Roderick Luvert Aubrey Golston v. Andre Saul

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: June 24, 2021
• Docket: 2:20-cv-05727
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RODERICK L. A. G., Case No. CV 20-5727-RAO

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Roderick L. A. G.1 (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Commissioner’s denial 19 of his application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the 20 Social Security Act. For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner 21 is AFFIRMED. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25

26 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil 27 Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United 28 States. 1 II. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 2 On May 2, 2017, Plaintiff protectively applied for SSI alleging disability 3 beginning January 1, 2015, due to schizoaffective disorder, amphetamine use 4 disorder in remission, HIV, insomnia, and hypertension. (Administrative Record 5 (“AR”) 15, 141-46, 166.) His application was denied on September 18, 2017. (AR 6 62-76.) On October 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing, and a 7 hearing was held on April 3, 2019. (AR 29-61, 85-88.) Plaintiff, represented by 8 counsel, appeared and testified, along with an impartial vocational expert. (AR 29- 9 61.) On April 26, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff 10 had not been under a disability, pursuant to the Social Security Act,2 since May 2, 11 2017, the date the application was filed. (AR 24.) The ALJ’s decision became the 12 Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 13 for review. (AR 1-6.) Plaintiff filed this action on June 26, 2020. (Dkt. No. 1.) 14 The ALJ followed a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether 15 Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 16 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged 17 in substantial gainful activity since May 2, 2017, the application date. (AR 18.) At 18 step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of Human 19 Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), schizoaffective disorder, polysubstance abuse 20 (methamphetamine) and hypertension. (AR 18.) At step three, the ALJ found that 21 Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 22 medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, 23 Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (AR 18.) 24 Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual 25 functional capacity (“RFC”) to:

26 2 Persons are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are 27 unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment expected to result in death, or which has lasted or is expected to last for 28 a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 1 [P]erform medium work . . . [except Plaintiff] can [lift] and carry 50 2 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently[;] [h]e can stand and walk for 6 hours during an 8-hour work day, and can sit for 6 hours 3 during an 8-hour work day[;] [h]e can occasionally perform detailed 4 tasks[;] [h]e is able to occasionally interact with co-workers, supervisors and the public. 5 6 (AR 20.) 7 At step four, based on Plaintiff’s RFC and the vocational expert (“VE”)’s 8 testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. 9 (AR 23.) At step five, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant 10 numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (AR 23-24.) 11 Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability . . . since 12 May 2, 2017, the date the application was filed.” (AR 24.) 13 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 14 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s 15 decision to deny benefits. A court must affirm an ALJ’s findings of fact if they are 16 supported by substantial evidence, and if the proper legal standards were applied. 17 Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence . 18 . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla[,]’ . . . [which] means—and means only—‘such 19 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 20 conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, —U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed. 2d 21 504 (2019) (citations omitted); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 An ALJ can satisfy the substantial evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed 23 and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 24 interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 25 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 26 “[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a 27 specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record 28 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the 1 Secretary’s conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) 2 (citations and internal quotations omitted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to more 3 than one rational interpretation,’ the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. 4 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 5 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 6 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing 7 the ALJ’s conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”). The 8 Court may review only “the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability 9 determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” 10 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 11 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)). 