Roderick Williams v. Robert Gill and South Bend Public Transportation Corporation (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 30, 2019
• Docket: 18A-CT-3056
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 30 2019, 9:24 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Chad M. Buell Jamie C. Woods Schiller Law Offices, LLC Phillip A. Garrett Carmel, Indiana Thorne Grodnik, LLP Mishawaka, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Roderick Williams, July 30, 2019 Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CT-3056 v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court Robert Gill and South Bend The Honorable Jenny Pitts Manier, Public Transportation Judge Corporation, Appellees-Defendants. Trial Court Cause No. 71D05-1703-CT-125

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 1 of 12 Case Summary [1] On June 30, 2015, Roderick Williams was involved in an automobile accident

with Robert Gill. At the time of the accident, Gill was driving a bus in the

course of his employment as a driver for the South Bend Transportation

Corporation (“SBTC”). Williams allegedly suffered both property damage and

personal injury as a result of the accident and filed a claim for damages against

Gill and the SBTC (collectively, “Appellees”). On August 7, 2015, Williams

signed a “Release of Claim” (“the Release”) in exchange for $1733.06. The

Release indicated that Williams was releasing Appellees from liability for any

and all claims arising from or relating to the June 30, 2015 accident. Williams

subsequently filed suit against Appellees, arguing that he believed that the

Release only applied to his property damage claims and not his personal injury

claims. During discovery, Williams failed to answer certain requests for

admissions, resulting in the admissions being conclusively established pursuant

to Indiana Trial Rule 36. Williams later filed an affidavit in which he

attempted to contradict his prior admissions. The trial court rejected Williams’s

subsequent attempts to withdraw these admissions and to amend his affidavit

and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.

[2] Concluding that the Release was unambiguous and clearly stated that Williams

intended to release Appellees from liability for any and all claims arising from

the accident, we conclude that the award of summary judgment in favor of

Appellees was not erroneous. We further conclude that given the unambiguous

nature of the Release, any potential error committed by the trial court in

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 2 of 12 denying Williams’s requests to withdraw his admissions or to amend his

designated evidence was at most harmless because the trial court could not have

considered any extrinsic evidence relating to the parties’ intent. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On June 30, 2015, Gill was employed by the SBTC and was driving a bus

owned by the SBTC when he was involved in an automobile accident with

Williams in South Bend. On August 7, 2015, Williams signed the Release

releasing Appellees from liability for any and all claims arising out of the

accident in exchange for $1733.06.

[4] On March 17, 2017, Williams filed a lawsuit against Appellees, alleging that the

Release only applied to property damage sustained in the accident and seeking

additional damages for claimed personal injuries sustained as a result of the

accident. During discovery, Appellees mailed, via certified mail, a First

Request for Admissions on January 29, 2018. The document indicated that

Williams was “to admit or deny the following Request for Admission in

writing, on or before the 26th day of February, 2018.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II

p. 55. Appellees mailed, via certified mail, a Second Request for Admissions

on February 9, 2018. This document indicated that Williams was “to admit or

deny the following Request for Admissions in writing, on or before the 10th day

of March, 2018.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 57. Williams failed to answer any

of the requests for admissions. As a result, the admissions were conclusively

established pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 36.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 3 of 12 [5] On March 21, 2018, Appellees filed a motion requesting a status conference

and for the trial court to reset the scheduled trial date. Appellees included the

Release, a copy of the check for $1733.06 made payable to Williams, and the

First and Second Requests for Admissions as exhibits to the motion. A few

weeks later, on April 6, 2018, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.

On July 13, 2016, Williams filed a motion to withdraw his admissions and a

response in opposition to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Williams

included an affidavit, signed on Williams’s behalf by his counsel, in his

designated materials in which he attempted to contradict his prior admissions.

On July 16, 2018, Appellees filed a motion to strike Williams’s affidavit and

Williams sought permission to amend his affidavit to include a copy signed by

Williams.

[6] The trial court conducted a hearing on all pending motions on August 23, 2018.

After taking the matter under consideration, on September 4, 2018, the trial

court issued an order in which it denied Williams’s motion to withdraw

admissions, granted Appellees’ motion to strike Williams’s affidavit, denied

Williams’s motion to amend his designated materials, and granted Appellees’

motion for summary judgment. Williams’s motion to correct error was deemed

denied on November 19, 2018.

