Rodney Lee Lyon v. Sheriff of Lake County, Florida

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: January 12, 2023
• Docket: 22-11839
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 22-11839 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 01/12/2023 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11839 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

RODNEY LEE LYON, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus SHERIFF OF LAKE COUNTY, FLORIDA, BRET RUTZEBECK, individually,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida USCA11 Case: 22-11839 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 01/12/2023 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 22-11839

D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00438-SDM-PRL ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Rodney Lee Lyon appeals the district court’s order granting Lake County Sheriff’s Deputy Bret Rutzebeck’s motion for sum- mary judgment on Lyon’s claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Lyon argues that the district court erred in grant- ing summary judgment for Deputy Rutzebeck on his malicious prosecution claim. As Lyon was never meaningfully seized under the Fourth Amendment, we cannot hold he was maliciously pros- ecuted. Accordingly, we affirm. On June 1, 2016, Deputy Rutzebeck responded to a report that Lyon had neglected to treat the hooves of Lyon’s eighteen- year-old horse. After meeting at Lyon’s property, Deputy Rutze- beck noticed that the horse’s hooves had overgrown and curled “like an elf’s shoe.” Lyon informed Deputy Rutzebeck that Lyon had hired a veterinarian to trim the horse’s hooves. Two days later, the veterinarian and Deputy Rutzebeck ob- served the trimming of the horse’s hooves. This process revealed

1 The district court’s order also granted summary judgment in favor of the current and former sheriffs of Lake County on Lyon’s claim against them for “violation of civil rights” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lyon does not appeal this decision. USCA11 Case: 22-11839 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 01/12/2023 Page: 3 of 5

22-11839 Opinion of the Court 3

that the hooves would inevitably detach from the horse’s feet, which required the immediate euthanasia of the horse. The veteri- narian told Deputy Rutzebeck that Lyon’s failure to trim the horse’s hooves caused irreversible damage. Deputy Rutzebeck de- termined that this failure amounted to neglect. Deputy Rutzebeck met with Lyon at a barbeque restaurant and informed Lyon that he intended to recommend a charge of an- imal neglect. Deputy Rutzebeck forwarded a report to the state prosecutor’s office concluding that Lyon’s failure to furnish regular farrier care for the horse amounted to animal neglect under state law. The prosecutor charged Lyon with misdemeanor animal ne- glect. Lyon was never arrested or detained. He appeared once in court to plead not guilty to the charge. Two months later, the pros- ecutor dropped the charges. In granting Deputy Rutzebeck’s motion for summary judg- ment, the district court held that Lyon was never seized under the Fourth Amendment and therefore he could not succeed on his ma- licious prosecution claim as a matter of law. The district court also noted that even if Lyon had been seized, Rutzebeck would be enti- tled to qualified immunity as there was arguable probable cause to refer Lyon for prosecution. We need not reach the issue of whether Deputy Rutzebeck was entitled to qualified immunity because Lyon was never seized. We review a district court’s granting of a motion for sum- mary judgment de novo, “applying the same legal standards as those that control the district court.” Jackson v. State of Ala. State USCA11 Case: 22-11839 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 01/12/2023 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 22-11839

Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (2005). To succeed on a sum- mary judgment motion, the movant must establish he is entitled to prevail on questions of law, and “there are no genuine issues of material fact pertinent to those questions of law.” Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988). Malicious prosecution under Section 1983 requires that a plaintiff demonstrate (1) each element of malicious prosecution un- der relevant state law and (2) that the malicious prosecution re- sulted in a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). Lyon cannot satisfy the second element because he was never detained or arrested. The sole seizure that Lyon contends occurred is the requirement he ap- pear in court to plead not guilty. Under our precedents, Lyon was not seized merely because he was required to appear in court. In Kingsland, we held that a plaintiff was not seized when she was released on bond subject to a pretrial release program. In doing so, we held that without a “sig- nificant deprivation of liberty . . . a seizure [cannot be] violative of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1236 (citing Myers v. Shaver, 245 F. Supp. 2d 805, 812 (W.D. Va. 2003)). Here, Lyon merely appeared in court to plead not guilty. The restrictions in Kingsland—posting bond as part of a pretrial release program—are certainly more sub- stantial than merely appearing in court for a plea hearing. See Al- bright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 278–79 (1994) (plurality opinion) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing the restrictions of liberty as- sociated with pretrial release). Under our precedents, we cannot USCA11 Case: 22-11839 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 01/12/2023 Page: 5 of 5

22-11839 Opinion of the Court 5

conclude that Lyon was seized under the Fourth Amendment by being compelled to appear in court a single time. Deputy Rutze- beck was thus entitled to summary judgment on Lyon’s malicious prosecution claim. Rich, 841 F.2d at 1562. Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED.