COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, O’Brien and Chaney UNPUBLISHED
RODNEY HOWARD BROUGHMAN MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 0936-22-3 PER CURIAM JANUARY 24, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEGHANY COUNTY Edward K. Stein, Judge
(Jon C. Clark; Jon C. Clark, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; William K. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Rodney Howard Broughman appeals the trial court’s decision revoking the entirety of his
previously suspended sentence and resuspending all but three years. He contends that the court
abused its discretion by revoking the suspended sentence without considering mitigating evidence.
After examining the briefs and record, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is
unnecessary because “the issue has been authoritatively decided and appellant has not argued that
the case law should be overturned, extended, modified or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b);
Rule 5A:27(b). Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On appeal, “we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.”
Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). That principle requires us to “discard the evidence of the
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence
favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26
Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)).
Broughman pleaded guilty and was convicted of three counts of possession with intent to
distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, on June 11, 2015. He was sentenced to fifteen years’
incarceration, with ten years suspended.
On May 23, 2019, Broughman was released from incarceration and placed on supervised
probation. Initially, he adjusted well to probation. However, on May 22, 2020, Broughman was
arrested for assault and battery of a family member, and he was arrested again on June 3, 2020, for
violating a protective order. On September 18, 2020, Broughman was found not guilty of violating
a protective order and destruction of property in juvenile and domestic relations district court (JDR)
court. At the Commonwealth’s request, the court dismissed the assault and battery charge by nolle
prosequi.
Broughman tested positive for amphetamines on October 6, 2020, and tested positive for
methamphetamine on June 25, 2021. In October 2021, he was arrested on several charges after he
and his girlfriend ended their relationship. Broughman was convicted of three misdemeanor counts
of violating a protective order and misdemeanor stalking.
On February 18, 2022, Broughman was arrested again and on March 3, 2022, the trial court
issued a show cause order based on the allegations in the February 22, 2022 major violation report.
Broughman had four felony counts of violating a protective order pending at that time.
At a May 2, 2022 revocation hearing, an oral addendum to the major violation report noted
that Broughman had pled guilty to two counts of felony violation of a protective order just before
-2- the revocation hearing started.1 Broughman acknowledged that he had acquired several
misdemeanor and felony convictions while on probation. Further, he admitted that he had tested
positive for illicit narcotics while on probation. Broughman testified that the victim of all his crimes
was his former girlfriend. He stated that he has “moved on” from his former girlfriend and does not
plan to contact her again, but on cross-examination, he admitted that even after beginning a new
relationship, he contacted his former girlfriend in violation of a protective order.
The court noted that Broughman “chose to ignore [a protective order] on multiple occasions
while [he] was on probation.” Because Broughman violated the terms of his probation, the court
revoked his suspended ten-year sentence and resuspended seven years. The court ordered that the
revoked sentence run consecutively with Broughman’s sentence on his new convictions.
ANALYSIS
Broughman asserts that the court abused its discretion when it imposed three years of his
previously suspended sentence. He argues that the sentence was excessive because he also received
one year of incarceration for his two felony protective order convictions. He notes that his
adjustment to probation was mostly positive before committing the violation, and it was his first
violation. Broughman also argues that the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to
two years above the high end of the sentencing guidelines despite mitigating evidence.
“In revocation appeals, the court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed
unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App.
529, 535 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)). “The evidence is
considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below.” Id.
1 This Court does not have the transcript of the events that occurred just before Broughman’s revocation on May 2, 2022, nor a sentencing order for these felony convictions. These felony convictions, however, can be inferred from the record. -3- After suspending a sentence, a court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any
cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within
the period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “If the court, after hearing,
finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension, then the
court may revoke the suspension and impose a sentence in accordance with the provisions of
§ 19.2-306.1.” Code § 19.2-306(C). “The court may again suspend all or any part of this
sentence for a period up to the statutory maximum period for which the defendant might
originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned, less any time already served, and may place the
defendant upon terms and conditions or probation.” Id.
