Rodessa Wakefield v. Ryan Chevrolet

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: December 18, 2024
• Docket: 55,984-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered December 18, 2024. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 55,984-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

RODESSA WAKEFIELD Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

RYAN CHEVROLET Defendant-Appellant

Appealed from the Monroe City Court for the Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana Trial Court No. 2023CV00455

Honorable Tammy Deon Lee, Judge

CHARLES W. HEROLD, III Counsel for Appellant

RODESSA WAKEFIELD In Proper Person, Appellee

Before STONE, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ. STEPHENS, J.,

This appeal arises from the Monroe City Court, Parish of Ouachita,

the Honorable Tammy D. Lee, Judge, presiding. The defendant, Ryan

Chevrolet, appeals from the city court’s judgment awarding the plaintiff,

Rodessa Wakefield (“Ms. Wakefield”), $3,227.00 in special damages and

$1,298.00 in general damages. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse

the trial court’s award of general damages and amend the trial court’s special

damage award by reducing it to $298.00.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 7, 2022, Ms. Wakefield was in an automobile accident

in West Monroe, Louisiana, while driving her 2019 Chevrolet Impala, which

she had purchased just a week before from an Enterprise Car Rental in

Shreveport, Louisiana. Following the accident, Ms. Wakefield and her

automobile insurer communicated about the accident and worked on getting

the surveillance footage from the parking lot in which the accident occurred.

Once the recording was obtained, Ms. Wakefield took her vehicle to Ryan

Chevrolet in Monroe on February 13, 2023, to get a repair estimate.

Ms. Wakefield discussed the repair work with Mr. Todd, Ryan

Chevrolet’s body shop manager. Mr. Todd prepared an estimate for the

insurance company which indicated that repairs to the vehicle would cost

$3,227.42. According to Ms. Wakefield, the vehicle stayed in the repair

shop for a little over a week, and her insurance company covered the full

cost of these repairs. On March 8, 2023, Ms. Wakefield filed a petition

against Ryan Chevrolet, alleging that the body shop did not completely

repair her vehicle. She requested “$5,000 because full return of the Geico check signed for $3,227.42, another rental from Enterprise, another deposit

for rental,” lost wages, and court costs.

At the trial on July 6, 2023, Ms. Wakefield testified that during the

accident, her vehicle suffered damage to the front driver’s side of the

vehicle, and the maintenance to the vehicle included repairing the bumper

and the grille and an alignment. She indicated that once she received her car

from the body shop, she discussed with a family member the repairs that had

been done to her vehicle, and the family member told her that the vehicle

looked like it had not received any repairs.

Following this exchange, Ms. Wakefield testified that she contacted

Mr. Todd at Ryan Chevrolet and explained the issues she had with the repair

work. She stated that the bumper was hanging off, the grille was “sticking

off,” and she could place her finger in a gap under the hood of the vehicle.

Ms. Wakefield testified she then contacted Casey Key, Ryan Chevrolet’s

service manager. Mr. Key requested that Ms. Wakefield bring the vehicle

back so they could assess the repair work. According to Ms. Wakefield, she,

Mr. Key, Mr. Todd, and an insurance representative met and inspected the

vehicle. Although Mr. Key offered to repair the vehicle at no extra cost, Ms.

Wakefield continued to express her concerns about the repair work and

questioned whether she could use another body shop to complete the repair

work. The insurance representative told Ms. Wakefield she could use

another body shop, but the insurer would not make another payment—she

would have to get back the money GEICO paid to Ryan Chevrolet.

Ms. Wakefield stated that, following the exchange with Mr. Key and

the insurance representative, she got an estimate from Mitchell’s Body Shop.

The estimate showed the cost to repair her vehicle would be $615.15. Ms. 2 Wakefield stated she did not know the extent of the work needed to be

completed in order to repair her car, and she did not know how long it would

take to repair the vehicle. Furthermore, the length of time she would need a

rental vehicle was also unknown.

Mr. Key, who testified next, stated that he is the Fixed Operations

Director at Ryan Chevrolet, and he oversees the parts, service, body shop,

and detail departments. He testified about the meeting between himself, Ms.