Discussion and Decision [7] Williams raises numerous contentions on appeal which we restate as whether

the trial court (1) erred by granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment or

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 4 of 12 (2) abused its discretion by denying his requests to amend his designated

evidence and to withdraw certain admissions.1

I. Summary Judgment [8] Williams contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of Appellees.

[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. The review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court. We review decisions on summary judgment motions carefully to ensure that the parties were not improperly denied their day in court.

Midwest Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Stroup, 730 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 2000) (internal

citations omitted).

[9] Williams argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to

Appellees because an issue of material fact remains as to whether the parties

intended for the Release to apply to both his property damage and personal

injury claims or to only his property damage claim. For their part, Appellees

1 To the extent that Williams also argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on his motion to correct error, we note that Williams has failed to provide any cogent argument or citation to relevant authority in support of this argument. He has therefore waived this argument for appellate review. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. 2014) (providing that appellant waived claim on appeal because he failed to support it with cogent argument or citation to relevant authority).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 5 of 12 argue that the Release is unambiguous and the clear language of the Release

indicates that the parties intended for it to apply to any and all claims arising

out of/relating to the accident. We agree with Appellees.

[10] The Release is a settlement agreement, i.e., an agreement to release Appellees

from future liability in exchange for $1733.06. “Indiana strongly favors

settlement agreements.” Sands v. Helen HCI, LLC, 945 N.E.2d 176, 180 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2011). “Settlement agreements are governed by the same general

principles of contract law as other agreements.” Id.; see also Evan v. Poe &

Assocs., Inc., 873 N.E.2d 92, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“A release, as with any

contract, should be interpreted according to the standard rules of contract

law.”).

The goal of contract interpretation is to determine the intent of the parties when they made the agreement. This court must examine the plain language of the contract, read it in context and, whenever possible, construe it so as to render every word, phrase, and term meaningful, unambiguous, and harmonious with the whole. Construction of the terms of a written contract generally is a pure question of law. If, however, a contract is ambiguous, the parties may introduce extrinsic evidence of its meaning, and the interpretation becomes a question of fact. A word or phrase is ambiguous if reasonable people could differ as to its meaning. A term is not ambiguous solely because the parties disagree about its meaning.

Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc. v. Wilmoth, 70 N.E.3d 833, 839 (Ind. Ct. App.

2017), trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 6 of 12 [11] If contract language is deemed ambiguous, “the contract terms must be

construed to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties when they

entered into the contract.” Id.

Courts may properly consider all relevant evidence to resolve an ambiguity. Extrinsic evidence is evidence relating to a contract but not appearing on the face of the contract because it comes from other sources, such as statements between the parties or the circumstances surrounding the agreement. An ambiguous contract should be construed against the party who furnished and drafted the agreement.

Id. “A contract is ambiguous only if a reasonable person could find its terms

susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Evan, 873 N.E.2d at 98.

[12] However, “[i]f contract language is unambiguous, this court may not look to

extrinsic evidence to expand, vary, or explain the instrument but must

determine the parties’ intent from the four corners of the instrument.” Wilmoth,

70 N.E.3d at 839. Stated differently, “[w]here a contract is unambiguous, the

intent of the parties should be determined by the language employed in the

document.” Evan, 873 N.E.2d at 98 (internal quotation omitted).

Thus, if the contract is unambiguous, we give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the four corners of the document. We will neither construe clear and unambiguous provisions nor add provisions not agreed upon by the parties. The meaning of a contract is to be determined from an examination of all of its provisions, not from a consideration of individual words, phrases, or even paragraphs read alone.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 7 of 12 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Unambiguous contracts must

be specifically enforced as written without any additions or deletions by the

court.” Perfect v. McAndrew, 798 N.E.2d 470, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[13] In interpreting a settlement agreement, “[t]he primary purpose in construing a

document is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ mutual intent.” Id. “The

intent relevant in contract matters is not the parties’ subjective intents but their

outward manifestation of it.” Zimmerman v. McColley, 826 N.E.2d 71, 77 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2005) (citing Centennial Mortgage, Inc. v. Blumenfeld, 745 N.E.2d 268,

277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). “The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to

ascertain the intention of the parties’ from their expression of it.” Blumenfeld,

745 N.E.2d at 277. “A court does not examine the hidden intentions secreted

in the heart of a person; rather it should examine the final expression found in

conduct.” Id.

