Rodriguez v. Gore

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 PEDRO RODRIGUEZ, Case No. 22-cv-527-MMA (NLS)

13 Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING 14 v. ACTION FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 15 SHERIFF WILLIAM GORE,

16 Defendant. 17 18 19 On April 15, 2022, Defendant Sheriff William Gore filed a notice of removal from 20 the Superior Court for the County of San Diego. See Doc. No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”). 21 For the reasons set forth below, the Court sua sponte REMANDS this case to the 22 Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego for lack of subject matter 23 jurisdiction. 24 LEGAL STANDARD 25 Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 26 479 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). Federal courts possess only that power authorized by 27 the Constitution or a statute. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 28 541 (1986). The Court is constitutionally required to raise issues related to federal 1 subject matter jurisdiction and may do so sua sponte. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 2 Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998); see Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 3 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990). Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, et 4 seq. A state court action can only be removed if it could have originally been brought in 5 federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Duncan 6 v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, for an action to be removed on the 7 basis of federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must establish either that federal law 8 creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the 9 resolution of substantial questions of federal law. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. 10 Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1983). 11 “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal, 12 and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Nishimoto 13 v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990). “Federal 14 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 15 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Whether federal 16 jurisdiction exists is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. 17 at 392. The well-pleaded complaint rule is a “powerful doctrine [that] severely limits the 18 number of cases in which state law ‘creates the cause of action’ that may be initiated in or 19 removed to federal district court . . . .” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9–10. Under this 20 rule, the federal question must be “presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly 21 pleaded complaint.” Id.; accord Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 22 (9th Cir. 2002). 23 DISCUSSION 24 Upon review of Defendant’s Notice of Removal and the attached Complaint, the 25 Court finds it appropriate to sua sponte remand the case to state court because the Notice 26 of Removal and attached Complaint fail to establish a proper basis for the Court’s subject 27 matter jurisdiction. 28 1 In his Notice of Removal, Defendant asserts that removal was proper under 28 2 U.S.C. § 1331 because “Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Sheriff Gore, in his official and 3 personal capacities, violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by impeding his ability to 4 seek meaningful redress with the Court.” Doc. No. 1 at 2. However, Plaintiff does not 5 allege that Defendant violated his First Amendment rights, nor does Plaintiff allege a 6 cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Instead, Plaintiff asserts various causes of action 7 arising solely under California law in a well-pleaded Complaint. He brings claims for 8 violations of the California Constitution, California Government Code, Unruh Act, Bane 9 Act, and Ralph Act, see Doc. No. 1-4 at 5–10, but no claims arising under federal law. 10 Plaintiff is “the master of his complaint,” and as such may “avoid federal jurisdiction by 11 pleading solely state-law claims.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 12 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 13 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)); Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005). He 14 has done so here, and that Plaintiff’s factual allegations could have given rise to a claim 15 under federal law does not create federal question jurisdiction. See Schmid v. City of 16 Petaluma, No. C 11-05238 CRB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14141, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 17 2012). 18 Further, although not raised by Defendant, a review of the Notice of Removal and 19 Complaint reveals that subject matter jurisdiction is not proper under the Grable doctrine, 20 see Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 21 (2005) (framing the essential question as: “[D]oes a state-law claim necessarily raise a 22 stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may 23 entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state 24 judicial responsibilities”), nor is there diversity jurisdiction over this matter, see 28 25 U.S.C. § 1332. 26 CONCLUSION 27 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction 28 over this action and REMANDS to the Superior Court of California for the County of 1 ||San Diego. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to return the case to state court 2 || forthwith and close this action. 3 IT ISSO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: April 20, 2022 5 pide UM Lilt 6 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28