Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Does

507 F. Supp. 63, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 571, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10513
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedJanuary 26, 1981
DocketCiv. A. 81-C-0074-S
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 507 F. Supp. 63 (Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Does) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 571, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10513 (N.D. Ala. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION DENYING TEMPORARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

CLEMON, District Judge.

The alleged “bootlegging activities” of the “Various John Does” at rock concerts in Birmingham, Alabama and throughout the United States are herein sought to be enjoined in an ex parte proceeding by plaintiffs Rock Tours, Ltd and the rock group nationally and professionally known as “STYX.” For the reasons set forth below, this Court must deny the relief sought by the plaintiffs.

Procedural Background

On January 19, 1981 this action was filed in the federal district court in Birmingham, Alabama. In the complaint, plaintiffs Rock Tours, Ltd, a Michigan corporation; Tommy Shaw, John Panozzo, James Young, Dennis de Young, and Chuck Panozza, collectively and professionally known as “STYX”, seek a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and an order of seizure against various unnamed individuals and corporations. As immediate relief, and with respect to a scheduled January 27, 1981 STYX concert at the Birmingham-Jefferson County Civic Center, (“Civic Center”) plaintiffs seek an order enjoining the defendants from selling the alleged bootleg merchandise within a two-mile radius of the Civic Center between the hours of 4:00 P.M. and 3:00 A.M. on January 27-28, 1981; and plaintiffs further seek an order authorizing United States marshals, state and local police, local county deputy sheriffs, their attorney, and any person acting under their supervision to seize and impound any merchandise bearing the name “STYX” which the unnamed defendants may attempt to sell or hold for sale at the concert.

Plaintiffs further seek a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, without notice, restraining the unnamed defendants and any person acting on their behalf from:

(a) Manufacturing or selling any product using “STYX”, or bearing a likeness of any of the members of the group, or anything similar or confusing thereto;
(b) Representing that any article sold by them is sponsored by or authorized by plaintiff or the musical ensemble professionally known as “STYX”;
(c) Selling their imitation “STYX” merchandise within a two (2) mile radius of the confines of Jefferson Memorial Civic Center, Birmingham, Alabama, during the period of 4:00 P.M. on January 27, 1981, until 3:00 A.M. on January 28,1981, before during and after the concert on the evening of January 27, 1981.

On January 19, 1981 the Court conferred with plaintiffs’ local counsel concerning the application for temporary injunctive relief; a further conference was held on January 20; and on January 22 the motion was deemed submitted to the Court on plaintiffs’ affidavits.

Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action

Plaintiffs’ basic complaint is that the unnamed defendants will, at the January 27 Civic Center Concert and at similar concerts throughout the country, attempt to sell imitation, inferior and unlicensed merchandise bearing the service mark “STYX” or likenesses of the individual plaintiffs, without *65 the authorization of plaintiffs. 1 Predicating their causes of action on the Lanham Act, (15 U.S.C. § 1125), the Federal Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.), 2 and what is presumably the Alabama common law of unfair competition and misappropriation of the right of publicity, plaintiffs claim damages arising out of loss of business reputation and goodwill, as well as loss of sales and profits. These damages are asserted to be impossible of monetary ascertainment; and it is alleged that only injunctive relief is appropriate.

The Birmingham City Ordinance

The City of Birmingham is not unfamiliar with the problems posed by unlicensed vendors selling unauthorized or “bootleg” merchandise at various functions held at the Civic Center. It has, in response thereto, adopted an ordinance which provides, in relevant part:

“It shall be unlawful for any person, while upon the public streets or sidewalks within the loop area, ... or within any area within one-half (Vz) mile of such loop area, to sell or offer for sale any emblem, pennant, or any goods or personal property of any character whatsoever.... ” § 12-14-4 Birmingham City Code
(Ord.No. 77-109).

The Civic Center is judicially noticed to be comfortably within a half mile of the “loop area”, as defined by the ordinance. The “loop area” is the downtown area; and as Chief of Security of the Civic Center points out, the ordinance was enacted “for the purpose of prohibiting this sale of [unauthorized] merchandise outside the area of the Civic Center.” Authorized merchandise, such as that marketed by the corporate plaintiff, is sold within the Civic Center Building through a concessionaire, Interstate United.

Since the enactment of the ordinance, bootlegging activities at the Civic Center have been curtailed, and the Civic Center’s Security staff is prepared to “... look out for bootleggers and take appropriate action under the law.” Of course, Birmingham policemen who regularly patrol the Civic Center area and others who are specially assigned to it during rock concerts may arrest any person violating the ordinance in their presence.

The Justiciability Of The Controversy

In this ex parte proceeding, this Court is necessarily concerned with the extent, if any, to which the instant action is justiciable. Is there a “case or controversy” within the reach of Article III of the federal Constitution; and, if so, should the Court nonetheless exercise its authority or discretion under the Article?

Direction to this Court is provided by the United States Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) in which the Chief Justice noted that

the judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ As is so often the situation in constitutional adjudication, the two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government. Embodied in the words ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part, those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of *66 art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon the federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
507 F. Supp. 63, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 571, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rock-tours-ltd-v-does-alnd-1981.