Rodriguez Diaz v. Kaiser

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 14, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05071
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 ARNOLDO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, Case No. 3:25-cv-05071

9 Petitioner-Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 10 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; AND ORDER TO SHOW 11 POLLY KAISER, Acting Field Office CAUSE WHY PRELIMINARY Director of San Francisco Office of INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE 12 Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department [Re: Dkt. No. 2] 13 of Homeland Security, et al., 14 Respondents-Defendants. 15 16

17 18 Before the Court is Petitioner-Plaintiff Arnoldo Rodriguez Diaz’s Ex Parte Motion for 19 Temporary Restraining Order. Dkt. No. 2 (“Mot.”). Petitioner-Plaintiff simultaneously filed his 20 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order against 21 Respondents-Defendants Acting Field Office Director Polly Kaiser, Acting Director of 22 Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd M. Lyons, Secretary of the Department of 23 Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney General Pam Bondi on June 14, 24 2025, seeking an order temporarily enjoining the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), 25 their agents, employees, and successors in office from re-detaining him until such time as he has 26 had an opportunity to challenge his re-detention before a neutral decisionmaker. Id. at 1. 27 Petitioner-Plaintiff states that he was released from immigration custody five years ago, but fears 1 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in appointment this weekend. Id. 2 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner-Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for 3 Temporary Restraining Order. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 Petitioner-Plaintiff was born in El Salvador and has lived in the United States since he was 6 nine years old. Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”) ¶ 24. DHS initiated removal proceedings against him 7 when he was fifteen years old. Id. ¶ 30. Petitioner-Plaintiff was arrested in 2018 and pled guilty 8 to domestic violence charges. Id. ¶ 33. He was taken into custody by ICE upon completion of his 9 sentence. Id. Petitioner-Plaintiff was incarcerated by DHS for seventeen months between 2019 10 and 2020 pending resolution of his immigration case. Id. ¶ 2. DHS released him on a $10,000 11 bond in May 2020 pursuant to an order of District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers. Id. DHS 12 installed an electronic ankle monitor and enrolled Petitioner-Plaintiff in the Intensive Supervision 13 Appearance Program (“ISAP”). Id. DHS removed the ankle monitor in April 2022. Id. 14 Petitioner-Plaintiff has been out of custody for five years, during which time he has been 15 the sole caretaker for his minor U.S. citizen son, and he recently became the father of a newborn 16 U.S. citizen daughter. Petition ¶¶ 2-3. Petitioner-Plaintiff has complied with all conditions of 17 release. Id. ¶ 2. His most recent check-in appointment with ICE was on May 31, 2024 and he has 18 another appointment on June 30, 2025. Id. ¶ 4. Id. Petitioner-Plaintiff has several pending 19 applications for relief for removal, including a pending asylum application that is scheduled for a 20 Master Calendar Hearing before the San Francisco Immigration Court on August 19, 2026. Id. ¶ 21 24. 22 On Friday, June 13, 2025, Petitioner-Plaintiff received a message on his telephone from 23 ISAP directing him to report to the San Francisco ISAP Office in person on either Saturday, June 24 14, 2025 or Sunday, June 15, 2025. Petition ¶ 5. No reason was given. Id. Petitioner-Plaintiff’s 25 counsel attempted to call ISAP three times, and each time counsel was placed on hold before the 26 call was disconnected. Id. Petitioner-Plaintiff’s counsel also tried calling and emailing the San 27 Francisco ICE Office to seek clarification, but received no response. Id. Petitioner-Plaintiff is 1 of those individuals were incarcerated or re-incarcerated when they complied. Id. ¶¶ 6-9. 2 Petitioner-Plaintiff filed the present Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Ex Parte 3 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order on June 14, 2025, seeking to enjoin Respondents- 4 Defendants from re-detaining him at his in-person check-in with immigration authorities. 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for 7 issuing a preliminary injunction. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 8 2017) (“[T]he legal standards applicable to TROs and preliminary injunctions are substantially 9 identical.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). An injunction is a matter of equitable 10 discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 11 the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 12 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). And “a TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and 13 preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing 14 and no longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) 15 (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 16 70, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974)). 17 A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish “[1] that he is likely to 18 succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 19 relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 20 interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions 21 going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary 22 injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the 23 other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 24 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hen the Government is the 25 opposing party,” the final two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the requirements for issuing a temporary 1 case. Petitioner-Plaintiff’s attorney has set out specific facts showing that “immediate and 2 irreparable injury, loss, or damage” may result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition 3 and has stated that counsel attempted to contact the Civil Division Chief at the U.S. Attorney’s 4 Office for the Northern District of California on Friday, June 13, 2025 regarding the forthcoming 5 Habeas Petition and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. See Dkt. No. 2-2, Sinodis Decl. Re 6 Notice ¶¶ 3-5. 7 The Court finds that Petitioner-Plaintiff has shown at least that there are “serious questions 8 going to the merits” and that “the balance of hardships tips sharply” in his favor. Weber, 767 F.3d 9 at 942. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 10 no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 11 amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 12 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 13 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). Courts have 14 previously found that individuals released from immigration custody on bond have a protectable 15 liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond. See Ortiz Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv- 16 5785, 2020 WL 5074312, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 17 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Just as people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a 18 liberty interest, so too does Ortega have a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”); 19 Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022) (“[T]his 20 Court joins other courts of this district facing facts similar to the present case and finds Petitioner 21 raised serious questions going to the merits of his claim that due process requires a hearing before 22 an IJ prior to re-detention.”); Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 783561, at *2 23 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021). 24 For similar reasons as those discussed in the aforementioned cases, this Court finds that the 25 three factors relevant to the due process inquiry set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 26 (1976)—“the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” “the risk of an erroneous 27 deprivation . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” 1 burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail,” id. at 335—support 2 requiring a pre-detention hearing for Petitioner-Plaintiff. Petitioner-Plaintiff has a substantial 3 private interest in remaining out of custody on bond, which “enables him to do a wide range of 4 things open to persons” who are free from custody, such as working, living at home, and “be[ing] 5 with family and friends . . . to form the enduring attachments of normal life.” See Mot. at 10; 6 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). There is also a risk of erroneous deprivation that 7 the additional procedural safeguard of a pre-detention hearing would help protect against. And, 8 like other Courts in this district, the Court concludes that the government’s interest in re-detaining 9 Petitioner-Plaintiff without a hearing is “low,” particularly in light of the fact that Petitioner- 10 Plaintiff has long complied with his reporting requirements. See Jorge M.F., 2021 WL 783561, at 11 *3; Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970. 12 Petitioner-Plaintiff is also likely to suffer immediate and irreparable harm in the absence of 13 preliminary relief. The Ninth Circuit has recognized “irreparable harms imposed on anyone 14 subject to immigration detention” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and 15 their families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms to children of detainees whose 16 parents are detained.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). Both risks are 17 present here, where Petitioner-Plaintiff has two minor children, one a newborn, who depend upon 18 him for support. Dkt. No. 2-1, Sinodis Decl. ¶ 9. In addition, “[i]t is well established that the 19 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. 20 Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 21 Finally, the balance of the equities and the public interest, which merge in light of the fact 22 that the government is the opposing party, tip sharply in Petitioner-Plaintiff’s favor. “[T]he public 23 has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth 24 Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge 25 M. F., 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (cleaned up) (quoting Ortiz Vargas, 2020 WL 5074312, at *4, and 26 then quoting Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996); see also Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th 27 Cir. 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has 1 requested injunctive relief, Petitioner-Plaintiff might be abruptly taken into ICE custody, 2 subjecting both him and his family to significant hardship. See Mot. at 13. Yet the comparative 3 harm potentially imposed on Respondents-Defendants is minimal—a mere short delay in detaining 4 Petitioner-Plaintiff, should the government ultimately show that detention is intended and 5 warranted. Moreover, a party “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable 6 sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 7 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). 8 Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Petitioner-Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary 9 Restraining Order. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court “may issue a preliminary 10 injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the 11 court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been 12 wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The rule “invests the district court 13 ‘with discretion as to the amount of security required, if any,’” and the court “may dispense with 14 the filing of a bond when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from 15 enjoining his or her conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 16 Barahona–Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999)). In this case, in light of the 17 minimal risk of harm to the government, the Court determines that security is not required. 18 IV. ORDER 19 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner-Plaintiff’s Ex Parte 20 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED to preserve the status quo pending further 21 briefing and a hearing on this matter. Respondents-Defendants are ENJOINED AND 22 RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner-Plaintiff without notice and a hearing. This Order 23 shall remain in effect until Monday, June 23, 2025 at 5:00 p.m. The Petition for Writ of Habeas 24 Corpus, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and this Order SHALL be served on 25 Respondents-Defendants such that they receive actual notice by no later than Monday, June 16, 26 2025 at 2:00 p.m. 27 Respondents-Defendants are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in-person at a hearing in the ] 2025 at 1:00 p.m. why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Respondents-Defendants shall 2 || file a response to Petitioner-Plaintiff's motion by no later than Wednesday, June 18, 2025 at 5:00 3 || p.m. No reply shall be filed. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 || Dated: June 14, 2025 at 3:40 p.m. _fptnfaecnan BETH LABSON FREEMAN, as Duty Judge 9 United States District Judge 10 1] as 12

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