Mr. Justice Blanco Lugo
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Relying on the provisions of § 37 (9) of the Municipal Law, Act No. 142 of June 21, 1960, as amended by Act No. 114 of June 27, 1964 (Sess. Laws, pp. 337, 343), 21 L.P.R.A. 1256,1 Francisco Robledo appealed to this Court so that we determine whether or not his removal from the position of mayor of Santa Isabel, ordered by the Committee for the Settlement of Municipal Complaints, was justified. Two are the contentions on which petitioner relies in order to request that the committee’s decision be set aside, to wit: (1) that said body erred in weighing the evidence and in finding defendant-petitioner guilty, and, (2) that even assuming that he committed the facts which were deemed proved it was error of law to order his removal on that account.
1. Aníbal Correa and José Matías Santiago, members of the Municipal Assembly of Santa Isabel, preferred charges against defendant, Francisco Robledo consisting of six counts. The Committee, considering that the charges were not frivolous or insufficient and that prima facie they involved immoral conduct or unlawful acts involving abandonment, inexcusable negligence or conduct prejudicial to the. best public interest in the discharge of his duties, §. 37 (4), ordered the holding of a hearing. In the course of the hearing the aforesaid body [4]*4dismissed the second, third, and sixth counts2 for insufficiency of evidence and the complainants withdrew the fourth and fifth charges.3 The controversy, then, was limited to the first charge.
Insofar as pertinent the first charge reads:
“That on June 15, .1965 when the . . . Municipal Assembly .,. . was holding a special meeting in order to consider the.resignation of its chairman, Mr. Efrain Santiago, the defendant mayor burst into the assembly hall accompanied by two persons, [5]*5in an evident state of intoxication, asked for the floor, to which Juan Santiago, member of the assembly, objected. In an aggressive attitude, the mayor, Francisco Robledo, uttering obscene, words rushed to assault José Matías Santiago, assemblyman, but was prevented from doing so because of the mayor’s wife’s intervention. This action gave rise to the intervention of policeman Pablo Guzmán, who, upon asking for reinforcement, took the mayor and his escorts out of the room, the meeting of the Assembly being continued behind closed doors.
“The defendant mayor’s attitude had the malicious intent of interrupting the works of the Assembly. . . .
“The foregoing constitutes immoral conduct, prejudicial to the best public interest....”
The defendant mayor denied the facts attributed in this charge and as affirmative defenses alleged that the same are not connected with any violation of the Municipal Law and do not constitute immoral conduct or imply moral turpitude. -
In their function of weighing the evidence the three members of the Committee, the chairman, Mr. Juan Enrique Géigel, and Mr. Francisco Parra Toro, and Mr. Francisco Torres Aguiar, agreed as to the basic facts that the defendant mayor interrupted the works of the Municipal Assembly asking for the floor, “in his capacity as mayor,” in order to make some statements as to the content of' an information published in the newspaper where some charges.were preferred against' him, and in attempting to attack' one of the' , members of said municipal entity.4 After analyzing the evidence which was qualified as “extremely conflicting, imprecise, and insufficient,” as to the charge that defendant was in a state of intoxication, the members of the committee. [6]*6agreed unanimously that there did not exist an adequate ground to reach'such, a finding. Not so as to the charge that the mayor used obscene words. Géigel and Parra Toro settled the conflict in the evidence and gave entire credit to those who maintain that while he reproved the members of the [7]*7Assembly Robledo uttered obscene words. Mr. Torres . Aguiar did not agree with this view.
The scope of our function in reviewing the proceedings had before the Committee for the Settlement of Municipal Complaints appears clearly delimited by the text of § 87 (9) aforecited which expressly provides that “the findings of fact of the committee shall be final.” This provision was originally incorporated into the former Municipal Law of 1928 by the amendment introduced to its § 29 by Act No. 4 of December 7, 1955 (Sp. Sess. Laws, pp. 62, 72). It appears from the debate which took place in the Legislature when the bill which finally became the aforementioned law was being discussed that specifically it was sought to assimilate our power to review with the one usually granted to us with respect to the orders and decisions of boards or administrative agencies,5 see, VI Journal of Proceedings 1734-1735 (1955), [8]*8and that interference with the facts would only be justified when it is adduced that the award thereof was not supported by the evidence presented, it constituting a question of law,6 VII Journal of Proceedings 222 (1955). See Rodríguez v. Committee, Etc., 84 P.R.R. 66, 70 (1961).
Even though under the legislation prior to the approval of Act No. 4 of December- 7, 1955, supra, it was not expressly provided that the findings of fact were final,7 we had usually granted significant deference to the findings of fact made by the trial body of first instance, Piñero, Governor v. Grillasca, 67 P.R.R. 853 (1947); Tugwell, Governor v. Campos, 65 P.R.R. 620 (1946); cf. De Castro v. Board of Commissioners, 57 P.R.R. 149 (1940); Valldejuli v. City Manager, 52 P.R.R. 275 (1937); Fernández v. Pavía, 42 P.R.R. 740 (1931); Rivera v. Municipal Assembly, 39 P.R.R. 71 (1929); Coll v. Todd, Mayor, 35 P.R.R. 572 (1926), although we reserved the power to discern as to the effect at law of the facts deemed proved; cf. Piñero, Governor v. Barreto, 68 P.R.R. 136 (1948).
[9]*9Petitioner in his discussion of this first error does not allege that the findings of the committee on the incident which occurred during the meeting of the assembly lack proof. He, rather, limits himself to challenging the weighing of the act of assault of an assemblyman by the mayor8 and to insist that if the testimony of the principal witness, Matías, was disregarded in other points it should also not deserve credit as respects this one. For the reasons stated we shall not interfere with the committee’s function of adjudicating the facts. It is advisable to indicate that with very similar evidence a like weighing was made by both, the District Court, as well as by the Superior Court, Ponce Part, in a new trial in the criminal action filed against defendant for the same facts. By judgment rendered on March 27, 1967 in appeal CE-66-10, People v. Robledo, we refused to disturb the weighing of the evidence made by the trial court.
2.
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Mr. Justice Blanco Lugo
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Relying on the provisions of § 37 (9) of the Municipal Law, Act No. 142 of June 21, 1960, as amended by Act No. 114 of June 27, 1964 (Sess. Laws, pp. 337, 343), 21 L.P.R.A. 1256,1 Francisco Robledo appealed to this Court so that we determine whether or not his removal from the position of mayor of Santa Isabel, ordered by the Committee for the Settlement of Municipal Complaints, was justified. Two are the contentions on which petitioner relies in order to request that the committee’s decision be set aside, to wit: (1) that said body erred in weighing the evidence and in finding defendant-petitioner guilty, and, (2) that even assuming that he committed the facts which were deemed proved it was error of law to order his removal on that account.
1. Aníbal Correa and José Matías Santiago, members of the Municipal Assembly of Santa Isabel, preferred charges against defendant, Francisco Robledo consisting of six counts. The Committee, considering that the charges were not frivolous or insufficient and that prima facie they involved immoral conduct or unlawful acts involving abandonment, inexcusable negligence or conduct prejudicial to the. best public interest in the discharge of his duties, §. 37 (4), ordered the holding of a hearing. In the course of the hearing the aforesaid body [4]*4dismissed the second, third, and sixth counts2 for insufficiency of evidence and the complainants withdrew the fourth and fifth charges.3 The controversy, then, was limited to the first charge.
Insofar as pertinent the first charge reads:
“That on June 15, .1965 when the . . . Municipal Assembly .,. . was holding a special meeting in order to consider the.resignation of its chairman, Mr. Efrain Santiago, the defendant mayor burst into the assembly hall accompanied by two persons, [5]*5in an evident state of intoxication, asked for the floor, to which Juan Santiago, member of the assembly, objected. In an aggressive attitude, the mayor, Francisco Robledo, uttering obscene, words rushed to assault José Matías Santiago, assemblyman, but was prevented from doing so because of the mayor’s wife’s intervention. This action gave rise to the intervention of policeman Pablo Guzmán, who, upon asking for reinforcement, took the mayor and his escorts out of the room, the meeting of the Assembly being continued behind closed doors.
“The defendant mayor’s attitude had the malicious intent of interrupting the works of the Assembly. . . .
“The foregoing constitutes immoral conduct, prejudicial to the best public interest....”
The defendant mayor denied the facts attributed in this charge and as affirmative defenses alleged that the same are not connected with any violation of the Municipal Law and do not constitute immoral conduct or imply moral turpitude. -
In their function of weighing the evidence the three members of the Committee, the chairman, Mr. Juan Enrique Géigel, and Mr. Francisco Parra Toro, and Mr. Francisco Torres Aguiar, agreed as to the basic facts that the defendant mayor interrupted the works of the Municipal Assembly asking for the floor, “in his capacity as mayor,” in order to make some statements as to the content of' an information published in the newspaper where some charges.were preferred against' him, and in attempting to attack' one of the' , members of said municipal entity.4 After analyzing the evidence which was qualified as “extremely conflicting, imprecise, and insufficient,” as to the charge that defendant was in a state of intoxication, the members of the committee. [6]*6agreed unanimously that there did not exist an adequate ground to reach'such, a finding. Not so as to the charge that the mayor used obscene words. Géigel and Parra Toro settled the conflict in the evidence and gave entire credit to those who maintain that while he reproved the members of the [7]*7Assembly Robledo uttered obscene words. Mr. Torres . Aguiar did not agree with this view.
The scope of our function in reviewing the proceedings had before the Committee for the Settlement of Municipal Complaints appears clearly delimited by the text of § 87 (9) aforecited which expressly provides that “the findings of fact of the committee shall be final.” This provision was originally incorporated into the former Municipal Law of 1928 by the amendment introduced to its § 29 by Act No. 4 of December 7, 1955 (Sp. Sess. Laws, pp. 62, 72). It appears from the debate which took place in the Legislature when the bill which finally became the aforementioned law was being discussed that specifically it was sought to assimilate our power to review with the one usually granted to us with respect to the orders and decisions of boards or administrative agencies,5 see, VI Journal of Proceedings 1734-1735 (1955), [8]*8and that interference with the facts would only be justified when it is adduced that the award thereof was not supported by the evidence presented, it constituting a question of law,6 VII Journal of Proceedings 222 (1955). See Rodríguez v. Committee, Etc., 84 P.R.R. 66, 70 (1961).