12 IV. DISCUSSION 13 Plaintiff’s contentions all concern alleged errors at step five. Specifically, 14 Plaintiff contends: (1) the ALJ erred in relying on VE testimony regarding full-time 15 work; (2) the ALJ erred in relying on VE testimony regarding occasional capacity for 16 detailed tasks; and (3) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s step five 17 determination. (Joint Submission (“JS”) at 5-7, 15-20, 23-29, 35.) The 18 Commissioner disagrees, arguing forfeiture, lack of merit, and lack of apparent 19 conflict. (JS at 7-15, 20-23, 29-35.) For the reasons below, the Court affirms. 20 A. Applicable Legal Standards 21 At step five of the sequential disability analysis, it is the Commissioner’s 22 burden to establish that, considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, the 23 claimant can perform other work. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1011 (9th Cir. 24 2014) (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). To make this 25 showing, the ALJ may rely on the testimony of a VE. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 26 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ may pose accurate and detailed hypothetical 27 questions to the VE to establish: (1) what jobs, if any, the claimant can do; and (2) 28 the availability of those jobs in the national economy. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1011. 1 The VE then translates the ALJ’s scenarios into “realistic job market probabilities” 2 by testifying about what kinds of jobs the claimant can still perform and whether 3 there is a sufficient number of those jobs available in the economy. Id. (quoting 4 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101). “[I]n the absence of any contrary evidence, a VE’s 5 testimony is one type of job information that is regarded as inherently reliable; thus, 6 there is no need for an ALJ to assess its reliability.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 7 1051 (9th Cir. 2017). 8 B. The ALJ’s Decision 9 At step five, the VE testified that an individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, 10 work experience, and RFC would be able to perform the requirements of 11 representative occupations such as linen room attendant, hospital cleaner, and 12 dishwasher. (AR 58-59.) The ALJ determined that the VE’s testimony was 13 consistent with the information contained in the DOT. (AR 24.) Adopting the VE’s 14 testimony, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 15 national economy that Plaintiff could perform, and Plaintiff was, therefore, not 16 disabled. (AR 24.) 17 C. Discussion 18 1. Full-Time Work 19 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by not restricting his question to the VE 20 at step five to full-time work. (JS at 5-7, 15-18.) 21 At the hearing, the ALJ asked the VE a series of hypothetical questions, asking 22 the VE to consider a hypothetical person with the same age, education, work 23 background and RFC as Plaintiff. (AR 58.) After the VE testified that such a 24 hypothetical person could not do Plaintiff’s past work, the ALJ asked, “Could this 25 person do other work?” (AR 58.) The VE testified that such a person could do some 26 unskilled jobs, such as linen room attendant, hospital cleaner, and dishwasher. (AR 27 59.) 28 /// 1 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE was incomplete 2 because it permitted the consideration of part-time work, which is inconsistent with 3 the regulations and agency policy. (JS at 6.) Relying on evidence from Occu 4 Collect,3 which he presented to the Appeals Council, Plaintiff argues that the error is 5 material because “a significant number of jobs within each category of work 6 represent part-time work,” and it is unclear whether the VE would have identified 7 those jobs had the ALJ restricted his question to full-time work. (JS at 6-7.) 8 The Commissioner contends that Plaintiff forfeited his vocational argument by 9 not raising it at the hearing; Plaintiff’s argument is, nevertheless, meritless; and the 10 ALJ is not required to reconcile conflicts between the VE’s testimony and non-DOT 11 sources. (JS at 7-11, 13-15.) 12 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff forfeited his argument regarding not 13 specifically restricting the hypothetical question to the VE to full-time work. Plaintiff 14 was represented by counsel at the hearing, and counsel did not cross-examine the VE 15 on whether the jobs identified were full-time, despite questioning the VE on two 16 hypothetical questions of his own.4 (AR 60). Thus, Plaintiff forfeited the issue. See 17 Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]t least when claimants are 18 represented by counsel, they must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative 19 hearings in order to preserve them on appeal.”); see also Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 20 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that challenges to a VE’s job numbers based 21 on an alleged conflict with alternative sources of job information must be raised “in 22 a general sense before the ALJ” to preserve a claimant’s challenge). 23 3 According to the Commissioner, Occu Collect is a for-profit company, for which 24 Plaintiff’s attorney is the president and holds a 51% financial interest. (JS at 13 n.6). 25 Plaintiff states that Occu Collect reports data from government sources. (JS at 17.)

