Rocha v. Rocha

High Court of American Samoa

Rocha v. Rocha

24 Am. Samoa 2d 30

CourtHigh Court of American Samoa

DecidedApril 29, 1993

DocketDR No. 74-89

StatusPublished

This text of 24 Am. Samoa 2d 30 (Rocha v. Rocha) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering High Court of American Samoa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rocha v. Rocha, 24 Am. Samoa 2d 30 (amsamoa 1993).

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Opinion

[31]*31On Motion for Relief from Judgment:

Respondent, Jose M.B. Rocha, seeks relief from final judgment under T.C.R.C.P. Rule 60(b), on the grounds of "extrinsic fraud." Rule 60(b)(3), however, requires that motions grounded on fraud "shall be made within a reasonable time . . . and not more than one year after judgment." (Emphasis added.) The motion here was not made within one year and is therefore untimely.

Alternatively, plaintiff moves under Rule 60(b)(6), which provides for relief for "any other ground justifying relief from the operation of judgment." Subsection (6) motions are subject to a "reasonable time" limitation. Notwithstanding, respondent is not entitled to relief hereunder, since Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 60(b)(3) are mutually exclusive. Taulaga v. Patea, 12 A.S.R.2d 64, 65-66 (1989). That is, the claimed grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief must not also fall under subsections (l)-(5). Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988); Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482, 493 n.2 (D. Del. 1974), aff’d without opinion 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975); Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 494 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 776 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (6th Cir. 1985) (because "[i]t has been suggested" that Rule 60(b)(6) only applies when (l)-(5) do not, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief).

For the reasons given, the motion is DENIED.

It is so ordered.

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[31]*31On Motion for Relief from Judgment:

Respondent, Jose M.B. Rocha, seeks relief from final judgment under T.C.R.C.P. Rule 60(b), on the grounds of "extrinsic fraud." Rule 60(b)(3), however, requires that motions grounded on fraud "shall be made within a reasonable time . . . and not more than one year after judgment." (Emphasis added.) The motion here was not made within one year and is therefore untimely.

Alternatively, plaintiff moves under Rule 60(b)(6), which provides for relief for "any other ground justifying relief from the operation of judgment." Subsection (6) motions are subject to a "reasonable time" limitation. Notwithstanding, respondent is not entitled to relief hereunder, since Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 60(b)(3) are mutually exclusive. Taulaga v. Patea, 12 A.S.R.2d 64, 65-66 (1989). That is, the claimed grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief must not also fall under subsections (l)-(5). Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988); Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482, 493 n.2 (D. Del. 1974), aff’d without opinion 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975); Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 494 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 776 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (6th Cir. 1985) (because "[i]t has been suggested" that Rule 60(b)(6) only applies when (l)-(5) do not, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief).

For the reasons given, the motion is DENIED.

It is so ordered.

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24 Am. Samoa 2d 30, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rocha-v-rocha-amsamoa-1993.

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