[14] In this case, the Release signed by the parties reads as follows:

The Undersigned, being of lawful age, for sole consideration of one thousand seven hundred thirty three dollars and six cents ($1,733.06) to be paid to Roderick Williams do/does and for your/your heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and forever discharge Transpo and his, her, their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators, and all other persons, firms, corporations [ ] or partnerships of and from any and all claims, actions, course of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses, and compensation whatsoever, which thus undersigned now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of us or any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen damages and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the accident, casualty Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 8 of 12 or event which occurred on or about the 30th day of June 2015, at or near Eddy Street & Jefferson Blvd. in South Bend, IN. It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a claim, and that the payment made is not to be considered as an admission of liability on the part of the party or parties hereby released nor as a contribution toward any bodily injury or medical related expense of any kind.

The Undersigned further declare(s) and represent(s) that no promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made to the Undersigned, and that this Release serves as the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and that the terms of this release are contractual and not a mere recital.

THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 59 (emphases added). Upon review, we do not

believe that a reasonable person could find the terms of the Release susceptible

to more than one interpretation. As such, we conclude that the Release is

unambiguous. We will therefore confine our review of the parties’ intent to the

four corners of the document and will enforce the terms as written.

[15] The Release clearly states that, in exchange for $1733.06, Williams agreed to

“release, acquit and forever discharge” Appellees “from any and all claims,

actions, course of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of services,

expenses, and compensation whatsoever … resulting or to result from the

accident.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 59. This language clearly indicates that

by signing the Release, Williams intended to release Appellees from all claims

arising from the accident. Williams cannot subsequently circumvent the clear

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 9 of 12 language used in the Release by stating on appeal that he believed it meant

something else. See Zimmerman, 826 N.E.2d at 77 (providing that the parties’

outward manifestation of intent, not their subjective intents, is relevant in

contract matters).

[16] The clear language of the Release supports the trial court’s determination that

Appellees were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Given that the

Release is unambiguous, it would have been improper for the trial court to

consider any contrary extrinsic evidence relating to the parties’ intent when

ruling on the summary judgment motion. See Wilmoth, 70 N.E.3d at 839;

Perfect, 798 N.E.2d at 479. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err

in granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.2

II. Motion to Amended Designated Evidence [17] Williams also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his

motion to amend his designated evidence, specifically to amend his affidavit.

In requesting permission to file an amended affidavit, Williams’s counsel

explicitly states that the only change in the amended document is that it is

2 We are unpersuaded by Williams’s counsel’s assertion that the entry of summary judgment should be reversed because Williams apparently signed the release without first discussing the matter with counsel, whom he had retained prior to signing the Release. See generally Waterfield v. Waterfield, 61 N.E.3d 314, 319– 20, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (denying a respect to set aside a settlement agreement when the party entered into the agreement despite her attorney’s warnings and cautions). We are also unpersuaded by Williams’s claim that the Release did not apply to his personal injury claims merely because he filed those claims under a different claim number than his property damage claim. Williams’s attempt to circumvent the Release by filing his claims under different claim numbers does not change the fact that both the property damage and personal injury claims resulted from the accident.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 10 of 12 signed by Williams rather than the original which was signed by Williams’s

counsel on Williams’s behalf. Counsel states that “[o]therwise, the substance,

form, and content of the Amended Designation of Materials is exactly the same

as the previously filed Designation of Materials filed by Plaintiff on

7/13/2018.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 178.

[18] In challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to amend his designated

evidence, Williams argues that his affidavit, in both its original and amended

form, presented statements sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to

intent. However, given our conclusion above that the language of the Release

was unambiguous, the trial court could not have properly considered this

extrinsic evidence when determining the parties’ intent. See Wilmoth, 70 N.E.3d

at 839; Perfect, 798 N.E.2d at 479. Thus, even if the trial court had allowed

Williams to amend his designated evidence to include a copy of his affidavit

that was signed by him, the amended affidavit would have had no bearing on

the trial court’s summary judgment ruling as the trial court could not have

considered it as evidence of intent. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its

discretion in this regard.

III. Withdrawal of Admissions [19] Williams last contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his

request to withdraw certain admissions. In raising this contention, Williams

argues that he should have been permitted to withdraw his admissions because

without the admissions, he could have presented evidence that would have

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 11 of 12 created an issue of material fact as to intent that would have, in turn, precluded

the award of summary judgment for Appellees. Given our conclusion above

that the trial court could not have considered any extrinsic evidence regarding

to intent because the Release was clear and unambiguous, we conclude that

even if the trial court erred by denying Williams’s request to withdraw his

admissions, such error could, at most, be found to be harmless as it would have

had no bearing on the trial court’s summary judgment determination. The trial

court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in this regard.

[20] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-3056 | July 30, 2019 Page 12 of 12