Opinion issued October 13, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-13-00805-CR ——————————— RODNEY CARNELL MAYS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 7 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1875634
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court found appellant, Rodney Carnell Mays, guilty of assault on a
family member and assessed his punishment at confinement for fifty-six days in
the Harris County Jail. 1 In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2014). in denying his motion for an instructed verdict of not guilty because the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction.
We affirm.
Background
Appellant was charged with assault of Olivia Fields, the mother of his child.
The information alleged that he assaulted her by striking her with his hand. At his
bench trial, Fields testified that she first met appellant in 2008. She stated that
appellant told her he was a counselor for troubled teens, youth, and young adults,
and they exchanged numbers. Fields testified that they spoke about her “getting
over what [she] had been through” and eventually arranged to meet in person
“maybe a month or two” after their first meeting. Fields believed that appellant
was picking her up for counseling, but instead he took her to a party. They left the
party and had intercourse, which resulted in Fields becoming pregnant with their
son, who was born in September 2009. However, Fields was engaged to a different
man at the time and did not know that appellant was the child’s father.
Once appellant’s paternity was established, Fields allowed appellant to visit
their son. Because the child had severe asthma, she would limit appellant’s
visitation “depending on how [her] son was feeling.” Fields testified that her
limiting his visitation upset appellant and caused him to become angry with her on
occasion.
2 On the day of the offense, December 18, 2012, Fields stated that her son
“was sick all that day” and that appellant complained to her that he did not get to
spend enough time with the child. Fields “offered for him to be with [her] and [her]
son at the hospital for his treatment,” and appellant offered to drive them to the
hospital and back home again. But instead of returning Fields and the child to their
home, appellant drove them to his condo. She became worried because she did not
want to be alone with him, and she attempted to walk with her son to the nearest
bus stop.
As she grabbed the child’s car seat and bag to leave, appellant became
“mildly” upset and tried to convince her to stay with him. When she continued to
walk toward the bus stop, appellant tried to grab the child and the car seat.
Appellant then began walking behind Fields and “yelling things.” She testified that
she kept walking until appellant “walked around in front of [her] with his fist
balled up in the air” and continued to yell. She walked around him to continue to
the bus stop, and at that point appellant “got angry and punched [her] in the back of
the head.” Fields testified that she lost her balance and managed to turn so that she
fell and hit the ground “bottom first.” She then hit her head again but her son
remained safe in her arms. Appellant “walked away” and Fields “gathered
[her]self, made sure [her] son was okay, and then called 911.”
3 Following Fields’ testimony, the State rested and appellant moved for a
directed verdict, arguing that the State had failed to prove the “manner and means”
of the assault. The trial court denied the motion.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. He denied that he represented himself
as a counselor, and he testified that he never offered to counsel Fields. He also
disputed Fields’ account of events on the day of the assault. He stated that he
wanted to return to his condo after the trip to the hospital because he was
exhausted and needed to sleep before he drove Fields home, and she initially
agreed. However, once they got to his home, Fields insisted on leaving. He felt too
tired to drive her, but he was concerned that she should not take the bus because it
was cold. Appellant testified that they fought and Fields threatened that he would
never see his son again if he refused to take her home. Then he stated, “[N]ext
thing I know she fell. She was on the ground. I don’t know if she fell or sat herself
down.” He denied that he hit Fields.
The trial court found appellant guilty of assault and assessed his punishment
at confinement in the Harris County Jail for fifty-six days.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court should have granted the
motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate
that he struck Fields with his hand as alleged in the information.
4 A. Standard of Review
A challenge to the denial of a directed verdict is a challenge to the legal
sufficiency of the evidence. See Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003); Gabriel v. State, 290 S.W.3d 426, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, no pet.). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we view all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789
(1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We defer to
the factfinder to resolve conflicts, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt
of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.
Id. Evidence is insufficient when (1) the record contains no evidence, or merely a
“modicum” of evidence, probative of an element of the offense, (2) the evidence
conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt, or (3) the acts that the State alleges, if
true, do not constitute the charged crime. Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104, 107–08
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314–
19, 99 S. Ct. at 2786–89; Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007).
5 Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “Such a charge is one that ‘accurately sets out the law, is
authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Opinion issued October 13, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-13-00805-CR ——————————— RODNEY CARNELL MAYS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 7 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1875634
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court found appellant, Rodney Carnell Mays, guilty of assault on a
family member and assessed his punishment at confinement for fifty-six days in
the Harris County Jail. 1 In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2014). in denying his motion for an instructed verdict of not guilty because the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction.
We affirm.
Background
Appellant was charged with assault of Olivia Fields, the mother of his child.
The information alleged that he assaulted her by striking her with his hand. At his
bench trial, Fields testified that she first met appellant in 2008. She stated that
appellant told her he was a counselor for troubled teens, youth, and young adults,
and they exchanged numbers. Fields testified that they spoke about her “getting
over what [she] had been through” and eventually arranged to meet in person
“maybe a month or two” after their first meeting. Fields believed that appellant
was picking her up for counseling, but instead he took her to a party. They left the
party and had intercourse, which resulted in Fields becoming pregnant with their
son, who was born in September 2009. However, Fields was engaged to a different
man at the time and did not know that appellant was the child’s father.