If the court finds the basis of a violation of the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence or probation is that the defendant was convicted of a criminal offense that was committed after the date of the suspension, or has violated another condition other than (i) a technical violation or (ii) a good conduct violation that did not result in a criminal conviction, then the court may revoke the suspension and impose or resuspend any or all of that period previously suspended.
Code § 19.2-306.1(B).
Broughman was originally sentenced within the statutory maximum and acquired four
new misdemeanor convictions and two new felony convictions during the suspension period;
therefore, the court had sufficient cause to revoke his suspended sentence. “The statutes dealing
with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the trial court valuable tools to help
rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of all or part of a sentence, and/or
restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740 (2007). “When coupled with a
suspended sentence, probation represents ‘an act of grace on the part of the Commonwealth to one
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, O’Brien and Chaney UNPUBLISHED
RODNEY HOWARD BROUGHMAN MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 0936-22-3 PER CURIAM JANUARY 24, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEGHANY COUNTY Edward K. Stein, Judge
(Jon C. Clark; Jon C. Clark, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; William K. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Rodney Howard Broughman appeals the trial court’s decision revoking the entirety of his
previously suspended sentence and resuspending all but three years. He contends that the court
abused its discretion by revoking the suspended sentence without considering mitigating evidence.
After examining the briefs and record, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is
unnecessary because “the issue has been authoritatively decided and appellant has not argued that
the case law should be overturned, extended, modified or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b);
Rule 5A:27(b). Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On appeal, “we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.”
Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). That principle requires us to “discard the evidence of the
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence
favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26
Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)).
Broughman pleaded guilty and was convicted of three counts of possession with intent to
distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, on June 11, 2015. He was sentenced to fifteen years’
incarceration, with ten years suspended.
On May 23, 2019, Broughman was released from incarceration and placed on supervised
probation. Initially, he adjusted well to probation. However, on May 22, 2020, Broughman was
arrested for assault and battery of a family member, and he was arrested again on June 3, 2020, for
violating a protective order. On September 18, 2020, Broughman was found not guilty of violating
a protective order and destruction of property in juvenile and domestic relations district court (JDR)
court. At the Commonwealth’s request, the court dismissed the assault and battery charge by nolle
prosequi.
Broughman tested positive for amphetamines on October 6, 2020, and tested positive for
methamphetamine on June 25, 2021. In October 2021, he was arrested on several charges after he
and his girlfriend ended their relationship. Broughman was convicted of three misdemeanor counts
of violating a protective order and misdemeanor stalking.
On February 18, 2022, Broughman was arrested again and on March 3, 2022, the trial court
issued a show cause order based on the allegations in the February 22, 2022 major violation report.
Broughman had four felony counts of violating a protective order pending at that time.
At a May 2, 2022 revocation hearing, an oral addendum to the major violation report noted
that Broughman had pled guilty to two counts of felony violation of a protective order just before
-2- the revocation hearing started.1 Broughman acknowledged that he had acquired several
misdemeanor and felony convictions while on probation. Further, he admitted that he had tested
positive for illicit narcotics while on probation. Broughman testified that the victim of all his crimes
was his former girlfriend. He stated that he has “moved on” from his former girlfriend and does not
plan to contact her again, but on cross-examination, he admitted that even after beginning a new
relationship, he contacted his former girlfriend in violation of a protective order.
The court noted that Broughman “chose to ignore [a protective order] on multiple occasions
while [he] was on probation.” Because Broughman violated the terms of his probation, the court
revoked his suspended ten-year sentence and resuspended seven years. The court ordered that the
revoked sentence run consecutively with Broughman’s sentence on his new convictions.
