Roderick Mitchell v. Jolee Chambers, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Henry Horton and Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 20, 2024
• Docket: 55,949-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered November 20, 2024. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 55,949-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

RODERICK MITCHELL Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

JOLEE CHAMBERS, STATE Defendants-Appellees FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, HENRY HORTON, AND FOREMOST INSURANCE COMPANY GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 638,951

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

THE LAW OFFICE OF ALLEN Counsel for Appellant COOPER, LLC By: James Allen Cooper, Jr. Joseph Christopher Miciotto

LUNN IRION LAW FIRM, LLC Counsel for Appellees, By: Gerald Martin Johnson, Jr. Henry Horton, and Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan

Before COX, STEPHENS, and MARCOTTE, JJ. MARCOTTE, J.

This devolutive appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,

Caddo Parish, Judge Chris Victory presiding. Roderick Mitchell (“plaintiff”

or “appellant”) seeks review of the trial court’s judgment granting summary

judgment in favor of defendants, Henry Horton (“Horton”) and Foremost

Insurance Company Grand Rapids, Michigan (“Foremost”). The trial court

found no genuine issue of material fact existed that made Horton liable for

injuries plaintiff sustained in Horton’s truck after it was rear-ended. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

This suit arises from an August 15, 2021, automobile accident which

occurred on North Market Street in Shreveport, Louisiana, at its intersection

with the I-220 eastbound on-ramp. Horton, traveling north on North Market

in his 2007 Dodge pickup truck during daytime hours, was pulling a single-

axle flatbed utility trailer with a metal mesh ramp that was locked in the

raised position. Plaintiff was a guest passenger in Horton’s truck.

Horton was in the outside northbound lane of North Market planning

to turn right to enter I-220 and go east toward his home. While Horton was

stopped for the red light at the intersection, the rear of his trailer was struck

from behind by a Ford Fusion driven by defendant Jolee Chambers

(“Chambers”). Plaintiff claims he was injured as a passenger in Horton’s

truck after Chambers collided with the rear of Horton’s trailer.

The accident led to two lawsuits. On August 15, 2022, Mitchell filed

this suit naming Chambers and her auto insurer, State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), alleging the accident was caused by the negligence of Chambers. Mitchell also named Horton and

Foremost as defendants, alleging negligence due to inoperative lights on

Horton’s trailer.

Horton filed a separate suit against Chambers and State Farm, alleging

that Chambers was completely at fault for the accident for following too

closely, failing to keep a proper lookout, and failing to bring her vehicle to a

stop before the collision – typical allegations against a rear-ending motorist.

Horton settled with Chambers and State Farm and this suit was dismissed.

In the instant suit, Mitchell settled his claims against Chambers and

State Farm. Thus, his only remaining claim was against Horton and

Foremost related to the inoperative lights on Horton’s trailer.

In his petition, Mitchell contended that Horton “failed to have

properly operating brake lights on the rear of the trailer he was pulling

behind his pickup truck,” and that he “should have made sure that the brake

lights on his trailer were operating correctly.” He further contended Horton

“should not have operated it when the brake lights were not operating

correctly” and that Horton should have inspected the brake lights before

operating the trailer.

On December 19, 2022, defendants filed an answer to plaintiff’s

petition in which they generally denied his allegations. Defendants also

asserted that the accident was caused by the sole and exclusive negligence of

Chambers.

On October 2, 2023, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment

seeking dismissal of Mitchell’s claims against them, alleging that the

condition of Horton’s trailer had no effect on how the accident actually

2 occurred, and that the accident was caused by the negligence of Chambers,

the rear-ending motorist. The gravamen of defendants’ motion was that the

sworn testimony of the parties involved in the accident established that

Horton’s conduct and the condition of the trailer had nothing to do with the

accident and that there was no causal relationship between the condition of

the trailer and the accident.

