Roddy Sturdivant Enterprises, Inc. v. National Advertising Company

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Roddy Sturdivant Enterprises, Inc. v. National Advertising Company

244 S.E.2d 648, 145 Ga. App. 706, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2095

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedApril 20, 1978

Docket55338

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 244 S.E.2d 648 (Roddy Sturdivant Enterprises, Inc. v. National Advertising Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Roddy Sturdivant Enterprises, Inc. v. National Advertising Company, 244 S.E.2d 648, 145 Ga. App. 706, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2095 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).

Pincite

Opinion

Smith, Judge.

Appellants appeal from the grant of summary judgment against them. They allege that summary judgment was improper since issues of fact remained as to whether appellant Roddy Sturdivant was liable individually on the note sued upon and that the trial court erred in entering a money judgment including a non-categorized award of $412.91 in addition to an award of $2,752.74 in total principal and interest due on the note. We affirm with direction.

1. The terms of the $3,000 note which appellant Sturdivant signed as maker specifically obligated him "individually and as an authorized officer of and acting for Roddy Sturdivant Enterprises, Inc.” (Emphasis supplied.) Under these circumstances, appellant Sturdivant was, as a matter of law, individually liable on the note, and the trial court did not err in so holding.

2. Appellants and appellee agree that the noncategorized, $412.91 award included in the money judgment was intended to be an award of attorney fees under the note. The note authorized appellee, in the event it had to employ an attorney to recover on the note, to collect "a reasonable attorney’s fee equal to the amount suggested by the local Bar Association or customary in similar cases involving like amounts.” Contrary to appellants’ contention, this provision of the note does not *707 in itself constitute price-fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act (15 USCA § 1). See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (95 SC 2004; 44 LE2d 572) (1975). Furthermore, in light of-Code § 20-506(b)’s specifications of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, it was not error for the court to award attorney fees in the absence of proof of the value of the attorney’s services. Goldstein v. Ipswich Hosiery Co., 104 Ga. App. 500 (5) (122 SE2d 339) (1961). However, the court did commit a mathematical error in applying Code § 20-506(b), and the judgment is affirmed with the direction that the trial court vacate the judgment and enter one awarding appellee $2,752.74 in total principal and interest and $300.27 in attorney fees.

Submitted February 2, 1978 Decided April 20, 1978. Harland, Cashin, Chambers, Davis & Dosier, Thomas J. Venker, for appellants. Zusmann, Sikes, Pritchard & Cohen, Dennis M. Hall, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed with direction.

Deen, P. J., and Banke, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Smith, Judge.

Appellants appeal from the grant of summary judgment against them. They allege that summary judgment was improper since issues of fact remained as to whether appellant Roddy Sturdivant was liable individually on the note sued upon and that the trial court erred in entering a money judgment including a non-categorized award of $412.91 in addition to an award of $2,752.74 in total principal and interest due on the note. We affirm with direction.

1. The terms of the $3,000 note which appellant Sturdivant signed as maker specifically obligated him "individually and as an authorized officer of and acting for Roddy Sturdivant Enterprises, Inc.” (Emphasis supplied.) Under these circumstances, appellant Sturdivant was, as a matter of law, individually liable on the note, and the trial court did not err in so holding.

2. Appellants and appellee agree that the noncategorized, $412.91 award included in the money judgment was intended to be an award of attorney fees under the note. The note authorized appellee, in the event it had to employ an attorney to recover on the note, to collect "a reasonable attorney’s fee equal to the amount suggested by the local Bar Association or customary in similar cases involving like amounts.” Contrary to appellants’ contention, this provision of the note does not *707 in itself constitute price-fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act (15 USCA § 1). See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (95 SC 2004; 44 LE2d 572) (1975). Furthermore, in light of-Code § 20-506(b)’s specifications of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, it was not error for the court to award attorney fees in the absence of proof of the value of the attorney’s services. Goldstein v. Ipswich Hosiery Co., 104 Ga. App. 500 (5) (122 SE2d 339) (1961). However, the court did commit a mathematical error in applying Code § 20-506(b), and the judgment is affirmed with the direction that the trial court vacate the judgment and enter one awarding appellee $2,752.74 in total principal and interest and $300.27 in attorney fees.

Submitted February 2, 1978 Decided April 20, 1978. Harland, Cashin, Chambers, Davis & Dosier, Thomas J. Venker, for appellants. Zusmann, Sikes, Pritchard & Cohen, Dennis M. Hall, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed with direction.

Deen, P. J., and Banke, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

244 S.E.2d 648, 145 Ga. App. 706, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2095, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roddy-sturdivant-enterprises-inc-v-national-advertising-company-gactapp-1978.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack