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AARON D. FORD Attorney General HARRY B. WARD, Bar No. 11317 Deputy Attorney General State of Nevada Public Safety Division 100 N. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4717 Tel: (775) 684-1259 E-mail: hward@ag.nv.gov Attorneys for Defendant James Dzurenda } PEDRO RODRIGUEZ, Case No. 3:17-cv-00205-MMD-CLB Plaintiff, vs. MOTION TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE TO FILE MOTIONS FOR JAMES DZURENDA, SUMMARY JUDGMENT (First Request) Defendant. Defendant, James Dzurenda, by and through counsel, Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General of the State of Nevada, and Harry B. Ward, Deputy Attorney General, hereby move to extend the deadline to file dispositive motions in this matter by thirty (30) days. Plaintiff Pedro Rodriguez #59114 (Rodriguez), is a prisoner in the lawful custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). (ECF No. 7 at 1). Rodriguez is proceeding pre se in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action asserting an First Amendment free exercise claim; ar equal protection claim; and a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Ac (RLUIPA) claim against Defendant, former NDOC Director James Dzurenda (Dzurenda) (See generally, ECF No. 7). Rodriguez asserts that the NDOC does not recognize Satanisn as a legitimate faith group. (/d.). Rodriguez seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Ud. at 14). i///
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Dzurenda filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 37); Rodriguez opposed the motion (ECF No. 50); and Dzurenda replied. (ECF No. 54). United States Magistrate Judge Carla B. Carry reviewed the record and motions anc submitted a Report and Recommendation that Dzurenda’s motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 37). United States District Judge Miranda M. Du declined to adopt the Report and Recommendation and ordered Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be denied (ECF No. 64 at 13:1-4). The Court rejected Defendant’s arguments that he is entitled tc }summary judgment based on: the statute of limitations; exhaustion of administrative remedies; personal participation of Dzurenda; and qualified immunity. (See generally ECF No. 64). Defense counsel respectfully requests this extension to: 1. become more acquainted with this Court’s original Order denying Defendant’s initial motion to dismiss / motion fox summary judgment; 2. evaluate the sensitive nature of a religious case regarding Satanism; 3. explore all possible defenses; and 4. obtain new and additional declarations from NDOC in support of defendant’s (second) motion for summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) governs extensions of time and provides as follows: When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or (B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect. Defendants’ request is timely and will not hinder or prejudice Rodriguez’s case, but wil. allow for a thorough briefing to narrow or eliminate issues in this case and to address Judge Du’s Order of denial of Defendant’s initial motion. (See generally ECF No. 64). The requested thirty (30) day extension of time should permit Defendant time to adequately research, draft, obtain new and additional declarations and submit additional dispositive ;motions in this case. Defendants assert that the requested good cause is present tc warrant the requested extension of time.
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For these reasons, Defendant respectfully requests a thirty (80) day extension o: /time from the current deadline to file dispositive motions in this case, with a new deadline to and including Monday, March 30, 2020. If, DISCUSSION A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1) allows this Court to extend deadlines. District courts have inherent power to control their dockets. Hamilton Copper & Steel Corp. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 898 F.2d 1428, 1429 (9th Cir. 1990); Oliva v. Sullivan 958 F.2d 272, 273 (9th Cir. 1992). Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1) governs enlargements of time and provides as follows: When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or (B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect. “The proper procedure, when additional time for any purpose is needed, is t present to the Court a timely request for an extension before the time fixed has expirec (i.e, a request presented before the time then fixed for the purpose in question ha: expired).” Canup v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282, 283 (D.Pa. 1962). The Canup Court explained that “the practicalities of life” (such as an attorney’s “conflicting professional engagements” or personal commitments such as vacations, family activities j/ illnesses, or death) often necessitate an enlargement of time to comply with a cour deadline. Id. Extensions of time “usually are granted upon a showing of good cause, i timely made.” Creedon v. Taubman, 8 F.R.D. 268, 269 (D.Ohio 1947). The good cause standard considers a party’s diligence in seeking the continuance or extension. Johnsor Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). B. Good Cause Exists to Enlarge the Time for Defendants to Respond. Here, Defendants are requesting additional time to respond in advance of the deadline to do so. Therefore, they must demonstrate good cause for the □□□□□□□□□ enlargement. Moreover, good cause exists to enlarge Defendant’s time to move fo:
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AARON D. FORD Attorney General HARRY B. WARD, Bar No. 11317 Deputy Attorney General State of Nevada Public Safety Division 100 N. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4717 Tel: (775) 684-1259 E-mail: hward@ag.nv.gov Attorneys for Defendant James Dzurenda } PEDRO RODRIGUEZ, Case No. 3:17-cv-00205-MMD-CLB Plaintiff, vs. MOTION TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE TO FILE MOTIONS FOR JAMES DZURENDA, SUMMARY JUDGMENT (First Request) Defendant. Defendant, James Dzurenda, by and through counsel, Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General of the State of Nevada, and Harry B. Ward, Deputy Attorney General, hereby move to extend the deadline to file dispositive motions in this matter by thirty (30) days. Plaintiff Pedro Rodriguez #59114 (Rodriguez), is a prisoner in the lawful custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). (ECF No. 7 at 1). Rodriguez is proceeding pre se in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action asserting an First Amendment free exercise claim; ar equal protection claim; and a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Ac (RLUIPA) claim against Defendant, former NDOC Director James Dzurenda (Dzurenda) (See generally, ECF No. 7). Rodriguez asserts that the NDOC does not recognize Satanisn as a legitimate faith group. (/d.). Rodriguez seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Ud. at 14). i///
