Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00025-CR
Rodolfo Villarreal,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
13th District Court of Navarro County, Texas Judge James E. Lagomarsino, presiding Trial Court Cause No. D42177-CR
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Rodolfo Villarreal of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and the trial court assessed punishment at life in prison. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND J.B. lived with her grandmother, Micaela Cano, whom J.B. called “mom.”
On December 18, 2022, when J.B. was 10 years old, Cano prayed with her
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pastor while at church, and revealed a potential outcry by J.B. of sexual assault. The outcry was reported to police by the pastor’s wife. Villarreal, whom J.B. called “dad” and who had lived with Cano and J.B., was later alleged to be the perpetrator of the sexual assault. Villarreal and Cano were married but had separated shortly before the outcry.
Dr. Lydia Bailey, the Program Director at the Navarro County Children’s Advocacy Center, performed a forensic interview of J.B. after the initial report to police, and interviewed J.B. on two different occasions. In the first interview, conducted on December 20, 2022, J.B. detailed how on one date, Villarreal touched her while on her bed, took off her underwear, and penetrated her vagina with his finger and then rubbed and pinched her chest. She also detailed how Villarreal touched her chest and penetrated her vagina with his finger on another date. A second forensic interview was conducted on January 12, 2024, over two years after J.B.’s initial statements. In this interview, J.B. recanted, stating that she had lied about Villarreal. J.B. further stated that she had made the initial outcry, based on a suggestion by a school friend, because she did not want Villarreal to leave. Dr. Bailey, who had been found to be the outcry witness, shared the details of both interviews of J.B. with the jury. At trial, J.B. maintained that her initial outcry statement was a lie, despite also claiming she did not remember what she had said.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE In his first issue, Villarreal contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because J.B. recanted her outcry of sexual assault and the remaining evidence supporting the conviction was too speculative to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Villarreal’s fingers contacted J.B.’s vagina. 1 The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows:
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App.
1 We note that Villarreal was not charged with contacting J.B.’s sexual organ; rather, he was charged with penetrating her sexual organ.
Villarreal v. State Page 3
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2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665.
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Our review of “all of the evidence” includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Likewise, it is well established that the factfinder, as the exclusive judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. See Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Further, outcry testimony admitted in compliance with article 38.072 is
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considered substantive evidence, admissible for the truth of the matter asserted in the testimony. Rodriguez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Thus, this type of evidence is, by itself, sufficient to support a jury's verdict of conviction. Id.; Cervantes v. State, 594 S.W.3d 667, 673 (Tex. App.— Waco 2019, no pet.). When the requisites of article 38.072 are met as far as the substantive nature of the outcry testimony, there is no requirement that the outcry witness testimony be corroborated or substantiated by the victim's testimony or by independent evidence. Rodriguez v. State, 819 S.W.2d. at 874.
Dr. Bailey was determined to be, and was designated as, the outcry witness as defined by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072. She testified that J.B. already knew why she was at the Advocacy Center: the police had come to J.B.’s house to talk to her “[b]ecause they know something, like my dad [Villarreal] touched me.” When Bailey asked J.B. to tell her about it, J.B. described that, after Cano and Villarreal separated, Villarreal had touched her two times. The first time was on a Monday or Wednesday, and the last time was on a Friday.
She described the first time as that he touched her on her private place.
When asked to tell the whole story from start to finish, J.B. told Bailey that she had woken up and that Villarreal had come to the house before J.B. left for school. J.B. said Villarreal touched her and then he took her to the bus stop.
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J.B. then described that, on Friday, he came in and did the same thing.
Dr. Bailey had J.B. clarify how she was alone with Villarreal during the first incident and testified that:
[Villarreal] came in with his own keys. He let himself in the house.
He left his stuff and he went into her room, where she was. She had already changed her clothes for school.
***
The first thing he did was tell her to sit on the bed. And she sat on the bed, like she was sitting in the chair. He moved her legs. He pushed them to the side. This -- that was when she's sort of gesturing how it happened with her hands; and that he touched her private part and on her top.
Dr. Bailey clarified with J.B. that the private part she was describing was the part that she used to go “No.1.” Then J.B. told Dr. Bailey that Villarreal was sitting beside her and he used his hand to touch under her clothes. He took her pants off by telling her to stand up and pulling her pants down. He took off her underwear and started touching her private parts, “and then on top.”
Dr. Bailey testified that:
[J.B.] pointed to these parts, as she was talking. And then, she said, when he was touching her private part — her private part, he rubbed it on the inside of her body and he used — she used her hand to gesture movements, while she was actually touching her own private part.
