Rockwell Graphic System, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc.

730 F. Supp. 171, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1042, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4131, 1990 WL 7690
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJanuary 31, 1990
Docket84 C 6746
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 730 F. Supp. 171 (Rockwell Graphic System, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rockwell Graphic System, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 171, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1042, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4131, 1990 WL 7690 (N.D. Ill. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

The court has reviewed Magistrate Lef-kow’s very thorough and thoughtful Report and Recommendation in this case. The court has also reviewed de novo those matters in the Magistrate’s Report to which Rockwell objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). United States v. Fenet Jar-amillo, 891 F.2d 620, 627-28 (7th Cir.1989). Rockwell’s objections are without merit. Rockwell’s main objection, broadly stated, is that Magistrate Lefkow improperly resolved factual disputes regarding Rockwell’s procedures for maintaining the trade secret status of its piece part drawings. Rockwell’s contentions have a superficial appeal, because there are many points in the Magistrate’s Report where she seems to weigh the testimony of Rockwell’s witnesses against that of DEV’s. Such a weighing of evidence would of course be inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment.

However, Magistrate Lefkow did not im-permissibly weigh conflicting evidence. What Rockwell fails to acknowledge is that Magistrate Lefkow dealt with two different categories of evidence. That is, Rockwell presented evidence tending to show the kind of security precautions it took in general to protect its trade secrets. DEV presented evidence showing that in practice many of Rockwell’s piece part drawings were not subject to these precautions. Much of Rockwell’s evidence was thus irrelevant to the issue Magistrate Lefkow had to resolve: whether or not drawings like the approximately 100 drawings at issue were kept as trade secrets. When there is ample evidence of dissemination of piece part drawings, and that evidence is uncontradicted, it is no answer for Rockwell to say, well, but look at all the precautions we usually take. Magistrate Lefkow points to essentially uncontradicted evidence that the Southtown Economist possessed, and shared with many others, many piece part drawings. Merrill Printing Company also had scores of such drawings, as did Pathfinder Graphic Systems. It is wishful thinking on Rockwell’s part to claim that the evidence regarding South-town was effectively destroyed on cross-examination. It was not. Magistrate Lef-kow was similarly — and properly — unimpressed by Rockwell’s transparent attempt to create a chimerical issue of fact by submitting the affidavit of Robert B. Gaal to contradict his deposition testimony. Miller v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., 766 F.2d 1102, 1104 (7th Cir.1985).

There are no genuine issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment. The court adopts Magistrate Lefkow’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety, and grants summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Dec. 7, 1989.

JOAN H. LEFKOW, United States Magistrate:

This matter is pending on the motion of defendants DEV Industries, Inc., Press Ma *173 chinery Corporation (“PMC”) and Robert J. Fleck for partial summary judgment under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff, Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc., in its six-count amended complaint, rests federal jurisdiction on allegations that defendants violated provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. Rockwell also asserts five Illinois common law counts, including misappropriation of trade secrets at issue here. The RICO claim charges that defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to misappropriate Rockwell’s trade secrets and confidential information relating to the design, development, and manufacture of printing presses and replacement press parts. The alleged scheme involves the use of Rockwell’s secrets in the manufacture, marketing and sale of competing products. Rockwell alleges that defendant Fleck, as well as defendant Pasquale Peloso (who has since settled), are former employees who had positions of trust and confidence which gave them access to trade secrets and confidential information, that they left their employment at Rockwell to work for DEV and/or PMC and thereafter they surreptitiously obtained Rockwell’s trade secrets for DEV and PMC to use for commercial gain. Rockwell alleges that defendants used the mails in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under RICO was denied. Memorandum Opinion and Order of February 12, 1987 (McGarr, J.). Defendants now claim that discovery has demonstrated that Rockwell cannot establish its trade secret allegations because the drawings found in the hands of defendants were not secret in the first place. SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE

Under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., summary judgment is appropriate when the court is satisfied “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary judgment “will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). On summary judgment, a judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The burden is on the moving party to point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Rule 56 does not require the movant, however, to negate the other party’s claim. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, it must respond to the movant’s showing by demonstrating a genuine dispute as to a material fact on that issue. The non-moving party cannot rest on bare pleadings but must designate specific facts in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits which show that there is a genuine issue of fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54. In assessing whether a genuine issue exists as to any material fact, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc, 356 F.2d 442, 446-47 (7th Cir.1966). To enter summary judgment, the court must, in effect, conclude that based on the evidence plaintiff intends to rely on at trial, no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff. Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
730 F. Supp. 171, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1042, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4131, 1990 WL 7690, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rockwell-graphic-system-inc-v-dev-industries-inc-ilnd-1990.