26 4 Plaintiff’s counsel questioned the VE solely on whether past relevant work or any 27 jobs would be available if such an individual had an additional limitation for problems concentrating and focusing so that the individual would be off task 15 28 percent of the day on a consistent basis. (AR 60.) 1 In the Reply, Plaintiff argues that he is permitted to submit rebuttal evidence 2 to the Appeals Council, and the evidence is timely. (JS at 16). Submitting new 3 evidence to the Appeals Council, however, “does not resolve the forfeiture issue” 4 where claimant failed to raise the argument at the administrative hearing. Shapiro v. 5 Saul, 833 F. App’x 695, 696 (Mem) (9th Cir. 2021) (relying on Meanel and Shaibi 6 and finding “the submission of new evidence to the Appeals Council does not resolve 7 the forfeiture issue, because the issue was not first raised before the ALJ”); see also 8 Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1159 n.14 (9th Cir. 2020) (challenging a VE’s testimony 9 may occur by cross-examining the VE at the hearing on apparent conflicts, making a 10 request to the ALJ to “submit supplemental briefing or interrogatories contrasting the 11 [VE]’s specific job estimates with estimates of the claimant’s own,” or, raising new 12 evidence before the Appeals Council if the ALJ declines the request for supplemental 13 briefing) (quoting Shaibi, 883 F.3d at 1110); Tommy D. J. v. Saul, 2021 WL 780479, 14 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (finding challenge to VE’s testimony forfeited where 15 new evidence was submitted to the Appeals Council but the issue was not raised 16 before the ALJ); McCloud v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 987222, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 17 2018) (finding plaintiff waived challenge on appeal based on the OOH by failing to 18 raise it before ALJ, even though it was raised before the Appeals Council). Plaintiff’s 19 failure to raise the issue at the hearing of whether the VE’s testimony was restricted 20 to full-time work precludes Plaintiff from overcoming forfeiture of that issue.5 21 Plaintiff argues that the Court should not rely on Shapiro because the opinion 22 is unpublished and conflicts with another unpublished opinion, Jaquez v. Saul, 840 23 F. App’x 246 (Mem) (9th Cir. 2021). (JS at 16.) In Jaquez, the Ninth Circuit reversed 24 and remanded on the issue of job numbers where plaintiff submitted evidence to the 25 Appeals Council contradicting the VE’s testimony and the evidence had not been

26 5 Plaintiff implies that he did not raise the full-time issue at the hearing because it is 27 difficult to anticipate what the VE will testify. (JS at 16.) The Court is not persuaded. In this context, asking the VE whether the jobs identified are full-time takes little, if 28 any, preparation and anticipation on behalf of a claimant’s attorney. 1 presented to the ALJ. Jaquez, 840 F. App’x at 247. In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit 2 found that plaintiff did not forfeit the issue because “it appears that the Appeals 3 Council considered this evidence in denying [plaintiff’s] appeal.” Id. at 247 n.2 4 (citing Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2012)). It 5 appears that the Ninth Circuit in Jaquez may have overlooked a distinguishing factor 6 in Brewes. In Brewes, the Ninth Circuit held that “when a claimant submits evidence 7 for the first time to the Appeals Council, which considers that evidence in denying 8 review of the ALJ’s decision, the new evidence is part of the administrative record, 9 which the district court must consider in determining whether the Commissioner’s 10 decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1159-60. Of 11 relevance here is that in Brewes, the claimant had raised the issue to the ALJ about 12 the impact of missing two or more days of work per month and then submitted 13 “additional evidence” from claimant’s treating providers opining that claimant would 14 miss “quite a few days a month” of work to the Appeals Council that “was directly 15 responsive to the vocational expert’s testimony.” Id. at 1163-64. Thus, Brewes is 16 consistent with the process set forth in Meanel and Shaibi, both of which are 17 published and binding decisions. For these reasons, the Court finds Shapiro more 18 persuasive than Jaquez and consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s binding decisions in 19 Meanel, Shaibi, and Brewes. Accordingly, Plaintiff has forfeited his vocational 20 argument by not raising it at the hearing. 