***
So I asked her to clarify that. And she said he stuck his finger inside of her body and gestured a moving kind of in a circular motion. She said it felt weird that he, then, touched on top of her body. He took off her shirt and touched her chest. She pointed directly to her breasts, at that moment. She said he rubbed it and
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pinched it. And she used a gesture, at that time, of pinching.
***
In clarifying questions, when she's describing what’s happening, she was actually sort of doing that to her own body: Moving her leg, when she said he would—he opened her legs; pinching, she would pin—make the motion towards her body; demonstrating her finger, what his finger was doing, is indicative of a person who probably experienced that but may not have the language to describe it verbally.
Regarding the second incident occurring on a Friday, Dr. Bailey asked follow- up questions of J.B. who then described the incident to Dr. Bailey as follows:
… she was in her bedroom, sitting on her bed, brushing her hair, which was different than the first time. That he came in and he began that second time by touching her breasts. She again, gestured with her hands, that portion of her body. And then, he started touching her over her clothes and then on her skin, by raising her shirt up.
***
And then, this time, he touched her private part second. He touched her private area where she gestured again, pointed, on her clothes, and then took her pants off, but not all the way. And then, he was touching and rubbing her private part. He touched her skin on the inside of her body with his fingers that time. She said it felt weird but kind of like uncomfortable. Then, she described that his finger moved around and he was rubbing it.
Dr. Bailey stated that J.B. said Villarreal stopped what he was doing this time because it was time to go to the bus stop.
On appeal and at trial, Villarreal attacked Dr. Bailey’s credibility, claiming she prompted J.B.’s responses. Villarreal also asserted that the evidence of digital penetration was too weak because J.B. recanted her
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accusation against Villarreal. But because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be given the witnesses' testimony, the jury could have reasonably believed Dr. Bailey’s testimony regarding J.B.’s initial outcry describing how Villarreal sexually assaulted her rather than J.B.’s later recant of the offense to Dr. Bailey and J.B.’s trial testimony in which she stated she lied about the sexual assault. That the jury believed Dr. Bailey’s testimony is especially convincing because in J.B.’s recant of the offense to Dr. Bailey, J.B. blamed the idea to accuse Villarreal on a classmate named Sophia who was later determined not to be enrolled in school with J.B. at the time the original outcry was made. Further, when J.B. testified in court, she could not remember much about occurrences on which the State asked her, including what she discussed in either of her interviews with Dr. Bailey. Yet, on cross- examination by Villarreal’s counsel, J.B. could remember quite a few details about falsely accusing Villarreal.
Villarreal also asserted on appeal that because the jury sent out several notes regarding a read-back of why Dr. Bailey may not have believed J.B.’s recant of the offense, the jury was confused by Dr. Bailey’s testimony and did not believe her. However, once the trial court and counsel understood what the jury was requesting (it took several notes from the jury to clarify their request) and that portion of Dr. Bailey’s testimony was read back, the jury
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returned with a unanimous guilty verdict 20 minutes later. This does not indicate that the jury did not believe Dr. Bailey and is not a reason to find the evidence insufficient to support Villarreal’s conviction.
Accordingly, because Villarreal's conviction can be supported by the testimony of Dr. Bailey alone, we find that the evidence Dr. Bailey presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to support Villarreal’s conviction. However, if upon further review it is determined Dr. Bailey's testimony alone is not sufficient, there is other evidence in the record, when combined with Dr. Bailey’s testimony, sufficient to support Villarreal’s conviction.
During a medical evaluation, the SANE nurse, Elizabeth Wolf, wrote in her report, which was admitted into evidence and read aloud to the jury, that J.B. explained:
So when my parents separate, kinda [sic] like my parents (grandmother & her husband) I had to go to school one day I was changing clothes, well I was already dressed and he came in and started touching me. He touched my here (points at vagina). I had my clothes on but he took them off. This was at where I live now.
His name is Rudy. I don't know his last name. He is like 40 or something like that. He used to be be [sic] my mom (grandmother)
husband. He took off my pants and underwear but not my shirt. I was confused. This was the first time. I [sic] was before Christmas, well, I don't [sic] the date but it was like before Christmas. He did it 2 times. He always do the same thing. It was his hand. It was on the outside of my middle part but one finger was inside my middle part. I told my mom (grandmother)
on a weekend because I was all sad and everything. I felt
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disappointed, kinda [sic] sad, and pretty mad. I think he was in jail before for the same thing but I don't know the girl it was. I feel more safer [sic] that he is in jail but sad to [sic], but mostly safer with him in jail.
Wolf added the information in the parentheses for clarification.
Further, Wolf reported that J.B. said the last incident occurred “before Christmas, like a Friday” and that J.B. did not want to take her clothes off for a head-to-toe exam because she did not feel comfortable doing so. Wolf also wrote in her report that the grandmother, meaning Micaela Cano, said Villarreal told J.B. not to tell about what had happened and that she goes to work at 5 a.m., and that Villarreal was home with J.B. In response to questioning by Villarreal about failing to acquire DNA evidence, Wolf stated she had never gone to trial on a case where DNA was recovered on a digital penetration outcry.
