Rodriguez v. Hunt

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedAugust 22, 2024
Docket6:18-cv-01640
StatusUnknown

This text of Rodriguez v. Hunt (Rodriguez v. Hunt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rodriguez v. Hunt, (D. Or. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

EDGAR T. RODRIGUEZ, Case No. 6:18-cv-1640-MK

Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER

v.

TIMOTHY HUNT, an individual, MARK HUBBARD, an individual, FAITH MCCREADY, an individual, and CITY OF EUGENE, a municipal corporation,

Defendants.

KASUBHAI, United States Magistrate Judge: Plaintiff Edgar T. Rodriguez filed this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Oregon state law. Defendants include the City of Eugene as well as individuals Timothy Hunt, Mark Hubbard, and Faith McCready. Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Electronically Stored Information. ECF No. 131. For the reasons below, Defendants’ motion is denied. BACKGROUND This case arises out of a police response to a disturbance at Plaintiff’s apartment on September 10, 2016, during which Plaintiff was shot by Defendants Hubbard and Hunt with the

Eugene Police Department. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 35, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff survived and was taken to the hospital. Id. Ten days after the injury, on September 20, 2024, Plaintiff’s attorney sent the city a tort claim notice. Miller Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 132. The next day, Defendants responded with a letter advising Plaintiff to preserve relevant material. Miller Decl. Ex. 3. The preservation letter specifically instructed Plaintiff not to destroy, conceal, or otherwise alter any relevant electronic data stored on all computers and cell phones in his possession. Id. at 1. The letter also advised Mr. Rodriguez to back up his texts on a separate device so they did not accidentally get lost or destroyed. Id. at 2. Plaintiff brought this civil rights and state law action against Defendants on September 7,

2018. Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ First Request for Production (RFP) on February 5, 2019. Miller Decl. Ex. 4. That response noted that Plaintiff had “no responsive documents” to Defendants’ request for “[a]ll non-privileged communications between plaintiff and others, including, but not limited to, friends, family members, or members of the media, about the subject matter of this lawsuit.” Id. Plaintiff responded similarly for other RFPs related to ESI. Shortly after Plaintiff responded to this request for production, this case was stayed while criminal proceedings took place against Plaintiff. The stay was lifted on August 9, 2022, and discovery resumed. ECF No. 79. During Plaintiff’s deposition on April 14, 2023, Plaintiff testified that the cell phone he had at the time of the incident was seized by police related to the criminal investigation and that any subsequent cell phones he possessed during the relevant time following the incident had been discarded without downloading or preserving any data. Miller Decl. Ex. 17 at 28:9-32:14. On the phone Plaintiff was using at the time of his deposition, he testified that he used Facebook for text messages and that “the system” deleted those messages after a time. Id. at 49:5-21. He also had several email accounts that were set up to auto-delete

emails and he disposed of a laptop he possessed at the time of the incident without preserving any ESI. Id. at 49:22-51:9, 187:2-189:4. Plaintiff has testified that “[f]rom early on in this case, I have always suspected that the lawyers defending the cops who shot me would try to twist anything that I wrote to serve their interests. Therefore, I knew not to text or email anyone about the subject matter of this lawsuit.” Larwick Decl. Ex. 1 ¶ 3, ECF No. 144. He also explained that neither of the email accounts at issue nor the laptop he disposed of contained any communications about the subject matter of this lawsuit. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. Plaintiff’s sister testified that she never communicated with her brother via text about the lawsuit or how Plaintiff was doing physically or emotionally. Larwick Decl.

Ex. 2 at 13:14-14:4. Likewise, Defendants’ subpoenas to Plaintiff’s family and friends resulted in no responsive documents. See ECF Nos. 132-7, 132-8, 132-9, 132-10, 132-11, 132-12, 132-13. STANDARDS A court’s authority to sanction a party that has failed to preserve evidence is derived from two sources: “the inherent power of federal courts to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices, and the availability of sanctions under Rule 37 against a party who fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Sanctions are available under Rule 37(e) when “electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery.” If the moving party proves those elements, then: Two categories of sanctions exist. First, where the district court finds that the loss of information has prejudiced the moving party, the district court may order “measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1). Second, where the district court finds that the offending party “acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation,” the district court may require an adverse evidentiary presumption, dismiss the case, or enter default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2). Newberry v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 750 F. App’x 534, 537 (9th Cir. 2018). Sanctions are available under the Court’s inherent authority when “a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive practices that undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 958 (citation omitted). When applying that authority in the context of sanctions for spoliation, “[a] party’s destruction of evidence qualifies as willful spoliation if the party has some notice that the evidence was potentially relevant to the litigation before it was destroyed.” Id. at 959. DISCUSSION Defendants seek sanctions for Plaintiff’s alleged failure to preserve evidence Defendants argue was relevant. Plaintiff does not contest that he received a preservation of evidence letter, nor does he deny that he failed to preserve all text messages and emails in the years following the incident. However, Plaintiff contends that Defendants are not entitled to sanctions because they have not proven (1) that relevant ESI that should have been preserved is lost; (2) that Plaintiff did not take reasonable steps to preserve relevant ESI; (3) that the lost evidence cannot be obtained through other means; and (4) that Defendant was prejudiced by the loss and/or Plaintiff acted with an intent to deprive Defendants of relevant ESI. The Court agrees on Plaintiff’s first point that Defendants have not shown that relevant ESI that should have been preserved has been lost. Defendants present two primary arguments that Plaintiff failed to preserve relevant ESI. First, they argue that the volume of text messages Plaintiff exchanged in the month preceding the incident—recovered the seized cell phone—must mean that relevant text messages existed in the

subsequently-destroyed phone or phones. Second, they note that Plaintiff has admitted to communicating with family or friends about the incident. Defendants’ purported evidence fails to establish that any of the destroyed ESI was relevant to the litigation.

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Rodriguez v. Hunt, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rodriguez-v-hunt-ord-2024.