21 Even were the Court to assume that Plaintiff’s argument were not forfeited, it 22 would be meritless. First, there is no indication in the record that the VE included 23 the availability of part-time work when answering the hypothetical questions posed 24 at step five. As the Commissioner argues, the ALJ expressly informed the VE prior 25 to the hearing that it was necessary “to consider vocational factors in order to 26 determine whether or not the claimant is able to engage in any substantial gainful 27 activity.” (AR 125.) In addition, the VE, who had over 30 years of experience in 28 vocational rehabilitation consulting and worked as a VE for the Social Security 1 Administration since 1996, presumably knew that an RFC assessment was “an 2 individual’s ability to do sustained work-related . . . activities in a work setting” for 3 “8 hours a day, for 5 days a week,” and that she was asked to identify national jobs 4 that constituted full-time substantial gainful activity. (AR 53, 195-96); Soc. Sec. 5 Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *1. Further, during the hearing, there 6 appeared to be no confusion over whether the VE was testifying about the availability 7 of solely full-time work. Not only did Plaintiff’s attorney not ask the VE whether 8 the jobs identified were all full-time, he did not restrict his own hypothetical 9 questions to full-time work. (AR 60.) The record does not support Plaintiff’s 10 speculative argument that the VE did not restrict her testimony to full-time work. 11 Second, Plaintiff’s arguments fail because the ALJ was entitled to rely on the 12 VE’s testimony. “[T]he Social Security Administration relies primarily on the 13 [DOT] for information about the requirements of work in the national economy,” and 14 a VE’s testimony generally should be consistent with it. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 15 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2). 16 When there is a conflict between the DOT and a VE’s testimony, neither 17 automatically prevails over the other. Id. The ALJ must determine whether a conflict 18 exists and, if so, determine whether the expert’s explanation for the conflict is 19 reasonable and whether there is a basis for relying on the expert rather than the DOT. 20 Id. Here, the ALJ found the VE’s testimony consistent with the DOT. (AR 24.) 21 The ALJ was not required to consider whether the VE’s testimony was 22 consistent with Occu Collect, a non-DOT source. See Shaibi, 883 F.3d at 1109-10 23 (finding no duty to inquire into an alleged conflict between the VE’s testimony and 24 non-DOT sources); see also Maxwell v. Saul, 840 F. App’x 896, 899 (9th Cir. Dec. 25 15, 2020) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that ALJ failed to resolve conflict between 26 VE’s testimony and non-DOT vocational resources because an ALJ “does not have 27 an affirmative obligation to resolve such conflicts”) (citing Shaibi, 883 F.3d at 1109- 28 10); Grether A. D. v. Saul, 2021 WL 1664174, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021) 1 (finding ALJ had “no duty to consider whether the vocational expert’s testimony was 2 consistent with [non-DOT] sources [including Occu Collect]”). In any event, 3 Plaintiff’s lay interpretation and unexplained conclusions about the Occu Collect data 4 does not undermine the VE’s testimony. See David G. v. Saul, 2020 WL 1184434, 5 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2020) (“Plaintiff’s subjective lay assessment of the data 6 [from various non-DOT sources] is insufficient to undermine the VE’s analysis.”), 7 aff’d 837 F. App’x 516 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2021)). 8 In sum, Plaintiff forfeited his vocational argument, but even assuming he did 9 not, his argument is meritless. 10 2. Occasional Capacity for Detailed Tasks 11 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by not resolving apparent conflicts 12 between his RFC for occasional detailed tasks and the jobs identified by the VE. (JS 13 at 18-20, 23-24.) Specifically, he argues that the ALJ failed to resolve an apparent 14 conflict between the limitation to occasional detailed tasks and the tasks required to 15 perform the linen room attendant job, which involves reasoning Level 3 work. (JS 16 at 19.) Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to resolve an apparent conflict 17 between the limitation to occasional detailed tasks and the detailed but uninvolved 18 tasks required to perform the dishwasher and hospital cleaner jobs, which involve 19 reasoning Level 2 work. (JS at 20.) 20 The VE testified that a person with the RFC the ALJ found to exist could 21 perform the jobs of linen room attendant, hospital cleaner, and dishwasher, stating 22 that all were medium with SVP 2. (AR 59.) When the ALJ asked the reasoning level 23 for the three identified occupations, the VE testified that the hospital cleaner and 24 dishwasher jobs were reasoning Level 2 and “oh, linen room attendant is a 3.” (AR 25 59.) The ALJ asked for another representative occupation for a person with 26 Plaintiff’s RFC, and the VE testified, “[O]h, well, let me double check if you’re 27 looking at reasoning – oh, a hand packager,” with reasoning Level 2. (AR 59.) 28 /// 1 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to resolve an apparent conflict between 2 Level 3 reasoning work and a limitation to occasional detailed tasks. Reasoning 3 Level 3 jobs require the ability to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out 4 instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form. Deal with problems 5 involving several concrete variables in or from standardized situations.”6 DOT, App. 6 C, (4th ed. Rev. 1991), 1991 WL 688702. A linen room attendant “[s]tores, 7 inventories, and issues or distributes bed and table linen and uniforms in 8 establishments, such as hotels, hospitals, and clinics: Collects or receives and 9 segregates, counts, and records number of items of soiled linen and uniforms for 10 repair or laundry, and places items in containers.” DOT No. 222.387-030. 