With this additional testimony, also viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find the evidence sufficient to support Villarreal’s conviction.
Villarreal’s first issue is overruled.
EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE Villarreal next contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Villarreal’s prior 2003 conviction for the aggravated sexual assault of Octavia Lewis when she was nine years old because the prior offense was not “res gestae” or pursuant to a common plan under Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of
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Evidence, and was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403 also of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b), 403.
Generally, evidence of an extraneous offense is inadmissible if offered to prove a person's character to show the person acted in conformity with that character. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); Deggs v. State, 646 S.W.3d 916, 922 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref'd). However, pursuant to article 38.37 and despite Rule 404(b), evidence that a defendant on trial for certain sex offenses against a child committed a separate sex offense against another child is admissible for any relevant purpose, including as proof of the defendant's character and propensity to act in conformity with his character. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, sec. 2(b); Deggs, 646 S.W.3d at 922. The sex offenses committed by Villarreal fall under the scope of article 38.37, and the extraneous offense was admitted pursuant to this statute. Thus, Villarreal’s Rule 404(b) complaints are not valid. Even if his complaints were valid, they were not preserved because Villarreal failed to raise a Rule 404(b) complaint with the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). This part of Villarreal’s issue is overruled.
Nevertheless, even when evidence of a defendant's extraneous acts is relevant under article 38.37, the trial court must still conduct a Rule 403 balancing test upon proper objection or request. Distefano v. State, 532 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd). See also Guedea v.
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State, 683 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. App.—Waco 2023, no pet.). Villarreal’s Rule 403 complaint was raised with the trial court and thus is preserved for our review.
To determine whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403, we use the Montgomery factors: (1) the strength of the evidence's probative value; (2) the potential for the evidence to “impress the jury in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way;” (3) the amount of time required at trial to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence. Hart v. State, 688 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh'g). All testimony and physical evidence are likely to be prejudicial to one party or the other. Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). It is only when there exists a clear disparity between the degree of prejudice of the evidence offered and its probative value that Rule 403 is applicable. Id.
Villarreal cited to the six-factor review listed in Gigliobianco.
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). However, when applying those factors, he merely repeated three of the factors in a conclusory manner and asserted the introduction of the extraneous offense was “unfairly prejudicial.” This is not sufficient. There was no application of the facts the trial court had before it to the factors relied on by Villarreal and
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no argument that this application would support a determination that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See TEX. R. EVID. 403.
Accordingly, this part of Villarreal’s issue is inadequately briefed and presents nothing for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We are under no obligation to make his arguments for him. Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896- 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (affirming that this Court has no obligation “to construct and compose” a party's “issues, facts, and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record” (internal quotes omitted)).
Villarreal’s second issue is overruled.
MISTRIAL In his third issue, Villarreal contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after a witness testified in a non-responsive manner, that Villarreal “does have a Sex Offender—Sex Offender—,” to a question regarding whether Villarreal had a vehicle. Counsel for Villarreal cut off any further response from the witness by objecting. When he approached the bench, counsel immediately requested a mistrial. After considerable discussion at the bench, the trial court instructed the jury to “disregard the last statement,” and denied the motion for mistrial. The trial court also gave an extraneous offense
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limiting instruction in its charge to the jury.
We review a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 738-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Mistrial is the appropriate remedy when the objectionable event is so emotionally inflammatory that curative instructions are not likely to prevent the jury from being unfairly prejudiced against the defendant. Id. at 739. We generally presume the jury followed the trial court's instructions. Allison v. State, 666 S.W.3d 750, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Waldo v. State, 746 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard evidence). This presumption is rebuttable; however, to rebut the presumption, Villarreal must point to evidence in the record indicating the jury failed to follow the trial court's instructions. See Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Villarreal argues that the jury heard he was a registered sex offender, and the intentional reference, coupled with the instruction to disregard, permanently influenced the jury’s perception of him. But there was no testimony as to what the witness meant when he stated Villarreal had a “Sex Offender—.” No witness or evidence ever mentioned, prior to this moment or immediately thereafter, that Villarreal was a registered sex offender. It was only at the end of the State’s case the following day that the jury learned
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Villarreal had a 20-year old prior aggravated sexual assault conviction. And although the jury sent notes to the trial court during its deliberations, none of the notes concerned the witness’s testimony or the prior conviction. Further, the trial court did not reference the subject of the statement when it gave its instruction to disregard after a contentious discussion at the bench. Thus, there is no evidence in this record to indicate that the jury failed to follow the trial court's instruction to disregard the witness’s non-responsive answer.
Accordingly, we conclude that the witness’s non-responsive answer was not so inflammatory as to undermine the efficacy of an instruction to disregard. See Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 627-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025); Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“uninvited and unembellished reference to appellant's prior incarceration—although inadmissible—was not so inflammatory as to undermine the efficacy of the trial court's instruction to disregard.”). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Villarreal’s motion for mistrial.
Villarreal’s third issue is overruled.
OUTCRY WITNESS Next, Villarreal contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Dr. Bailey’s testimony concerning J.B.’s sexual-assault outcry since, Villarreal alleges, J.B.’s grandmother, Micaela Cano, was the first person to
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whom J.B. described the offense. We disagree with Villarreal.
Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the outcry statute, governs the admissibility of certain hearsay evidence in a trial for specified crimes, such as the crime in this case—aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years old. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072; TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021. The statute creates a hearsay exception and allows testimony of the first adult in whom the child confides regarding sexual or physical abuse. See id. art. 38.072, § 2(a)(3); see also Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 810-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that under article 38.072, the proper outcry witness is the first adult person to whom the child describes the alleged offense in some discernible manner beyond general insinuations that sexual abuse occurred. Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). However, the proper outcry witness is not determined merely by comparing the statements the child gave to different individuals and then deciding which person received the most detailed statement about the offense. Bradshaw v. State, 675 S.W.3d 78, 80 (Tex. App.—Waco 2023), aff’d, 707 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). Rather, the victim must describe the alleged offense to the witness. Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91; Bradshaw, 675 S.W.3d at 80.
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We review a trial court's ruling regarding an outcry witness designation for an abuse of discretion. See Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 92; Bradshaw, 675 S.W.3d at 80. We will not disturb the trial court's decision “if the ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Cervantes v. State, 594 S.W.3d 667, 673 (Tex. App.— Waco 2019, no pet.).
Villarreal contends Cano was the first adult to whom J.B. described the alleged offense because the required summary provided by the State of what Cano would testify about, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072, sec. 2, (b)(1), showed that J.B. described the offense in a discernible manner to Cano, first and then to Dr. Bailey, three days later. The summary indicated that Cano told the State:
two different times, after everyone left for work and [J.B.] was alone, her dad (the defendant) would come over and take her to her bedroom and touch her. He took her pants off and touched her private part with his hand. Then he put his fingers inside of her middle part.
However, by the time the trial court held the required outcry-witness hearing, see id. sec. 2, (b)(2), J.B. had recanted and Cano testified that J.B. told her Villarreal had touched her but did not give Cano any details. When pressed, Cano testified that J.B. said Villarreal touched J.B. once on her “private part” on the outside of her body. Cano also testified that later, J.B. told her she had
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lied. Meanwhile, Dr. Bailey testified consistent with her summary that, at two different times in J.B.’s bedroom, Villarreal touched J.B.’s “private part with his hands and fingers” and that he “would rub inside of her vagina….”
Further, after Dr. Bailey’s testimony, the State informed the court that it was concerned Cano would not be the proper outcry witness because Cano’s testimony at the hearing was distinctly different than what she had told the State earlier. The State further asserted that since Cano would not admit Villarreal penetrated J.B., Cano could not be an outcry witness to the indicted offense. Consequently, the State offered Dr. Bailey as the outcry witness who the trial court accepted.
Simply because Cano, at one time, could recall J.B.’s description of the alleged offense, but at trial could not, or would not, recall that same description, describing instead a different offense, does not mean the State must use her as the outcry witness. Thus, we agree with the Austin Court of Appeals which, when it was presented with a similar situation, determined that:
the societal interest in curbing child abuse would not be served if we interpreted the statute to require that the “first person” could only be the person to whom the child made outcry even though that person did not hear, did not remember, or did not understand what the child was saying. We interpret the statute to mean that the “first person” refers to the first adult who can remember and relate at trial the child's statement that in some discernible manner describes the alleged offense.
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Foreman v. State, 995 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref'd) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, because Cano was not the first adult who could remember and relate at trial J.B.’s statement describing the alleged offense in a discernible manner and Dr. Bailey was the first adult who could do so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Dr. Bailey was the proper outcry witness.
Villarreal’s fourth issue is overruled.
BILL OF COSTS In his fifth and final issue, Villarreal complains that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment amount of costs because no bill of costs was included in the appellate record. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 103.001. Villarreal asserts that the appellate record should be supplemented with a bill of costs. See Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The appellate record has been supplemented with a bill of costs, and Villarreal’s fifth issue is overruled. CONCLUSION Having overruled each of Villarreal's issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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LEE HARRIS
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: August 27, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do Not Publish CRPM