Wakefield, and the GEICO representative. He also reviewed the photos of

the vehicle and indicated that an adjustment could be made to the gap

between the top of the headlight and the hood/piece of trim on the vehicle.

For each problem he was questioned about, Mr. Key suggested that the

repair shop would have attempted to make adjustments and address Ms.

Wakefield’s concerns about the alleged faulty repair work. However, Ms.

Wakefield declined any additional services offered by Mr. Key.

Regarding the Mitchell’s Body Shop estimate, Mr. Key explained that

several items listed on the estimate had been completed by Ryan Chevrolet’s

body shop. One item specifically, the upper grille, could be deducted from

the second estimate, according to Mr. Key. Because of this, Mr. Key stated

that the total cost of repair should be about $298.00. At the close of his

testimony, Mr. Key indicated that had Ms. Wakefield allowed Ryan

Chevrolet to repair the vehicle, the repairs would have taken less than a day

and would have been free of charge. Mr. Key reiterated that Ryan Chevrolet

was still willing to make those adjustments for Ms. Wakefield.

At the close of the trial, the court found Ms. Wakefield to be a

credible witness and indicated that Mr. Key’s testimony regarding the

meeting at which he addressed Ms. Wakefield’s concerns about the vehicle 3 was “incredulous at best.” The court also disagreed with Mr. Key that it

would only require $298.00 to complete a second round of repairs to the

vehicle. The court awarded Ms. Wakefield $4,525.00 in damages, with

$1,298.00 of those damages classified as general damages. Ryan Chevrolet

objected to the award of damages and indicated that general damages were

not requested by Ms. Wakefield in her petition. Ryan Chevrolet now

appeals.

DISCUSSION

In its sole assignment of error, Ryan Chevrolet contends that the trial

court erred in awarding $4,525.00 in damages to Ms. Wakefield. More

specifically, Ryan Chevrolet maintains that Ms. Wakefield made no demand

for general damages in her lawsuit or at trial, and the evidence does not

support awarding Ms. Wakefield general damages. Similarly, any amount

awarded above $298.00 in special damages by the trial court to Ms.

Wakefield is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

The trial court’s findings of fact are subject to the manifest error

standard of review, and the court of appeal may not set these aside unless

they are manifestly erroneous or plainly wrong. Broussard v. State, ex. rel

Office of State Buildings 12-1238 (La. 4/05/13), 113 So. 3d 175, Hodge v.

Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 55,656 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/24), 388

So. 3d 1281. The appellate court must decide only whether the factfinder’s

conclusion was reasonable, not whether it was right or wrong. Id.; Smith v.

City of Monroe, 52,605 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 267 So. 3d 1218.

Reversal is warranted only when the record, viewed in its entirety, (1)

contains no reasonable factual basis for the district court’s finding and (2)

establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Id. Without such a showing, 4 the appellate court may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting

as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Criswell

v. Kelley, 54,188 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 335 So. 3d 483.

Every act whatever of man that causes damages to another obliges

him by whose fault it happened to repair it. La. C.C. art. 2315(A). In the

assessment of damages in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi

contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury. La. C.C. art.

2324.1.

Special damages are those which can be fixed to a pecuniary certitude.

Burks v. Hogan, 55,699 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/24), 387 So. 3d 841, writ

denied, 24-00814 (La. 10/15/24), 394 So. 3d 814; Stevens v. Winn-Dixie of

Louisiana, 95-0435 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/09/95), 664 So. 2d 1207; Hernandez

v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 615 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1993), writ

denied, 620 So. 2d 850 (La. 1993). When items of special damage are

claimed, they must be specifically alleged. La. C.C.P. art. 861. Generally, a

trial court may not award special damages which have not been specifically

pled. The purpose of the specificity requirement is to avoid the imposition

of surprise upon the defendant. Stevens, supra.

General damages include mental or physical pain and suffering,

inconvenience, and loss of intellectual or physical enjoyment that cannot be

definitively measured in monetary terms. Burks, supra; Montgomery v.

