENESS OF REQUESTED AWARD 19 While the FLSA mandates an award of attorneys’ fees to a successful plaintiff, 20 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), “the amount of the award is within the discretion of the court,” Houser 21 v. Matson, 447 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir. 1971). Courts “employ the ‘lodestar’ method to 22 determine a reasonable attorney’s fees award.” Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 23 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Fischer v. SJB–P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000)). 24 Courts calculate the lodestar figure by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably 25 expended on a case by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. 26 After calculating the lodestar figure, a Court may reduce or increase the award based 27 on a variety of factors. Those factors include: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the 28 novelty and difficulty of the legal questions involved, (3) the skill required to perform the 1 legal service properly, (4) other employment precluded due to acceptance of the case, (5) 2 the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed 3 by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the 4 experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, 5 (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards 6 in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.

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Rodriguez v. Pride Dealer Services Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2024).

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