Roddy v. Brick

42 N.J. Eq. 218
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedOctober 15, 1886
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 42 N.J. Eq. 218 (Roddy v. Brick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roddy v. Brick, 42 N.J. Eq. 218 (N.J. Ct. App. 1886).

Opinion

Bird, V. C.

This bill is filed to foreclose a mortgage bearing date the 17th of May, 1880, and recorded on the 17th day of June, in the same year, in the county wherein the mortgaged premises are situated. [219]*219This mortgage was given by Riley A. Brick and wife to the complainants, as trustees, to secure the payment of one hundred bonds, given by the said Brick, payable in five years, with interest semi-annually, on the 1st days of January and July, on condition that if default should be made in the payment of any interest, or any part thereof, on the day when the same was payable, and should remain unpaid for the space of thirty days, then the principal of said bonds should become due. The property covered by' the mortgage is first described as follows: “All that certain lot or parcel of ground, with the buildings and improvements thereon erected, situate&c., with a more particular description by courses and distances, containing four acres and a half. It makes no mention of the property which is in dispute, which the complainant claims is part of the real estate, as being fixtures, and which the defendant Campbell claims is personal property.

The bill alleges that at the time of the execution and delivery of the said mortgage the said premises were designed for and used as an iron foundry for the casting and making of water pipe and gas pipe, and that there were, at that time, machinery and fixtures of a permanent nature used in the said business and attached to the realty, and intended to be and actually included in the said mortgage, and, as such, did pass as a part of the real estate to the complainants. The articles claimed by the complainants are—

“One large steam crane, one jack, one steam-engine and boiler, one large lathe, one small lathe, one planer, one drill-press, one drill upright, one Mackenzie blower, two small pumps; in machine-shop—shafting, belting &c , one large truck scale, (for weighing ears and contents), one wire rope and drum, one jig-saw and stand; in blacksmith shop—one pair of bellows, two anvils, one large anvil, railroad track and switch at foundry ; in machine-shop—one iron hoisting-block and chain, one wood hoisting-block and rope, one wood hoisting-block and small.”

The bill states that the whole number of bonds, that is, one hundred, was issued, and that many of them are held entirely by persons unknown, and that no interest has been paid since [220]*220January 1st, 1884, and that therefore the whole amount of principal and interest has become due.

The bill also shows that on the 29th day of May, 1880, the said Brick and wife made and delivered to the defendant Campbell a mortgage upon the same premises to secure the sum of 110,000.

The bill also shows that on the 24th day of June, 1882, the said Brick conveyed all the said mortgaged premises to the said Campbell; and also that, on the 29th day of May, 1880, the said Brick executed a bill of sale to the said Campbell for said articles and many others, which was filed in the clerk’s office on the 16th of August, 1880, and also a certain other bill of sale, dated January 5th, 1882, which was recorded on January 6th, 1882, and also recorded on December 22d, 1882, and on the 18th of December, 1883, which were given to the said Campbell by the said Brick, to complete the sale and transfer of the chattels therein mentioned by said Campbell to said Brick, each one containing a distinct proviso that in case default be made by said Brick in the payment of four several notes, given in consideration of said sales, or any part thereof, then said sale should be void and the said chattels should revert to Campbell, and it should be lawful for him to take possession of them.

As intimated, the articles above enumerated are all named in this bill of sale. Campbell claims two cranes (one steam and one jack), one engine and boiler and one blower, by virtue of the proviso in said bill of sale, insisting that the title did not pass thereby, and could not, in law, until all the consideration-money was paid; whereas the complainants claim that they have all been attached to the realty, and are fixtures, and that the taking of a chattel mortgage or treating the bill of sale as a chattel mortgage, estops Campbell from claiming under the bill of sale.

First. Did the title pass, and was the instrument called a bill of sale intended to be used as a mortgage to secure the payment of the purchase-money only? I think it was intended to be used as a mortgage only. It is true the language used, which is, in case of default, this conveyance to be void, of no effect, and [221]*221the possession of the goods herein described shall revert to the said party of the first part,” is very clear and emphatic; yet a copy of this bill of sale Campbell had recorded in 1882, after having it acknowledged both by himself and Brick, and after making thereon an affidavit by himself, .in which he declares himself to be “the mortgagee in the within-described chattel mortgage.” This must be taken to show what the parties intended. Campbell called it a mortgage when giving it character under oath. I cannot see how the court can now give the instrument any other name. And if there be any doubt, the law prefers treating such instruments as securities. Mr. Justice Story, in Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 486-533, so declares—I quote: “It has been said that the true test whether a conveyance is a mortgage or not, is to ascertain whether it is a security for the payment of any money or not, whether it is a security for the performance or non-performance of any act or thing. If the transaction resolves itself into a security, whatever be its form, it is, in equity, a mortgage. If it be not a security, then it may be an absolute sale or a conditional purchase.” “Again, it is well known that courts of equity lean against construing contracts to be conditional sales; and therefore, unless the construction be clearly made out to be of that nature, it is always construed to be a mortgage. So Lord Hardwicke laid down the doctrine in Longuet v. Scawen, 1 Ves. Sr. 402, 406, and it has never been departed from. The onus probandi, then, is on the defendants to establish it to be a conditional sale. If it be doubtful, then it must be construed to be a mortgage.” Id. 535. And this view of the law is not at all in conflict with the case of Cole v. Berry, 13 Vr. 308, where the rights of the vendor, when it is intended that possession shall pass to the vendee, but not the title to the thing agreed to be sold, are most, clearly defined. The doctrine which is involved in the present case is discussed in Jones on Chat. Mortg. §§ 26-32. In section 30 he declares the law to be the same as laid down by Mr. Justice Story in Flagg v. Mann, supra, but I believe he does not notice this case in his treatise.

If the parties had stood by the original bill of sale, with the [222]*222distinct agreement that the. title should not pass until all the the consideration-money was paid, no question could fairly have been raised, as to the articles included therein and now in this foundry, whether, independently of this question, they be considered fixtures or not. Attaching them to the freehold, however securely, would deprive the true owner of them. See Ewell on Fixtures 54.

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Bluebook (online)
42 N.J. Eq. 218, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roddy-v-brick-njch-1886.