ANALYSIS
Broughman asserts that the court abused its discretion when it imposed three years of his
previously suspended sentence. He argues that the sentence was excessive because he also received
one year of incarceration for his two felony protective order convictions. He notes that his
adjustment to probation was mostly positive before committing the violation, and it was his first
violation. Broughman also argues that the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to
two years above the high end of the sentencing guidelines despite mitigating evidence.
“In revocation appeals, the court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed
unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App.
529, 535 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)). “The evidence is
considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below.” Id.
1 This Court does not have the transcript of the events that occurred just before Broughman’s revocation on May 2, 2022, nor a sentencing order for these felony convictions. These felony convictions, however, can be inferred from the record. -3- After suspending a sentence, a court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any
cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within
the period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “If the court, after hearing,
finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension, then the
court may revoke the suspension and impose a sentence in accordance with the provisions of
§ 19.2-306.1.” Code § 19.2-306(C). “The court may again suspend all or any part of this
sentence for a period up to the statutory maximum period for which the defendant might
originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned, less any time already served, and may place the
defendant upon terms and conditions or probation.” Id.
If the court finds the basis of a violation of the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence or probation is that the defendant was convicted of a criminal offense that was committed after the date of the suspension, or has violated another condition other than (i) a technical violation or (ii) a good conduct violation that did not result in a criminal conviction, then the court may revoke the suspension and impose or resuspend any or all of that period previously suspended.
Code § 19.2-306.1(B).
Broughman was originally sentenced within the statutory maximum and acquired four
new misdemeanor convictions and two new felony convictions during the suspension period;
therefore, the court had sufficient cause to revoke his suspended sentence. “The statutes dealing
with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the trial court valuable tools to help
rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of all or part of a sentence, and/or
restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740 (2007). “When coupled with a
suspended sentence, probation represents ‘an act of grace on the part of the Commonwealth to one
who has been convicted and sentenced to a term of confinement.’” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56
Va. App. 582, 587 (2010) (quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443, 448 (2008)). By
obtaining new convictions while on probation, Broughman failed to make productive use of the -4- opportunity that had been extended to him. His disregard of the terms of his suspended sentence
supports a finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation.
Accordingly, we hold that the court’s sentence for the probation violation represents a
proper exercise of discretion. See Alsberry v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 314, 321-22 (2002)
(finding that the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the defendant’s previously
suspended sentence in its entirety “in light of the grievous nature of [the defendant’s] offenses
and his continuing criminal activity”).
Further, the probation violation guidelines, like the standard sentencing guidelines, “are
not binding on the trial judge; rather, the guidelines are merely a ‘tool’ to assist the judge in
fixing an appropriate punishment.” Belcher v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 44, 45 (1993).
Code § 19.2-298.01(F) precludes appellate review of whether the court adhered to Code
§ 19.2-298.01(B). Specifically, Code § 19.2-298.01(F) states that “[t]he failure to follow any or
all of the provisions of [§ 19.2-298.01] in the prescribed manner shall not be reviewable on
appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction relief.” See also West v. Director of Dept. of
Corr., 273 Va. 56, 65 (2007) (holding Virginia sentencing guidelines are discretionary); Fazili v.
Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 239, 248-49 (2019) (holding Code § 19.2-298.01(F) prohibits
appellate review of a court’s failure to follow discretionary sentencing guidelines). In view of
this broad statutory exemption from appeal, the court’s written explanation in the sentencing
revocation report satisfies Code § 19.2-298.01(B) and provides no basis for review on appeal.
Finally, to the extent that Broughman argues that his sentence was disproportionate, this
Court declines to engage in a proportionality review in cases that do not involve life sentences
without the possibility of parole. Cole v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 642, 653-54 (2011). We
noted in Cole that the Supreme Court of the United States “has never found a non-life ‘sentence
for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual
-5- punishment’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370,
372 (1982) (per curiam)). Cf. Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 243 (2016) (rejecting
Eighth Amendment challenge to 133-year active sentence because the sentence was imposed for
“eighteen separate crimes”).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
-6-