Kedgy, 44,601 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/26/09), 21 So. 3d 980, writ denied, 09-

2110 (La. 11/25/09), 22 So. 3d 167. No mechanical rule exists for

determining general damages; rather, the facts and circumstances of each

case control. Burks, supra; Kose v. Cablevision of Shreveport, 32,855 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/5/00), 755 So. 2d 1039, writs denied, 00-1177, 00-1289 (La. 5 6/16/00), 764 So. 2d 964, 765 So. 2d 340. Before the trial court’s general

damage award may be disturbed, the record must clearly show that the

factfinder abused its broad discretion in making the award. Id. The role of

the appellate court in reviewing general damages is not to decide what it

considers an appropriate award, but to review the exercise of discretion by

the trier of fact. Burks, supra; Criswell, supra.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court indicated that it awarded

Ms. Wakefield $4,525.00 in damages. Although the trial court noted it did

not include loss of wages, the trial court specified that it awarded the full

amount paid for the repairs to Ryan Chevrolet as well as the cost for a rental

vehicle. Similarly, the trial court indicated that it awarded general damages

to Ms. Wakefield for her “mental anguish and the condition under which

[she] had to endure while she did not have her vehicle.” Although the trial

court is in the best position to evaluate evidence and make credibility

determinations, the record before us is devoid of any evidence to support the

amount of damages awarded to Ms. Wakefield in this case.

Even though the testimony presented at trial shows that Ryan

Chevrolet acknowledged some level of faulty repair work, this admission,

standing alone, cannot support $4,525.00 in damages, especially considering

that Ms. Wakefield incurred no out-of-pocket expenses for the repair work.

Her insurance company provided the $3,227.42 payment to Ryan Chevrolet

directly, not to Ms. Wakefield. Most notably, there is testimony in the

record that Ryan Chevrolet offered to correct the faulty repair work at no

cost to Ms. Wakefield. However, she refused. Clearly, Ryan Chevrolet was

willing to remedy the issues Ms. Wakefield had with the repair work, and

her refusal of this offer is counterintuitive to her completely understandable 6 desire that her vehicle’s incomplete repairs be remedied. However, Ryan

Chevrolet is not to blame for Ms. Wakefield’s decision to forgo its offer and

instead go to another body shop.

Similarly, nothing in the record supports or establishes that Ms.

Wakefield incurred any expenses related to renting a vehicle. The only

actual special damages supported by the record is the $298.00 set forth by

Mr. Key in his testimony. Specifically, his explanation that the upper grille

part shown on the Mitchell’s Body estimate could be deducted from the total

amount of the estimate because Ryan Chevrolet’s repair work on Ms.

Wakefield’s vehicle included replacement of the grille. Subtraction of the

cost of an upper grille from the Mitchell’s Body estimate results in $298.00.

As it relates to general damages specifically, Ms. Wakefield presented

no evidence to support that she suffered mental anguish or endured hardship

while she was without her vehicle. Ms. Wakefield alleged in her petition

that she sought recovery for lost wages, but she presented no evidence

related to thereto. When asked about her request for lost wages, Ms.

Wakefield stated, “I’ll leave that alone.” There is no factual or evidentiary

basis in the record to support the trial court’s finding that Ms. Wakefield is

entitled to $1,298.00 in general damages. As such, the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding this amount.

Notwithstanding the broad discretion trial courts have in awarding

damages as well as assessing evidence and weighing credibility of witnesses,

this record, viewed in its entirety, contains no reasonable factual basis for

the trial court’s finding that Ms. Wakefield suffered mental anguish and

hardship or that she otherwise incurred $3,227.00 in special damages from

Ryan Chevrolet’s faulty repair work. The record before us unequivocally 7 establishes that the trial court’s findings are clearly wrong and therefore

must be set aside.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, that part of the trial court’s judgment

awarding general damages is reversed. That portion of the trial court’s

judgment awarding special damages is amended as follows. The trial court’s

award is vacated and the defendant, Ryan Chevrolet, is hereby ordered to

pay the plaintiff, Rodessa Wakefield, $298.00 in special damages, with legal

interest thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid. Costs of this

appeal are assessed equally between the parties.

REVERSED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART AND AS

AMENDED, AFFIRMED.