Rodensteiner Tech. v. Sunshine Enterprises, No. Sp97-8418 (Apr. 1, 1998)

1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 4748
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedApril 1, 1998
DocketNo. SP97-8418
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 4748 (Rodensteiner Tech. v. Sunshine Enterprises, No. Sp97-8418 (Apr. 1, 1998)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rodensteiner Tech. v. Sunshine Enterprises, No. Sp97-8418 (Apr. 1, 1998), 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 4748 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION The plaintiff in this action, Rodensteiner Technologies, LLC hereinafter ("Landlord"), seeks a judgment of immediate possession based upon two allegations: (1) nonpayment of rent; and (2) termination of the lease agreement by lapse of time.

The defendant, Sunshine Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter "Tenant"), asserts by way of defense that a dispute exists as to CT Page 4749 the amount of additional rent, if any, owed to the plaintiff. Defendant also contends that the lease has not terminated by lapse of time because the Landlord has not provided a rental offer in accordance with the terms of the lease agreement.

FACTS

On or about September 22, 1992, Sunshine Enterprises, Inc. entered into a commercial lease ("lease") for a five year term with plaintiff's predecessor in interest for premises known as 12 South Street, Danbury, Connecticut.

Paragraph 2 of the commercial lease describes the leased premises as "building one, rear, Danbury, Connecticut, for which Tenant shall have exclusive possession and a designated exclusive parking area for the personnel and business visitors of the Tenant as shown on the site plan filed with the Planning and Zoning officials of the City of Danbury."

Pursuant to the description of premises contained in the lease, the Tenant occupied 3096 square feet of space and had sixteen parking spaces. Also, pursuant to the terms of the lease, the Tenant paid $1687.50 per month in 1997. Accordingly, the Tenant was being charged approximately $6.50 per square foot. When the defendant originally moved into the space, it spent approximately $95,000 in fitting up this space for its laundry business.

Paragraph 42 of the lease contained a renewal option that provided as follows:

Renewal Option. Landlord, will, at least six (6) months prior to expiration of this Lease, submit to Tenant a renewal offer. The renewal offer will contain the terms and conditions under which Landlord will be willing to renew the Lease for an additional period of five (5) years. The rent for each year during the period of renewal shall not exceed the previous year's base rent plus a percentage increase thereof which is equal to the percentage increase (if any) in the "Consumer Price Index" for the month of September in the first (1st) and subsequent renewal years over such index for the month of September in the previous year.

On April 1, 1997, the plaintiff submitted a letter to the defendant in which it proposed a new lease (hereinafter "proposed CT Page 4750 lease") with modifications including the following:

Description of Leased Premises. The existing description will be voided. Our offer is based on this new description. Building 1, rear, with modified total space; of 2400 ft.2. Five total parking spaces will be available to accompany this leased space.

In addition, the proposed lease provided that the basic rent would be set at $8/per square foot, and that the total rent per year would be $19,200.

LAPSE OF TIME

In construing a lease, three elementary principles must be kept in mind; the intention of parties is controlling and must be gathered from the language of the lease and the circumstances surrounding the parties at the execution of the instrument; the language must be given its ordinary meaning unless technical or special meaning is clearly intended; and the lease must be construed as a whole and in such a manner as to give effect to every provision if reasonably possible. Hatcho Corporation v. DellaPietra, 195 Conn. 18 (1985). Additionally, a commercial lease imposes on the landlord a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement. Warner v. Konover, 210 Conn. 150 (1989).

Connecticut case law distinguishes between a covenant to extend the term of the lease and one to renew a lease for a certain specified term upon the expiration of the initial term.

Any lease, by agreement of the parties, may provide for tenancy beyond the minimum term therein in two well recognized ways: one, by means of a covenant to renew the lease for a certain specified term upon the expiration of the term of the original lease, which covenant contemplates a further lease to be entered into by the parties; the other, by means of what are termed agreements for extension. These latter come into existence by use of a great variety of phrases, such as "the privilege of two more years if desired," or "with right to remain for a further period of ____ if he so elect," or "the privilege of continuing this lease for ____." When such expressions are used, the original lease operates as a continuous one, and the holding for a term exceeding the minimum provided in the agreement, does not require any additional instrument to give it validity. CT Page 4751

City Coal Co. v. Marcus, 95 Conn. 454, 459 (1920).

The court finds that construing this lease as a whole, the parties contemplated a further lease to be entered into by the Landlord and Tenant. However, the court also finds that the Landlord clearly breached its obligation to provide Tenant with a legitimate renewal offer prior to the expiration of the lease.

The intention of the parties, as gathered from the language of the lease, was that the description of the leased premises would remain the same. To interpret the lease otherwise would make the language regarding the agreed upon rental rate contained in the renewal option paragraph superfluous. Moreover, for Landlord to argue that it could unilaterally reduce the amount of square footage by 696 feet, as long as it kept the rent at the rate provided for in the renewal option paragraph, is a clear demonstration of lack of good faith on the part of the Landlord. In essence, what the Landlord is attempting to do is increase from approximately $6.50 to $8 the amount of rent being charged per square foot, while at the same time reducing the amount of square footage available to the Tenant. This was clearly not contemplated by the parties as gathered from the language of the lease and circumstances.

Moreover, if the court were to agree with the Landlord that it could unilaterally reduce the amount of square footage, such interpretation would render the language regarding the description of the premises superfluous. The description of the leased premises are described as building one, rear, and a designated exclusive parking area as shown on the site plan filed with the planning and zoning officials of the City of Danbury. The language of the lease, as well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, require the Landlord to provide a renewal offer for the same property described in the lease dated September 22, 1992 and occupied by the tenants during the original term of the lease.1

A condition precedent is a fact or event which the parties believe must exist or take place before there is a right to performance. If the condition is not fulfilled, the right to enforce the contract does not come into existence. Whether a provision in a contract is a condition, the nonfulfillment of which excuses performance depends upon the intent of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair and reasonable construction of the CT Page 4752 language used in light of all the surrounding circumstances when the contract was executed. K.A. Thompson Electric Co. v. Wesco, Inc.,27 Conn. App. 120, 124 (1992); Lach v. Cahill

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Related

Lach v. Cahill
85 A.2d 481 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1951)
Automobile Insurance v. Model Family Laundries, Inc.
52 A.2d 137 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1947)
City Coal Co. v. Marcus
111 A. 857 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1920)
Hatcho Corp. v. Della Pietra
485 A.2d 1285 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1985)
Warner v. Konover
553 A.2d 1138 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1989)
Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dairy Mart, Inc.
627 A.2d 386 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1993)
K. A. Thompson Electric Co. v. Wesco, Inc.
604 A.2d 828 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1992)
Feinberg v. Berglewicz
632 A.2d 709 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 4748, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rodensteiner-tech-v-sunshine-enterprises-no-sp97-8418-apr-1-1998-connsuperct-1998.