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Dzurenda filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 37); Rodriguez opposed the motion (ECF No. 50); and Dzurenda replied. (ECF No. 54). United States Magistrate Judge Carla B. Carry reviewed the record and motions anc submitted a Report and Recommendation that Dzurenda’s motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 37). United States District Judge Miranda M. Du declined to adopt the Report and Recommendation and ordered Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be denied (ECF No. 64 at 13:1-4). The Court rejected Defendant’s arguments that he is entitled tc }summary judgment based on: the statute of limitations; exhaustion of administrative remedies; personal participation of Dzurenda; and qualified immunity. (See generally ECF No. 64). Defense counsel respectfully requests this extension to: 1. become more acquainted with this Court’s original Order denying Defendant’s initial motion to dismiss / motion fox summary judgment; 2. evaluate the sensitive nature of a religious case regarding Satanism; 3. explore all possible defenses; and 4. obtain new and additional declarations from NDOC in support of defendant’s (second) motion for summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) governs extensions of time and provides as follows: When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or (B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect. Defendants’ request is timely and will not hinder or prejudice Rodriguez’s case, but wil. allow for a thorough briefing to narrow or eliminate issues in this case and to address Judge Du’s Order of denial of Defendant’s initial motion. (See generally ECF No. 64). The requested thirty (30) day extension of time should permit Defendant time to adequately research, draft, obtain new and additional declarations and submit additional dispositive ;motions in this case. Defendants assert that the requested good cause is present tc warrant the requested extension of time.
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For these reasons, Defendant respectfully requests a thirty (80) day extension o: /time from the current deadline to file dispositive motions in this case, with a new deadline to and including Monday, March 30, 2020. If, DISCUSSION A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1) allows this Court to extend deadlines. District courts have inherent power to control their dockets. Hamilton Copper & Steel Corp. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 898 F.2d 1428, 1429 (9th Cir. 1990); Oliva v. Sullivan 958 F.2d 272, 273 (9th Cir. 1992). Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1) governs enlargements of time and provides as follows: When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or (B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect. “The proper procedure, when additional time for any purpose is needed, is t present to the Court a timely request for an extension before the time fixed has expirec (i.e, a request presented before the time then fixed for the purpose in question ha: expired).” Canup v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282, 283 (D.Pa. 1962). The Canup Court explained that “the practicalities of life” (such as an attorney’s “conflicting professional engagements” or personal commitments such as vacations, family activities j/ illnesses, or death) often necessitate an enlargement of time to comply with a cour deadline. Id. Extensions of time “usually are granted upon a showing of good cause, i timely made.” Creedon v. Taubman, 8 F.R.D. 268, 269 (D.Ohio 1947). The good cause standard considers a party’s diligence in seeking the continuance or extension. Johnsor Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). B. Good Cause Exists to Enlarge the Time for Defendants to Respond. Here, Defendants are requesting additional time to respond in advance of the deadline to do so. Therefore, they must demonstrate good cause for the □□□□□□□□□ enlargement. Moreover, good cause exists to enlarge Defendant’s time to move fo:
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summary judgment based on the sensitivity and complexity of Rodriguez's religious claims and this Court’s prior ruling denying Defendant’s initial motion to dismiss / motior for summary judgment. (See generally ECF No. 37 — Dzurenda’s motion for summary judgment and ECF No. 64 — Order denying Defendants motion for summary judgment.) Good cause exists to enlarge Defendants’ time to file dispositive motions in this matte because: (1) Rodriguez’s claims include sensitive religious claims; (2) this Court has \\denied Defendant’s initial motion for summary judgment regarding the defenses o: statute of limitations, exhaustion, and qualified immunity which now need additiona legal research and time to appropriately respond; and (3) counsel needs additional time t explore all possible defenses; obtain additional updated and new declarations from multiple NDOC personnel; and explore the new NDOC Director’s position in this matte! in support of their motion for summary judgment. Defendants request this enlargement of time in good faith, not for the purpose o unnecessary delay, and they do not anticipate any unfair prejudice to Rodriguez if thi motion is granted. 111. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Cour grant their motion and allow them an additional thirty (30) days, or up to and includin; Monday, March 30, 2020, to file their motion for summary judgment. DATED this 27th day of February, 2020. 99 Attorney General By: __/s/Harry B. Ward HARRY B. WARD, Bar No. 11317 Deputy Attorney General
on Attorneys for Defendants
IS SO ORDERED S. STRATE JUDGE 4 DATED: 2/, 26/2220 _
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I certify that I am an employee of the Office of the Attorney General, State o Nevada, and that on this 27th day of February, 2020, I caused to be deposited for mailing /in the U.S. Mail a copy of the foregoing, MOTION TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE TC FILE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (First Request) to the following Pedro Rodriguez, #59114 Ely State Prison P.O. Box 1989 Ely, NV 89301 /s/Perla M. Hernandez An employee of the Office of the Attorney General