Rodriguez Arevalo v. Bondi

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 3 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MAYRA ALEJANDRA RODRIGUEZ No. 23-3920 AREVALO; CARLOS FELIPE GIL Agency Nos. RODRIGUEZ, A240-055-130 A240-081-379 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 30, 2025**

Before: SANCHEZ, H.A. THOMAS, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Mayra Alejandra Rodriguez Arevalo and her minor son are natives and

citizens of Colombia. They appeal the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Rodriguez Arevalo’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We review de novo “due process

challenge[s] in an immigration proceeding.” Arizmendi-Medina v. Garland, 69

F.4th 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2023). We review the BIA’s factual findings for

“substantial evidence,” and uphold the BIA’s determination “if the decision is

supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record

considered as a whole.” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 2008)). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition in part and dismiss it in

part.

1. The IJ’s treatment of Rodriguez Arevalo’s asylum and withholding of

removal claims did not violate her due process rights. Rodriguez Arevalo did not

identify a particular social group, or any other protected ground, although one is

required to establish an asylum or withholding of removal claim. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). The IJ’s “obligation to fully develop the

record” for Rodriguez Arevalo as a pro se applicant did not alleviate Rodriguez

Arevalo of her “statutory burden of proof to establish that [she] satisfies the

1 Rodriguez Arevalo’s son is a derivative beneficiary of her asylum application. He did not file separate applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that, unlike asylum, derivative relief is not available with respect to withholding of removal or CAT protection).

2 23-3920 applicable eligibility requirements for the relief sought.” Zamorano v. Garland, 2

F.4th 1213, 1226 (9th Cir. 2021). Nor did it constitute the IJ impermissibly acting

as Rodriguez Arevalo’s attorney. Id.

Rodriguez Arevalo, moreover, did not challenge on appeal to the BIA the

IJ’s determination that her claims failed because she could not demonstrate that

there was a nexus between her particular social group and the persecution. This

“lack of a nexus to a protected ground is dispositive” of her claims for asylum and

withholding of removal. Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir.

2016).

2. The IJ did not deny Rodriguez Arevalo her due process right to seek

counsel. The IJ provided Rodriguez Arevalo with “reasonable time to locate

counsel” by granting her four continuances to obtain representation before the

merits hearing. Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Biwot

v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2005)). Further efforts were not

required. See id. (stating that there is no denial of petitioner’s right to counsel if an

IJ “had done everything he reasonably could to permit” the petitioner to obtain

counsel (quoting Biwot, 403 F.3d at 1099–1100)).

3. Rodriguez Arevalo has not exhausted her claim that the IJ violated her

due process rights by providing her a pamphlet in English explaining the

application process for special immigrant juvenile status. Tall v. Mukasey, 517

3 23-3920 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[P]rocedural errors that can be remedied by the

BIA are not exempted from the exhaustion requirement.”).

PETITION DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.2

2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

4 23-3920