Roblero v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 27, 2025
• Docket: 24-6556
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 27 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCISCO ANGEL ROBLERO, No. 24-6556 Agency No. Petitioner, A200-289-395 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 19, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: HIGGINSON, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.***

Petitioner Francisco Angel Roblero, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal

from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

1. Roblero argues that the IJ and BIA failed to make an appropriate

cumulative hardship determination. The IJ individually analyzed each factor, but

that does not mean that he failed to cumulatively weigh the evidence. And the IJ

also stated that he had “weighed” Roblero’s claim “in light of previous Board

decisions” that address the cumulative hardship standard. Like the IJ, the BIA

thoroughly and appropriately reviewed the totality of the hardship evidence.

2. Roblero argues that the IJ and BIA failed to properly assess the evidence

of economic and emotional hardship presented. We lack jurisdiction to review the

IJ and BIA’s factual determinations. See Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 339 (2022).

Whether the BIA erred in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

standard to a given set of facts is a “primarily factual mixed question” which we

review for “substantial evidence.” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003

(9th Cir. 2025).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA’s determination that Roblero did

not demonstrate that his qualifying relatives would suffer exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship if he were removed. The IJ identified that Roblero’s sons are

healthy and his daughter receives medication for her thyroid issue through state

insurance. If Roblero were removed, his children would stay in the United States

with his partner (the mother of his two youngest children), who is a lawful permanent

2 24-6556 resident and had been employed as recently as six months before the IJ’s decision.

And Roblero is healthy, has family support in Mexico, and could work in Mexico to

provide financial support for his children. Those factual findings—all of which

support a finding of no exceptional and extremely unusual hardship—are

nonreviewable. See Patel, 596 U.S. at 339.

Roblero alleges that the IJ and BIA misapplied the relevant legal frameworks

for assessing hardship. But a review of Roblero’s claims shows that he is in fact

challenging the IJ and BIA’s nonreviewable factual determinations regarding the

economic and emotional hardships posed to his U.S. citizen children. For example,

Roblero argues that “[t]he IJ and BIA incorrectly assumed that [Roblero’s partner]

could simply return to the workforce and provide for the family’s financial needs”;

that “the IJ failed to account for the cost of childcare should [Roblero’s partner] need

to work”; and that “[Roblero’s daughter] . . . depends on her father’s income for

consistent medical care.” But these factual determinations are not subject to review.

See Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024); Patel 596 U.S. at 339.

Insofar as Roblero argues that the IJ and BIA disregarded evidence of various

potential future economic and emotional hardships, this court “generally presumes

that the BIA thoroughly considers all relevant evidence in the record.” Szonyi v.

Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 897 (9th Cir. 2019). And Roblero identifies no evidence in the

record that supports his speculative claims of future hardship. As to his oldest son,

3 24-6556 Roblero testified only that his son was “fine.” As to his daughter, Roblero testified

that “[a]s long as she takes her medicine she’s fine.” And the IJ made the (again,

unreviewable) factual determinations that Roblero’s children would continue to

receive state-funded healthcare were Roblero removed, and that Roblero’s

daughter’s health was good, other than her treatable thyroid condition. The record

does not “compel the conclusion that [Roblero’s] removal would result in

‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to a qualifying relative.” Gonzalez-

Juarez, 137 F.4th at 999.

3. Roblero also challenges the IJ’s discretionary denial of his application for

cancellation of removal. “Because the BIA did not reach this ground” for denying

Roblero’s application, “we do not consider it here.” Guan v. Barr, 925 F.3d 1022,

1030 n.3 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Doissaint v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th

Cir. 2008) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds

relied upon by that agency.” (citation omitted)).

The petition is DENIED.1

1 The government has represented that Roblero has been returned to the United States, Docket No. 43, and Roblero has not challenged that representation. Thus we deny as moot Roblero’s motion to order Roblero’s return to the United States, Docket No. 17. We also deny Roblero’s motion to find Respondent in contempt. Docket No. 17. The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied. Docket No. 3.

4 24-6556