Defendants attached photographs of the vehicles and trailer, claiming

they established that the lights on Horton’s truck were working and that

Horton’s trailer, even without lighting on it, did not obstruct Mitchell’s view

of Horton’s truck. Defendants also pointed out that Chambers herself

admitted responsibility for the accident because she was following too

closely behind Horton’s trailer and failed to stop in time to avoid the

collision.

On November 6, 2023, Mitchell filed an opposition to defendants’

motion for summary judgment, claiming that there were numerous issues of

material fact that precluded summary judgment, including whether Horton

was negligent in failing to hook up the brake lights on his trailer and whether

such failure was a cause of the accident.

On November 20, 2023, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for

summary judgment with oral reasons expressed in open court on the day of

the hearing. The trial court found that Mitchell could not, as a matter of law,

establish the essential elements of a causal relationship between the accident

and Horton’s conduct or the condition of his trailer.

Mitchell now appeals the trial court’s ruling granting defendants’

motion for summary judgment.

3 DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when

there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed

for by a litigant. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So. 2d 880;

Driver Pipeline Co. v. Cadeville Gas Storage, LLC, 49,375 (La. App. 2 Cir.

10/1/14), 150 So. 3d 492, writ denied, 14-2304 (La. 1/23/15), 159 So. 3d

1058. Summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy,

and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by

La. C.C.P. art. 969(A)(2). The procedure is favored and shall be construed

to accomplish those ends. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2).

Appellate courts review motions for summary judgment de novo,

using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether

summary judgment is appropriate. Leisure Recreation & Ent., Inc. v. First

Guar. Bank, 21-00838 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So. 3d 508; Peironnet v. Matador

Res. Co., 12-2292 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 791; Elliott v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,

06-1505 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So. 2d 1247; Reynolds v. Select Props., Ltd., 93-

1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So. 2d 1180; Davis v. Whitaker, 53,850 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/28/21), 315 So. 3d 979.

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no genuine issue as

to material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.

C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). A material fact is one that potentially ensures or

precludes recovery, affects the ultimate success of the litigant, or determines

the outcome of the dispute. Because it is the applicable substantive law that

4 determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material for

summary judgment purposes can be seen only in light of the substantive law

applicable to the case. Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 12-2742 (La.

1/28/14), 144 So. 3d 876; Richard v. Hall, 03-1488 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So. 2d

131.

A genuine issue is one about which reasonable persons could

disagree. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459 (La.

4/12/05), 907 So. 2d 37, citing Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc.,

93-2512, (La. 7/5/94), 639 So. 2d 730; Franklin v. Dick, 51,479 (La. App. 2

Cir. 6/21/17), 224 So. 3d 1130. In determining whether an issue is genuine,

a court should not consider the merits, make credibility determinations,

evaluate testimony, or weigh evidence. Suire, supra; Chanler v. Jamestown

Ins. Co., 51,320 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 223 So. 3d 614, writ denied, 17-

01251 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So. 3d 1230.

On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof rests with the

mover. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). If the mover will not bear the burden of

proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary

judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate

all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but

rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more

elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. The

burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to

establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

5 In the context of a motion for summary judgment, a defendant can

prove the absence of causation with undisputed evidence. When a motion

for summary judgment based on a lack of causation is properly supported

with undisputed facts, the plaintiff must come forward with credible

evidence to support causation and cannot rely on a mere allegation of its

presence. Pellerin v. Foster Farms, L.L.C., 54,829 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/11/23), 354 So. 3d 790.

Sudden Emergency

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not finding a material

issue of fact created by Chambers’ testimony that Horton started driving

forward then abruptly stopped for no reason, thereby creating a “sudden

emergency” which caused or contributed to the accident. Mitchell claims

that this alone creates a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat

summary judgment.

Appellees claim that there was no “sudden emergency” with respect to

this accident. Appellees assert that even if Horton moved forward, then

stopped when the light turned green, as Chambers contends, her admission

that she was still following Horton’s trailer too closely and her failure to

observe any brake lights on Horton’s pickup at any time mean any such

motion by Horton did not create a hazard, and even if it did, Chambers could

have avoided it.