Once appellant’s paternity was established, Fields allowed appellant to visit
their son. Because the child had severe asthma, she would limit appellant’s
visitation “depending on how [her] son was feeling.” Fields testified that her
limiting his visitation upset appellant and caused him to become angry with her on
occasion.
2 On the day of the offense, December 18, 2012, Fields stated that her son
“was sick all that day” and that appellant complained to her that he did not get to
spend enough time with the child. Fields “offered for him to be with [her] and [her]
son at the hospital for his treatment,” and appellant offered to drive them to the
hospital and back home again. But instead of returning Fields and the child to their
home, appellant drove them to his condo. She became worried because she did not
want to be alone with him, and she attempted to walk with her son to the nearest
bus stop.
As she grabbed the child’s car seat and bag to leave, appellant became
“mildly” upset and tried to convince her to stay with him. When she continued to
walk toward the bus stop, appellant tried to grab the child and the car seat.
Appellant then began walking behind Fields and “yelling things.” She testified that
she kept walking until appellant “walked around in front of [her] with his fist
balled up in the air” and continued to yell. She walked around him to continue to
the bus stop, and at that point appellant “got angry and punched [her] in the back of
the head.” Fields testified that she lost her balance and managed to turn so that she
fell and hit the ground “bottom first.” She then hit her head again but her son
remained safe in her arms. Appellant “walked away” and Fields “gathered
[her]self, made sure [her] son was okay, and then called 911.”
3 Following Fields’ testimony, the State rested and appellant moved for a
directed verdict, arguing that the State had failed to prove the “manner and means”
of the assault. The trial court denied the motion.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. He denied that he represented himself
as a counselor, and he testified that he never offered to counsel Fields. He also
disputed Fields’ account of events on the day of the assault. He stated that he
wanted to return to his condo after the trip to the hospital because he was
exhausted and needed to sleep before he drove Fields home, and she initially
agreed. However, once they got to his home, Fields insisted on leaving. He felt too
tired to drive her, but he was concerned that she should not take the bus because it
was cold. Appellant testified that they fought and Fields threatened that he would
never see his son again if he refused to take her home. Then he stated, “[N]ext
thing I know she fell. She was on the ground. I don’t know if she fell or sat herself
down.” He denied that he hit Fields.
The trial court found appellant guilty of assault and assessed his punishment
at confinement in the Harris County Jail for fifty-six days.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court should have granted the
motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate
that he struck Fields with his hand as alleged in the information.
4 A. Standard of Review
A challenge to the denial of a directed verdict is a challenge to the legal
sufficiency of the evidence. See Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003); Gabriel v. State, 290 S.W.3d 426, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, no pet.). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we view all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789
(1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We defer to
the factfinder to resolve conflicts, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt
of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.
Id. Evidence is insufficient when (1) the record contains no evidence, or merely a
“modicum” of evidence, probative of an element of the offense, (2) the evidence
conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt, or (3) the acts that the State alleges, if
true, do not constitute the charged crime. Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104, 107–08
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314–
19, 99 S. Ct. at 2786–89; Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007).
5 Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “Such a charge is one that ‘accurately sets out the law, is
authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Byrd v. State,
336 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d
234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
A person commits the offense of assault if he “intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 2014). Appellant was charged with intentionally or knowingly
causing bodily injury to Fields, “a member of [his] family and a person with whom
[he] had a dating relationship . . . by striking [her] with his hand.” Thus, appellant
was guilty of assault if he intentionally or knowingly caused Fields bodily injury
by striking her with his hand. See id.; Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 246.
B. Analysis
Appellant argues that the State failed to prove that he struck Fields with his
hand. He argues that Fields “was unable to see what hit her and she did not testify
that [he] used his hand when he ‘punched her in the back of the head,’” and, thus,
the State failed to prove the manner and means required for the charged assault.
6 However, Fields testified that when she attempted to leave appellant and get
to the bus, he tried to stop her. He got in front of her “with his fist balled up in the
air” and yelled at her. Fields stated that, as she walked around him to continue to
the bus stop, he “got angry and punched [her] in the back of the head.” Although
Fields did not see how appellant struck her, she felt it and she testified that it was a
“punch.” The trial court, acting as the factfinder here, could make a rational
inference from this testimony that appellant struck Fields with his hand. See
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (stating that we defer to factfinder to draw reasonable
inferences); see also Johnson v. State, No. 14-01-00410-CR, 2002 WL 370199, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 7, 2002, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (holding that it was within trial court’s discretion “to
interpret ‘punch’ as a strike with the hand”); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTERS
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 725, 1567 (2nd ed. 2001) (defining “punch” as “a
thrusting blow, especially with the fist” and “fist” as “the hand closed tightly”).
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, it was not necessary that a third party
witnessed the assault, and we may rely on reasonable inferences drawn from both
direct and circumstantial evidence in conducting our sufficiency review. See
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that in
analyzing sufficiency of evidence, we “determine whether the necessary inferences
are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence
7 when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict” and treat direct and
circumstantial evidence equally). Fields’ testimony alone was sufficient to support
his conviction. See Padilla v. State, 254 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2008, pet. ref’d) (holding that complainant’s testimony alone, if believed, is
sufficient to support conviction for aggravated assault).
We conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant’s
conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Kiffe, 361 S.W.3d at
107–08. We overrule his sole issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Lloyd.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).