11 Plaintiff’s reliance on Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2015), is 12 inapposite here. In Zavalin, the Ninth Circuit held that “there is an apparent conflict 13 between the residual functional capacity to perform simple, repetitive tasks, and the 14 demands of Level 3 Reasoning,” and observed that “simple, repetitive” correlates 15 more with a Level 2 reasoning. Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 847. Here, the RFC is different 16 from that in Zavalin, as the ALJ did not limit Plaintiff to performing simple, repetitive 17 tasks, i.e., no detailed tasks. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Zavalin does not stand 18 for the proposition that the ability to perform reasoning Level 3 work has an apparent 19 conflict with a limitation to occasional detailed tasks. Plaintiff does not cite any 20 authorities on point, and it appears that the Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the 21 issue. 22 Based on this record, it is not clear whether the VE intended to include the 23 linen room attendant job as a representative occupation once she realized that the job 24 25 6 “There are six GED Reasoning Levels that range from Level One (simplest) to Level Six (most complex).” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 26 (9th Cir. 2015). “SVP ratings speak to the issue of the level of vocational preparation 27 necessary to perform the job, not directly to the issue of a job’s simplicity, which appears to be more squarely addressed by the GED [reasoning level] ratings.” Meissl 28 v. Barnhart, 403 F. Supp. 2d 981, 983 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 1 required reasoning Level 3. If the ALJ was going to rely on the VE’s identification 2 of the linen room attendant job, he should have clarified whether a person with 3 Plaintiff’s limitations could perform this job since the VE seemed surprised when she 4 realized that it required a Level 3 reasoning level. (AR 59.) If the VE replied that 5 such a person could still perform the linen attendant job, the ALJ should have 6 “ask[ed] the VE to explain in some detail why there [was] no conflict between the 7 DOT and [Plaintiff’s] RFC,” especially because the ALJ seemed to have reservations 8 about the reasoning level for that job. Lamear v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th 9 Cir. 2017); see also Cali v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 1276947, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 10 2017) (“[T]he [DOT] reflects that each of the representative occupations the ALJ 11 identified at step five requires Level 3 reasoning development – a level of complexity 12 which appears to exceed the abilities of a claimant who can understand, remember, 13 and carry out only “some detailed tasks.”) (internal footnote omitted). 14 Even assuming the ALJ erred by relying on the linen attendant job to find non- 15 disability, any error would be harmless because, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, 16 there was no apparent conflict between Plaintiff’s limitation to occasional detailed 17 tasks and the remaining jobs, which require Level 2 reasoning. See Shaibi, 883 F.3d 18 at 1110 n.7 (finding error at step five harmless where plaintiff could perform the two 19 remaining jobs identified). Level 2 jobs require the ability to “[a]pply commonsense 20 understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions. Deal 21 with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations.” 22 DOT, App. C, 1991 WL 688702. 23 Plaintiff argues that the Court should determine that the ability to perform 24 detailed but uninvolved tasks with few variables is consistently required in Level 2 25 work. (JS at 20.) The Court is not persuaded, finding no support for Plaintiff’s 26 argument and ultimate conclusion that a limitation to occasional detailed tasks 27 conflicts with Level 2 work. The Ninth Circuit has cited with approval the notion 28 that a limitation to simple, routine tasks is consistent with Level 2 reasoning. See 1 Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 847 (citing with approval Tenth Circuit case noting that Level 2 Two reasoning “appears more consistent” with a limitation to simple, routine tasks). 3 Unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions have concluded that a limitation to simple, 4 repetitive tasks is consistent with Level 2 reasoning. See Turner v. Berryhill, 705 F. 5 App’x 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The RFC determination limiting [claimant] to 6 ‘simple, repetitive tasks’ . . . is compatible with jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning.”); 7 Lara v. Astrue, 305 F. App’x 324, 326 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[S]omeone able to perform 8 simple, repetitive tasks is capable of doing . . . Reasoning Level 2 jobs.”). It stands 9 to reason, then, that a person who can do more than simple, repetitive tasks can also 10 perform Level 2 reasoning. See Davis v. Saul, 846 F. App’x 464, 466 (9th Cir. 2021) 11 (limitation to simple work, some detailed work, and some 3-4 step tasks consistent 12 with reasoning Level 2); Roberson v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 1173907, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 13 Mar. 29, 2017) (no error where jobs identified by VE required Level 2 reasoning and 14 RFC was for occasional detailed or complex tasks); see also Truong v. Saul, 2019 15 WL 3288938, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 19, 2019) (RFC limitation to “detailed non- 16 complex instructions” closely tracks Level 2 reasoning requirement for carrying out 17 “detailed but uninvolved” instructions), adopted by 2019 WL 3936153 (S.D. Cal. 18 Aug. 20, 2019). The Court finds no apparent conflict between Plaintiff’s ability to 19 perform occasional detailed tasks and the Level 2 jobs identified. 