Rodriguez-Mendoza v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-4815
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDRES RICARDO RODRIGUEZ- No. 24-4815 MENDOZA; JURLEY ANDREA Agency Nos. FARFAN-SANCHEZ; D.M.R.F, A240-335-557 A240-335-558 Petitioners, A240-335-559 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 11, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: GRABER, BEA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Andres Ricardo Rodriguez-Mendoza and Jurley Andrea Farfan-

Sanchez1 are natives and citizens of Colombia who seek review of a decision of the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Petitioners’ daughter is a derivative beneficiary on both of their asylum applications. Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial

evidence factual findings and will not overturn a finding “unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Flores-Rodriguez v.

Garland, 8 F.4th 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petitions.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Farfan-

Sanchez failed to show that the Colombian government is unwilling or unable to

protect her. See J.R. v. Barr, 975 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2020) (“In order to

establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution, an applicant must

show . . . [that] the government is either unable or unwilling to control [the

applicant’s persecutor].” (quoting Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir.

2000))). The existence of forensic evidence alone does not prove that the

Colombian police had a prosecutable case against Farfan-Sanchez’s uncle.

Additionally, the agency permissibly relied on the fact that the Colombian police

arrested the uncle and jailed him for a year until Farfan-Sanchez’s mother dropped

the charges against him. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s

ruling that Farfan-Sanchez is not eligible for asylum.

2 24-4815 2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that

Rodriguez-Mendoza did not fear harm on account of an imputed political opinion.

The fact that the stranger who shot Rodriguez-Mendoza called him a “snitch” does

not compel us to find that Rodriguez-Mendoza was persecuted for an imputed

political opinion. Even assuming that the unknown shooter was a member of a

paramilitary organization, the term “snitch” could have referred to the fact that

Rodriguez-Mendoza’s mother filed a police report after the paramilitary

organization asked Rodriguez-Mendoza to smuggle weapons and drugs on its

behalf. Therefore, the agency reasonably found that the stranger shot Rodriguez-

Mendoza because his family contacted the police after he refused to participate in

illegal activity, and not because he held, or was believed by the shooter to hold, a

political opinion hostile to the paramilitary organization. See Regalado-Escobar v.

Holder, 717 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that even when a political

organization commonly engages in illegal or violent activities, the refusal of

recruitment efforts does not necessarily compel a finding of imputed political

opinion).

3. In addition, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief

to Rodriguez-Mendoza.2 See Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023)

2 Farfan-Sanchez did not challenge the IJ’s denial of her request for CAT protection.

3 24-4815 (“The record must show that it is more likely than not that the petitioner will face a

particularized and non-speculative risk of torture.”). After being shot, Rodriguez-

Mendoza lived in Colombia for more than three years without additional incident.

Although he moved several times and lived a more secluded life than he did before

the shooting, he was able to earn a living as a taxi driver during those years. See

Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 704–05 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding that

the petitioner’s ability to relocate and avoid harm justified denial of CAT relief).

Accordingly, Rodriguez-Mendoza’s evidence does not compel us to find that he

established a likelihood of torture if returned to Colombia.

4. Finally, Rodriguez-Mendoza challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to

remand. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, Taggar v. Holder, 736 F.3d 886, 889

(9th Cir. 2013), we see none. Rodriguez-Mendoza sought remand to introduce

new evidence that two unknown men followed his sister, threatened her, and asked

about Rodriguez-Mendoza’s whereabouts. But remand is appropriate only if the

BIA concludes that it cannot decide a case without new evidence to resolve factual

disputes. Zumel v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 463, 475 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, the BIA

assumed the additional facts arguendo but held that those facts were unlikely to

affect the result. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying remand because

substantial evidence would have supported the BIA’s determination even

considering the sister’s testimony.

4 24-4815 PETITIONS DENIED.3

3 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for a stay of removal, Docket No. 18, and supplemental motion for a stay of removal, Docket No. 21, are otherwise DENIED.

5 24-4815