Rodriguez Aguilar v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 21-521
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LANDER DENILSON RODRIGUEZ No. 21-521 AGUILAR, Agency No. A209-247-999 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 30, 2026**

Before: GOULD, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Lander Rodriguez Aguilar (“Rodriguez Aguilar”), a native and citizen of

Guatemala, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) upholding an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

1. “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both

decisions.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2023)

(citing Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018)). We

review the denial of an application for asylum and withholding of removal for

substantial evidence. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021). We

also review the denial of CAT relief for substantial evidence. Tzompantzi-Salazar

v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2022) (as amended). The substantial

evidence standard is deferential, allowing reversal only when “any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quoting Zehatye

v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added)).

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and

withholding of removal. “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to

demonstrate a likelihood of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1059 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). The agency properly rejected Rodriguez Aguilar’s proposed particular

social group (“PSG”) of “young Guatemalan male[s] who declined forced

recruitment by a criminal street gang” as not cognizable because it lacks particularity

2 21-521 and social distinction. See, e.g., Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 854–55 (9th Cir.

2009) (as amended) (rejecting “young men in Guatemala who resist gang

recruitment” as a cognizable PSG), abrogated in part on other grounds by

Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Conde

Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2020) (rejecting “people who

report the criminal activity of gangs to police” in Guatemala as a socially-distinct

PSG); Gutierrez-Alm v. Garland, 62 F.4th 1186, 1200 n.7 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[T]his

Court has previously rejected similar proposed social groups….”). Because his

proposed PSG is not cognizable, the agency properly concluded that Rodriguez

Aguilar did not show a nexus between the harm he suffered from Mara 18 gang

members and any statutorily protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).

3. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief.

Rodriguez Aguilar testified that he did not contact the police, and, although his father

contacted the police about gang violence, general police ineffectiveness is not

sufficient to establish that the government “acquiesces” in torture under CAT.

Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (as amended) (“[A]

general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime

will not suffice to show acquiescence.”).1

1 We decline to reach Rodriguez Aguilar’s argument that he is entitled to a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion because we have consistently held that prosecutorial discretion decisions are not subject to judicial review. See Morales de

3 21-521 PETITION DENIED.2

Soto v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he exercise of prosecutorial discretion is a type of government action uniquely shielded from and unsuited to judicial intervention.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 2 The temporary administrative stay of removal is lifted and the motion for stay of removal is denied. See Dkt. 5.

4 21-521