20 In sum, any error was harmless with respect to Plaintiff’s capacity for 21 occasional detailed tasks and the jobs identified at step five. 22 3. Step Five Determination 23 Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s step 24 five determination. (JS at 24-29, 35.) 25 Plaintiff, again, relies on data he submitted for the first time to the Appeals 26 Council, namely the Occupational Requirements Survey (“ORS”) and O*NET 27 OnLine. (JS at 25-26.) He argues that this data presented to the Appeals Council 28 rebuts the VE’s testimony regarding the number of jobs available for the identified 1 jobs “that do not have bona fide occupational requirements to stand/walk more than 2 six hours in an eight-hour day, to avoid more than occasional interaction with others, 3 and engage in full-time work activity.” (JS at 26.) He argues that a “reasonable 4 person” would not be convinced that the job numbers remained reliable. (JS at 26.) 5 Plaintiff argues that in submitting rebuttal evidence to the Appeals Council, the issue 6 is not forfeited and the evidence is properly in the record. (JS at 28.) 7 As discussed above, Plaintiff forfeited his argument, and submitting new 8 evidence to the Appeals Council does not cure the forfeiture. See Meanel, 172 F.3d 9 at 1115; Shaibi, 883 F.3d at 1109-10; Shapiro, 833 F. App’x at 696. 10 Even were the Court to assume that Plaintiff’s argument were not forfeited, it 11 would be meritless because the ALJ was entitled to rely on the VE’s testimony. The 12 ALJ found the VE’s testimony consistent with the DOT.7 (AR 24.) Plaintiff’s 13 argument focuses on alleged inconsistencies between the VE’s testimony and non- 14 DOT sources. Yet, the ALJ is not required to reconcile conflicts between the VE’s 15 testimony and non-DOT sources, such as the ORS or O*NET OnLine. See Shaibi, 16 883 F.3d at 1109-10 (finding no duty to inquire into an alleged conflict between the 17 VE’s testimony and non-DOT source); see also Maxwell v. Saul, 840 F. App’x 896, 18 899 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2020) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that ALJ failed to resolve 19 conflict between VE’s testimony and non-DOT vocational resources because an ALJ 20 “does not have an affirmative obligation to resolve such conflicts”) (citing Shaibi, 21 883 F.3d at 1109-10); Rosalie M.M. v. Saul, 2020 WL 5503240, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 22 Sept. 11, 2020) (rejecting claim that ALJ was required to address inconsistency 23 between VE testimony and the ORS and O*NET OnLine). Plaintiff does not cite any 24 binding Ninth Circuit decision that finds that a VE must rely on the ORS or O*NET 25 OnLine, or that any other source of job information controls when it conflicts with 26 27 7 Even assuming the VE’s testimony regarding the linen room attendant job conflicted with the DOT, Plaintiff fails to show that the hospital cleaner or 28 dishwasher jobs conflicted with the DOT, as discussed above. 1 || the VE’s testimony, and the Court has found none. The Court declines to extend the 2 || ALJ’s duty to resolve apparent conflicts under SSR 00-4p to apparent conflicts 3 || between a VE’s testimony and non-DOT sources such as the ORS or O* NET OnLine. 4 Further, Plaintiff's lay interpretation of the vocational evidence does not trump 5 || the expertise of the VE. See, e.g., Kevin E. v. Saul, 2021 WL 134584, at *6 (C_D. 6 || Cal. Jan. 14, 2021) (finding a lay interpretation of data from non-DOT sources, such 7 || as the ORS and O*NET OnLine, “fails to undermine the reliability of the vocational g || expert’s testimony”) (citing, among others, Selia R. v. Saul, 2020 WL 3620228, at 9 | *14 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 27, 2020) (“[C]ourts in this circuit considering similar 10 || arguments have found that lay assessment of raw data does not rebut a vocational 1] || expert’s opinion.”): David G. v. Saul, 2020 WL 1184434, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 12 || 2020) (“Plaintiff's subjective lay assessment of the data [from various non-DOT 13 || sources] is insufficient to undermine the VE’s analysis.”), aff'd 837 F. App’x 516 14 || (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2021)). 15 In sum, Plaintiffs claim is forfeited, but even assuming it 1s not, it is meritless. 16 || The Court finds that the ALJ’s step five finding is supported by substantial evidence. 17 Vv. CONCLUSION 18 IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the decision of 19 || the Commissioner denying benefits. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this 21 || Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. 22 ° 53 | DATED: June 24, 2021 _ Raplh, a, Qe. 74 ROZELLA A. OLIVER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 NOTICE 2g | ESDREREE SY OSTEND LOB PPERCATION IN WESTLAW,