Rodriguez Garay v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-4705
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FATIMA LOURDE RODRIGUEZ No. 24-4705 GARAY; L.H.R., Agency Nos. A208-987-810 Petitioners, A208-987-811 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 10, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, MILLER, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Fatima Lourde Rodriguez Garay and her minor child—natives and citizens

of El Salvador—petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration

Appeals dismissing their appeal from an order of an immigration judge denying

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252,

and we deny the petition.

In reviewing the Board’s decision, “we consider only the grounds relied

upon by that agency.” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021).

“Where, as here, the [Board] has reviewed the [immigration judge’s] decision and

incorporated portions of it as its own, we treat the incorporated parts of the

[immigration judge’s] decision as the [Board’s].” Id. (quoting Molina-Estrada v.

INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002)). We review the Board’s factual findings

for substantial evidence. Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2021).

Under that standard, findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s asylum and withholding of

removal determinations. An applicant who asserts that she faces persecution on

account of a protected ground must show that the ground would be, for asylum,

“one central reason,” and for withholding, “a reason,” for the persecution. Garcia,

988 F.3d at 1146; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(C). Those

standards “address the persecutor’s motive for persecuting the victim.” Garcia,

988 F.3d at 1146 (quoting Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357 (9th Cir.

2 24-4705 2017)).

Petitioners assert they were persecuted because of Rodriguez Garay’s

feminist political opinion and her Christian religion. It was reasonable, however,

for the agency to find that the gang members who tried to recruit her were

motivated by neither. Rodriguez Garay testified that the gang members “wanted

[her] to join them” in order for her to be “one of their wom[en]” who would “go

around and do bad things like they do.” When asked whether she had “done

anything to cause this group to come after” her, she responded, “Just . . . not

joining them.” Although Rodriguez Garay testified that a gang member told her to

“stop talking about” her faith, when asked whether the gang member who

threatened her said “anything to [her] about [her] telling . . . people about God,”

she responded, “No.” Petitioners emphasize that Rodriguez Garay “was able to

withstand gang ‘recruitment’ due in large part to her Christian faith,” but the nexus

question is whether the alleged persecutors were motivated by a protected ground,

not whether the applicant was. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012,

1025 (9th Cir. 2023).

Petitioners argue that the Board erred by mistakenly reviewing for clear

error whether the gang members’ motives showed the required nexus. A

persecutor’s motive is a factual determination that the Board reviews for clear

error, and whether that motive “meets the required nexus standard is a legal

3 24-4705 determination that the [Board] is required to review de novo.” Umana-Escobar v.

Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 551 n.2 (9th Cir. 2023). The Board applied the correct

standards of review. The Board first “affirm[ed] the Immigration Judge’s

determination that [petitioners] did not establish the requisite nexus,” and it made

clear, in an explanatory parenthetical, that its review of the nexus determination

was “de novo.” The Board then went on to review the immigration judge’s factual

finding that the “alleged persecutors were not motivated by protected grounds,”

and it “discern[ed] no clear error in that finding.” Petitioners assert that the

sequencing of these sentences suggests that the Board reviewed the nexus

determination only for clear error, but “[i]n the absence of some contrary

indication in the Board’s opinion, we do not presume that the Board has

disregarded the law.” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 773 (9th Cir. 2022).

Petitioners also assert that the Board’s explanation was inadequate, but it was

“sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that” the Board “has heard and

thought and not merely reacted.” Li v. Bondi, 139 F.4th 1113, 1124 (9th Cir. 2025)

(quoting Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017)).

2. The agency’s CAT determination was also supported by substantial

evidence. To show eligibility for CAT protection, an applicant must demonstrate

that her future harm will be “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the

consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other

4 24-4705 person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The Board agreed

with the immigration judge’s finding that “neither the written record nor the

testimony establishes evidence of government actors in this case.” That finding

was reasonable. And as the immigration judge correctly noted, the country

conditions report submitted by petitioners “indicates the police have had success

enforcing the law against gang members as evidenced by the large number of

suspected gang members in the . . . Salvadoran prisons.”

The temporary stay of removal will remain in place until the issuance of the

mandate. The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 3) is otherwise denied.

PETITION DENIED.

5 24-4705