Under the sudden emergency doctrine, a person who finds himself in a

position of imminent peril and without sufficient time to consider and weigh

all the circumstances is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what

subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be the better method, unless

6 the emergency is brought about by his own negligence. Barfield v. Akins,

54,204 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/20/22), 342 So. 3d 1169. The rule of sudden

emergency, however, cannot be invoked by one who has not used due care

to avoid the emergency. King v. State Farm Ins. Co., 47,368 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/8/12), 104 So. 3d 33.

The sudden emergency doctrine is only applicable to the standard of

conduct after an emergency has arisen. It does not apply to lower the

standard of care required of motorists before the emergency occurs. Id.,

citing Ebarb v. Matlock, 46,243 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/11), 69 So. 3d 516,

writ denied, 11-1272 (La. 9/23/11), 69 So. 3d 1164.

Here, Chambers was at all times the following motorist required to

use a high degree of care, irrespective of any motion of Horton’s vehicle.

Thus, while the discrepancy between Chambers’ testimony and Horton’s

regarding the accident sequence may raise a genuine issue, it is not one of

material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Moreover, Mitchell himself never raised the “sudden emergency”

issue in his petition, nor did Chambers ever raise the issue as an affirmative

defense. When asked about the sequence of events leading up to the

accident, Mitchell testified as follows:

Q: Was the truck and the trailer -- were they both still at a complete standstill when the impact from the other vehicle occurred?

A: No, sir. It moved just a little bit.

Q: But I mean before that, at the time of the impact?

A: Yes. At the time of the impact, it was still. He was on his brakes.

Q: And it was in the -- was it in the same position

7 that it had been in when y’all came to a stop at that red light?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So it wasn’t like he stopped and eased forward that may have caused somebody behind them to think that he was moving ahead? Nothing like that happened, did it?

A: No, sir.

Q: Y’all were stopped the whole time?

A: Completely stopped.

Thus, plaintiff’s own testimony does not in any way indicate

that Horton created a sudden emergency which contributed to the

accident. To the contrary, it indicates that Chambers failed in her duty

to see what she should have seen, especially considering the

undisputed fact that she had a clear view of Horton’s truck and trailer

as well as the brake lights on Horton’s truck.

Moreover, Chambers’ admission that she was following Horton

at no more than “an arm’s length” seriously undermines Mitchell’s

“sudden emergency” claim. The “sudden emergency” doctrine is not

applicable when the party asserting it was also negligent. See Waters

v. Oliver, 2016-1262 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/22/17), 223 So. 3d 37

(refusing to apply the doctrine in connection with a bus driver who

was following another vehicle too closely and had to suddenly brake,

causing injury to a bus passenger).

Here, the hazard was created by Chambers following too

closely behind Horton. Accordingly, the “sudden emergency”

8 doctrine does not inure to the benefit of Mitchell, a passenger in

Horton’s vehicle.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

Failure to Plug in Trailer Brake Lights and Causation

Mitchell also avers that the trial court erred in not finding that

Horton’s failure to plug in his trailer brake lights to his truck created a

genuine issue of material fact. Mitchell claims that Horton’s failure to plug

in his trailer’s brake lights meant that Chambers did not have adequate

notice that the vehicle in front of her was stopped.

Mitchell also argues that the warning provided by brake lights helps

avoid accidents at night or during the day, thus the trial court erred in finding

that whether a rear-ended driver’s brake lights were working prior to a rear-

end collision only matters at night. Mitchell points out that if darkness were

required for brake lights to need to be working, then the law would not

require them to work during the day. Mitchell claims that a reasonable trier

of fact could find that the impact would not have happened or would have

been less severe if Horton’s brake lights had been working, thereby giving

Chambers a warning of the sudden, abrupt stop that he was making.

