Rocky 116, L. L. C. v. Weston

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rocky 116, L. L. C. v. Weston

284 A.D.2d 139, 726 N.Y.S.2d 94, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5669

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 7, 2001

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 284 A.D.2d 139 (Rocky 116, L. L. C. v. Weston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rocky 116, L. L. C. v. Weston, 284 A.D.2d 139, 726 N.Y.S.2d 94, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5669 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

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Opinion

—Order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, entered on or about August 8, 2000, which, in a summary proceeding to recover a rent-stabilized apartment on the ground of nonprimary residence, modified an order of the Civil Court, New York County (Shirley Kornreich, J.), entered on or about March 24, 1999, granting respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition, so as to deny the motion and reinstate the petition, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

While ordinarily an agreement or stipulation between a prior landlord and tenant is binding on a successor landlord, regardless of whether it is contained in the lease or rider, the motion to dismiss, which was based on petitioner’s predecessor’s waiver of the primary residence requirement in a so-ordered stipulation with respondent settling a prior summary proceeding, was properly denied on the ground that the stipulation waiving the primary residence requirements of the Rent Stabilization Law is against public policy and unenforceable [140]*140(Park Towers S. Co. v Universal Attractions, 274 AD2d 312). Concur — Andrias, J. P., Lerner, Rubin, Buckley and Marlow, JJ.

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—Order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, entered on or about August 8, 2000, which, in a summary proceeding to recover a rent-stabilized apartment on the ground of nonprimary residence, modified an order of the Civil Court, New York County (Shirley Kornreich, J.), entered on or about March 24, 1999, granting respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition, so as to deny the motion and reinstate the petition, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

While ordinarily an agreement or stipulation between a prior landlord and tenant is binding on a successor landlord, regardless of whether it is contained in the lease or rider, the motion to dismiss, which was based on petitioner’s predecessor’s waiver of the primary residence requirement in a so-ordered stipulation with respondent settling a prior summary proceeding, was properly denied on the ground that the stipulation waiving the primary residence requirements of the Rent Stabilization Law is against public policy and unenforceable [140]*140(Park Towers S. Co. v Universal Attractions, 274 AD2d 312). Concur — Andrias, J. P., Lerner, Rubin, Buckley and Marlow, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

284 A.D.2d 139, 726 N.Y.S.2d 94, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5669, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rocky-116-l-l-c-v-weston-nyappdiv-2001.

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