Rode v. Phelps

45 N.W. 493, 80 Mich. 598, 1890 Mich. LEXIS 686
Michigan Supreme Court·Decided May 9, 1890·Published·Cited by 22 cases

Opinion

Morse, J.

This case involves the constitutionality of Act No. 213, Laws of 1889, known as the “New Liquor Tax Law.”

Under the liquor tax law of 1887, the annual tax upon “the business of selling only brewed or malt liquors at wholesale or retail” was $300. Laws of 1887, p. 446. The law of 1889 fixes the tax “upon the business of selling malt, brewed, fermented, or vinous liquors at wholesale, and not at retail,” at $500, and “upon the business of selling spirituous, intoxicating, malt, brewed, fermented, or vinous liquors at retail, $500.” The act of 1889 differs from the law of 1887 in that it makes no distinction in the amount of the tax between the sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors, and the sale of malt, brewed, fermented, and vinous liquors. It makes no difference whether they are sold singly, or both at one place. The tax is the same, to wit, $500.

The relator is a resident of the city of Detroit, engaged in the business of selling malt, br.ewed, and fermented liquors at retail at 107 Gratiot avenue. Intending to continue [600]*600the business for the year 1890, on April 16, 1890, he tendered to Ealph Phelps, Jr., the county treasurer of Wayne county, the sum of $300, with an affidavit that he was then engaged in said business, and that he intended to engage in the same business, at the same place, from May 1, 1890, to April 30, 1891, and requested the said county treasurer to accept said $300, and to issue a receipt to said relator, under the provisions of Act No. 313, Laws of 1887, for the business of selling malt, brewed, or fermented liquors at retail for the year commencing May 1, 1890. The county treasurer refused to accept said money, or to issue said receipt, on the ground that the act of 1889 was in force, and that under said act the retail tax was fixed at $500 upon the business of selling such liquors.

It is claimed by the relator that the act of 1889 as signed by the acting Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the House, and as approved by the Governor and deposited with the Secretary of State, was never passed by the Legislature, which fact is established by the journals of the two Houses. Upon an examination of such journals, we find, beyond question, that this act was never adopted by both Houses in*the shape that it was certified to the Governor and approved by him.

The history .of this failure of legislation, in brief, as shown by the journals, is as follows: The bill was introduced in, and finally passed by, the House, and sent to the Senate. The Senate made nine amendments to the bill as it passed the House. Upon its return to the House, these amendments were reported in detail to the House, and spread upon the Journal. The bill, as it came from the Senate, is set out at length and in full in the House Journal, from page 1792 to page 1804, inclusive.

The House refused, upon June 5, 1889, to concur in any of the Senate amendments. House Journal, p. 1818. [601]*601Afterwards, two separate committees of conference were appointed to adjust the differences between the two Houses. The second conference committee recommended that the House concur in the first, third, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth of the Senate amendments; and, by the subsequent proceedings, these may b,e considered as properly receiving the concurrence of both Houses, and are found in the act approved by the Governor. In relation to the second, fourth, and fifth of the Senate amendments, the conference committee made certain recommendations compromising and adjusting the differences between the two Houses. The report of this second conference committee was agreed to and adopted by the two Houses, and the bill as so amended was passed by each House. But, in engrossing the bill and presenting it to the Governor, the bill, as originally passed by the House and sent to the Senate, with the nine Senate amendments added thereto as it passed the Senate, was copied, and all the amendments and modifications proposed by said second conference committee and adopted by both Houses were omitted. In this shape the bill was signed by the President of the Senate, or acting Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of the House, approved by the Governor, and deposited in the office of'the Secretary of State.

It follows that this act, as it now stands upon the statute-book, was never passed by the House, but rejected; .and, although it once had the approval of the Senate, that body subsequently adopted the amendments and modifications of the conference committee. So that the act, in fact, as it now roads, was adopted by neither House. These things are plainly apparent from a perusal of the journals, and a comparison of the bill as there recorded, as being passed by both Houses, and the act shows the difference between the two. These differences are:

[602]*6021. Upon the business of selling spirituous or intoxicating liquors at wholesale, and not at retail, $600 in the bill as passed, when it is $500 in the act as approved.

2. Upon the business of selling spirituous, intoxicating, malt, brewed, fermented, or vinous liquors at wholesale and at retail, $1,100 as passed, and $1,000 in the act as signed by the Governor.

3. Section 3, of the bill, as passed, reads as follows:

“Sec. 8. The penal provisions of this act shall not apply to druggists who have a permit to sell any of the liquors enumerated in section one of this act for chemical, scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and mechanical purposes, as provided in this section. The township boards and village and city councils of the respective towns, villages, and cities of this State, upon the written application of any druggist who is, or who employs, a registered pharmacist, may grant to such druggist, if they deem proper, a permit to sell the liquors enumerated in this act for chemical, scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and mechanical purposes, but for no other purposes whatever. The sum to be paid to the township, village, or city for such permit shall be one dollar, which sum shall be due- and payable when said permit is granted. Applications for permits shall be made by petition signed and sworn to by the applicant, and filed with the township, village, or city clerk, or recorder, as the case may be, of the township, village, or city in which such druggist proposes to sell intoxicating liquors under the permit applied for, which petition shall state the applicant’s name, place-of residence, in what business he is then engaged, and in what business he has been engaged for two years next preceding the time of filing petition; that he is, or employs, a registered pharmacist; that he has not been adjudged guilty of violating the law-relating to intoxicating liquors within the last two years preceding his application; and that he desires a permit to keep and sell such liquors for chemical, medicinal, sacramental, scientific, and mechanical purposes, and for no other purposes whatever.
“Permits granted under this section shall be for a term ending-on the first day of May next ensuing, but such permit may be-revoked by the authority granting the same whenever the holder of such permit shall have been adjudged guilty of violating any of the provisions of this act, whether relating to his business as druggist or not.

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Rode v. Phelps, 45 N.W. 493, 80 Mich. 598, 1890 Mich. LEXIS 686 (Mich. 1890).

45 N.W. 493 (Rode v. Phelps) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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