Roche-Organon, Inc. v. United States

18 Cust. Ct. 72, 1947 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 22
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedFebruary 26, 1947
DocketC. D. 1048
StatusPublished

This text of 18 Cust. Ct. 72 (Roche-Organon, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roche-Organon, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cust. Ct. 72, 1947 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 22 (cusc 1947).

Opinion

Cole, Judge:

"Drugs” and "medicinal preparations,” in a tariff sense, are closely allied terms. Drugs are divided into two categories, i. e., those in a crude state, paragraph 1669 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1201, par. 1669), entitled to free entry, and those advanced in value or condition, paragraph 34 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1001, par. 34), dutiable at 10 per centum ad valorem. The word “drug” is defined in the statute, paragraph 34, supra, as "those substances having therapeutic or medicinal properties and chiefly used for medicinal purposes.” The statutory provision for “medicinal preparations,” paragraph 5 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (J.9 U. S. C. § 1001, par. 5) has been limited, by judicial interpretation, to articles whose chief use is for medicinal purposes, United States v. Hillier’s Son Co., 14 Ct. Cust. Appls. 216, T. D. 41706. The similarity between the two tariff provisions was expressed in United States v. [73]*73Wm. Cooper & Nephews, Inc., 22 C. C. P. A. 31, T. D. 47038, as follows: "Both medicinal preparations and drugs, according to the statutory meaning of those terms, have therapeutic or medicinal properties, and both must be used for the prevention, cure, or alleviation of bodily disease of either man or animal.”

While identical factors — therapeutic qualities and medicinal use— control the tariff classification of merchandise, either as a drug or a medicinal preparation, the very definite difference in treatment accorded the respective products in the tariff act indicates an understanding by Congress that a real distinction between them existed and was intended to be respected. In other words, Congress is presumed to have had good and sufficient factual basis for setting up such separate provisions and to possess in its records and files, making up the Congressional intent, convincing and sound reason therefor.

The foregoing serves to introduce the present issue. The instant case is a retrial of Roche-Organon, Inc. v. United States, 12 Cust. Ct. 164, C. D. 848, the record therein being incorporated by consent of the parties. The merchandise, admittedly the same in both cases, is invoiced here as “Urine Concentrate in form of E. Ill-crystals.” It was classified by the collector as a medicinal preparation under paragraph 5, supra, as amended by the trade agreement with Argentina (T. I). 50504), and assessed with duty at 12% per centum ad valorem. Plaintiff seeks classification as a drug, either as crude under said paragraph 1669, supra, or as advanced in condition and therefore dutiable under paragraph 34, supra. The other claim in the protest, alleging classification as a nonenumerated, unmanufac-tured article, dutiable at 10 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 1558 of the Tariff Act of 1930, was not pressed, either at the hearing or in the briefs, and therefore no further reference will be made thereto.

The incorporated record consists of oral testimony of three witnesses, two of whom were employed by plaintiff. The third appeared on behalf of defendant. Plaintiff also introduced samples of the imported merchandise as it is received in this country and as it is sold commercially. Defendant produced tablets prepared with the use of the imported commodity and also offered illustrative charts showing the effect on humans from the use of the merchandise.

All of the original exhibits were destroyed by fire in the sample bureau of the court. Some, particularly the illustrative charts, are irreplaceable. While they were helpful in the presentation of the case, their presence is not regarded as essential for a proper determination of the issue. Duplicate samples of the imported merchandise, and as it is offered commercially, have been furnished and are referred to hereinafter.

A review of the evidence, adduced in the incorporated case can well be supplied by a virtual restatement of our analysis of the proof in [74]*74the earlier case. A discussion, of the additional testimony offered herein will then follow, applying its intended purpose toward any change it might dictate in the previously discussed factual record.

We do this with some confidence in its accuracy because in the retrial now before us, no criticism of our original factual findings is found in the briefs so ably and painstakingly prepared by counsel for the respective parties. The evidence in the previous case can be analyzed as follows:

Plaintiff corporation is engaged exclusively in the preparation of hormones for commercial distribution. Dr. Bernard Joseph Brent, its scientific director, who has “supervision of scientific research and of manufacturing,” offered some explanation concerning the source of the imported product and described in detail the treatment applied thereto by his firm in producing commercial preparations containing the same. The imported commodity consists of equilin, equilenin, hippulin, possibly some estradiol, coloring matter, and “about 90 per cent oestrone,” all of such substances being hormones found naturally in the urine of pregnant mares. The desired product is the estrogenic hormone for its therapeutic properties capable of correcting conditions peculiar to females. It is obtained from urine collected between the sixth and ninth month of pregnancy that extends over 11 months. The selected period is the time when the hormone excretion is at its highest. Although the witness was thoroughly familiar with the procedure followed to acquire the imported merchandise, having observed it during his 4 years’ experience with the foreign producer in Oss, Holland, and being in possession of “the procedure of manufacture,” he refused to describe what he admitted to be a highly involved and complicated process, stating, “I do not know whether I am at liberty to do so, because the company has a procedure of its own which has not been described in the literature yet, and I don’t think I am at liberty to divulge the process” '(referring obviously to what transpires before importation). Only a sketchy outline was given, consisting merely of a statement that the urine is acidified by adding a mineral acid and ultimately concentrated to form “a tarry, brown foul-smelling mass which is further repurified by the use of organic solvents, and at a certain point this purification is stopped.” Controlling purification of the urine is for the specific purpose of avoiding conflict with a product in this country that is protected by the Allen and Doisy patent, covering one hundred per centum pure oestrone.

After importation, the merchandise is biologically assayed in the laboratory of the importer. Injections are given to approximately 50 spayed mice, and the results are compared with those obtained from the use of a recognized international standard. The instant •merchandise was found to contain “8.8 million international units to the gram,” or approximately 10 per centum less potency than the [75]*75recognized standard, so that in the manufacture of its commercial products, collective exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, infra, plaintiff had to increase the gram weight of the active hormone.

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Roche-Organon, Inc. v. United States
12 Cust. Ct. 164 (U.S. Customs Court, 1944)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Cust. Ct. 72, 1947 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roche-organon-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1947.