Rodriguez-Aparicio v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-3085
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SILVIA JULIANA RODRIGUEZ- No. 24-3085 APARICIO; J.E. RODRIGUEZ- Agency Nos. APARICIO, A240-247-454 A240-493-901 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 9, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, NGUYEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Silvia Juliana Rodriguez-Aparicio and her minor son, J.E., natives and

citizens of Colombia, petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

decision dismissing their appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying their

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We review the denial of asylum, withholding

of removal, and CAT protection for substantial evidence. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,

918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). “Under this standard, we must uphold the

agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id. We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and withholding of

removal. For both asylum and withholding of removal, Rodriguez-Aparicio must

demonstrate that her persecution was “committed by the government” or “by forces

that the government was unable or unwilling to control.” Velasquez-Gaspar v.

Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions,

850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)).

In this case, the agency permissibly concluded that Rodriguez-Aparicio failed

to show that the Colombian government was unable or unwilling to control her ex-

partner Julian or paramilitary members in El Infierno. Rodriguez-Aparicio did not

report to the authorities her ex-partner’s violence or the attack by paramilitary

members. See Meza-Vazquez v. Garland, 993 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2021) (the

absence of a police report leaves “‘a gap in proof about how the government would

1 Rodriguez-Aparicio’s son is a derivative beneficiary, and his claims are based on Rodriguez-Aparacio’s. We refer to petitioners collectively as “Rodriguez- Aparicio.”

2 24-3085 respond’ to the crime, and that gap must be filled in ‘by other methods’ to show the

government was unable or unwilling to act” (citation omitted)). When Rodriguez-

Aparicio’s neighbor did call the police over Julian’s harassment, however, the police

came to Rodriguez-Aparicio’s apartment and asked Julian to leave, which he did.

While the country conditions evidence is mixed, the agency adequately considered it,

and it does not compel a different result. See, e.g., Velasquez-Gaspar, 976 F.3d at

1065 (“[A]lthough the State Department reports make clear that Guatemala still has a

long way to go in addressing domestic violence, the country’s efforts, coupled with

the pleas of Velasquez-Gaspar’s acquaintances, suggest that she could have obtained

help.”); Singh v. Garland, 46 F.4th 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he BIA can draw

its own conclusions from contradictory and ambiguous country conditions reports.”).

Nor did the agency err in assigning little weight to the vague letters submitted by

Rodriguez-Aparicio’s mother and aunt because neither testified at the merits hearing.

See Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the agency

did not err by affording affidavit “limited weight” because declarant was an interested

party and unavailable for cross-examination).

Rodriguez-Aparicio also challenges the IJ’s determination that she failed to

establish a nexus between her claimed persecution by paramilitary members and a

protected ground. But the BIA did not reach the nexus issue, so we do not here. See

Velasquez-Gaspar, 976 F.3d at 1064 (“We review only the BIA’s decision, except to

3 24-3085 the extent it expressly adopted portions of the IJ’s decision.”) (quoting Rayamajhi v.

Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2019)).

2. Substantial evidence likewise supports the denial of CAT relief. To prevail

on her CAT claim, Rodriguez-Aparicio must show that, “taking into account all

possible sources of torture, [s]he is more likely than not to be tortured” if removed to

Colombia. Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland, 49 F.4th 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2022).

Torture is “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment,” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(2), which is “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or

acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting

in an official capacity,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). “Evidence that the police were

aware of a particular crime, but failed to bring the perpetrators to justice, is not in itself

sufficient to establish acquiescence in the crime.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d

1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014).

Rodriguez-Aparicio does not make any independent arguments regarding CAT

relief. And for the reasons discussed above, substantial evidence supports the

agency’s finding that Rodriguez-Aparicio failed to establish that the Colombian

government would acquiesce to the torture she fears at the hands of private actors.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 Rodriguez-Aparicio’s motion to stay removal, Dkt. 30, is denied. The temporary stay of removal shall remain in place until the mandate issues.

4 24-3085