Appellees argue that the evidence is clear that the condition of

Horton’s trailer was not a causal factor in the accident, and that the trial

court correctly concluded the accident would have happened regardless of

whether Horton’s trailer lights were working. Appellees point out that

Horton’s truck had brake lights on each side of its rear and above the cab,

and that the testimony of all three parties involved in the accident made clear

that Chambers’ view of these brake lights was not obstructed by the trailer.

9 Therefore, appellees argue the fact that the accident happened in the daytime

is immaterial because the trailer’s lack of lighting was not a causal factor in

the accident.

To establish that Horton was liable for the accident, Mitchell must not

only prove Horton was negligent in some way but also that his negligence

caused or contributed to the accident. In other words, the issue of causation

depends on whether the accident would have happened without

consideration of any negligence on the part of Horton.

Horton’s truck and trailer are shown in several photographs taken at

the scene after the accident which were attached to the motion for summary

judgment. The photographs show a small, single-axle, flatbed trailer with a

metal grid ramp that was raised and secured in a vertical position for

transport and travel. The photographs also show that Horton’s truck had two

brake lights on each side of its rear and another one above the rear of the

cab.

It is undisputed that all the truck’s lights were functioning at the time

of the accident and the photographs and undisputed evidence show all three

lights were visible to a following motorist in Chambers’ position. In

describing the photographs in his deposition, Mitchell said the brake lights

on the truck were visible through the trailer and that he believed Chambers

would have been able to see the truck’s brake lights without obstructions.

Mitchell also said he had no information to suggest that the condition of any

lights on the trailer had anything to do with the accident.

In her deposition, Chambers testified that she was “an arm’s length”

behind Horton when she collided with his trailer. At such a short distance,

10 we find it difficult to believe that any brake lights on the trailer, functioning

or not, would have prevented this accident.

There are numerous cases in which a defendant breached or may have

breached a duty of some kind, but the breach was not found to be causally

related to the accident at hand. In Elee v. White, 21-0229 (La. App. 1 Cir.

10/21/21), 332 So. 3d 97, writ denied, 21-01732 (La. 1/19/22), 331 So. 3d

329, a delivery truck driver stopped, blocking traffic, in order to back his

vehicle into the driveway of a store. The plaintiff in that case, seeing the

delivery truck blocking the road, had stopped in the roadway when he was

rear-ended by another driver who failed to observe the obstruction. Plaintiff

sued the rear-ending motorist and the store owner, alleging the store owner

had not properly designed its parking lot. The court found the design and

layout of the parking lot were not a causal factor in the accident and

exonerated the store owner while imposing liability on the rear-ending

motorist.

In Harrington v. Bley, 12-0149 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/18/12), 101 So. 3d

64, a motorist ran a red light while turning left across oncoming traffic. The

negligence of the motorist was found to be the sole cause of the accident,

even though a codefendant construction company was ostensibly negligent

for failing to place signs prohibiting left turns at the intersection.

In Gaspard v. Safeway Ins. Co., 14-1676 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/5/15), 174

So. 3d 692, writ denied, 15-1588 (La. 10/23/15), 184 So. 3d 18, a motor

vehicle struck a pedestrian in a crosswalk located in the parking area of a

Safeway grocery store. The court noted that Safeway had not properly

striped the crosswalk and perhaps should have placed a stop sign at the

11 crosswalk, but that those ostensible breaches of duty did not causally relate

to the accident. The absence of a stop sign was rendered immaterial because

the motorist stopped before entering the pedestrian zone.

In this case, Mitchell’s arguments based on Horton’s actions and the

lack of working lights on his trailer may tend to support a finding of

negligence on Horton’s part, but they fail to establish that Horton’s actions

or the condition of his trailer had anything to do with the accident. In other

words, Mitchell’s case lacks the essential element of causation. This

assignment of error lacks merit.

We find that there remain no genuine issues of material fact and that

Mitchell failed to demonstrate sufficiently that causation can be proven at

trial. Thus, the trial court’s grant of appellees’ motion for summary

judgment was appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. The costs of the appeal are

assessed to appellant.

AFFIRMED.