Even though under the legislation prior to the approval of Act No. 4 of December- 7, 1955, supra, it was not expressly provided that the findings of fact were final,7 we had usually granted significant deference to the findings of fact made by the trial body of first instance, Piñero, Governor v. Grillasca, 67 P.R.R. 853 (1947); Tugwell, Governor v. Campos, 65 P.R.R. 620 (1946); cf. De Castro v. Board of Commissioners, 57 P.R.R. 149 (1940); Valldejuli v. City Manager, 52 P.R.R. 275 (1937); Fernández v. Pavía, 42 P.R.R. 740 (1931); Rivera v. Municipal Assembly, 39 P.R.R. 71 (1929); Coll v. Todd, Mayor, 35 P.R.R. 572 (1926), although we reserved the power to discern as to the effect at law of the facts deemed proved; cf. Piñero, Governor v. Barreto, 68 P.R.R. 136 (1948).
[9]*9Petitioner in his discussion of this first error does not allege that the findings of the committee on the incident which occurred during the meeting of the assembly lack proof. He, rather, limits himself to challenging the weighing of the act of assault of an assemblyman by the mayor8 and to insist that if the testimony of the principal witness, Matías, was disregarded in other points it should also not deserve credit as respects this one. For the reasons stated we shall not interfere with the committee’s function of adjudicating the facts. It is advisable to indicate that with very similar evidence a like weighing was made by both, the District Court, as well as by the Superior Court, Ponce Part, in a new trial in the criminal action filed against defendant for the same facts. By judgment rendered on March 27, 1967 in appeal CE-66-10, People v. Robledo, we refused to disturb the weighing of the evidence made by the trial court.
2. Under the legislation in force, § 37(1), the observance by a mayor of “immoral conduct or unlawful acts involving abandonment, inexcusable negligence, or conduct prejudicial to the best public interest in the discharge of his duties” constitutes cause for the preferment of charges against him. The committee is empowered to order the removal when the charges are found to be proved, except that if unlawful acts of a slight nature are involved the penalty is limited to directing the publicizing of the facts proven, with the remarks to be deemed pertinent, § 37(5).
Do the facts proved constitute sufficient cause to order the removal of defendant? The committee’s view on this par[10]*10ticular was not unanimous. In essence the majority opinion signed by Mr. Géigel and Mr. Parra Toro qualifies the conduct observed by petitioner as an improper intervention in the municipal legislative proceeding with criminal intent against the cardinal principle of the separation of powers. They rely on the impropriety in attempting to participate in the deliberations of the assembly without an invitation or request to that effect, on his unwise selection of forum to defend himself of the challenges he considered unjustified, and on his defiance to the constituted authority insisting on addressing the assembly and the public congregated therein despite the fact that he had been declared out of order, and what is even more censurable, assuming an aggressive and violent attitude and using vile and impudent language. Their position is summarized as follows: “The defendant-mayor’s conduct . . . was prejudicial to the best public interest because it was an improper and unjustified interference of the executive power of the municipality . . . with the legislative functions of said municipality; an open defiance to the authority of the legislative power; and an attempt of the executive power to threaten and coerce the legislative power in the performance of its functions.” Consequently, for the purposes of setting an example in order to avoid that these improper interferences of the executive power with the legislative functions be repeated in the future, the maximum penalty prescribed by law was imposed on him. On his part, the dissenting member of the Committee, Mr. Torres Aguiar, although he admits that the conduct observed by mayor Robledo is censurable, improper and offensive, concludes that it does not partake of the necessary seriousness, considering that it was the result of a moment of excitement and that it is not a question of reiterated actions of said officer.
[11]*11The former legislation9 and the rare occasions on which we have reviewed the removal of mayors10 do not shed much light on the content of the concept “unlawful acts involving'. . . conduct prejudicial to the best public interest.” In Rivera v. González, 41 P.R.R. 777 (1931), a mayor was [12]*12.charged- with being .addicted to the use of liquor .and having .attended a dance held by prostitute women in neglect of his official duties. In -reversing the removal decreed by the assembly, we said -that such conduct, although reprehensible did not constitute the immoral or incorrect conduct in the exercise of the duties of his office which was in the mind of the lawmaker. In Díaz v. Charneco, 48 P.R.R. 521 (1935), we referred to the fact that the concept just cause required that there be a relation of a substantial nature affecting the interests of the public. We made a similar pronouncement in Municipal Assembly v. Steidel, 54 P.R.R. 790 (1939).
The manner in which the statute is drafted suggests that the governing view for the removal does not partake of a punitive nature for the incumbent but contemplates the purpose of avoiding prejudice to the public interest. The measure should contemplate the improvement of public service, and therefore, conduct prejudicial to the morale and ef[13]*13ficiency 'of the public function must be involved. In general, 3 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 22.22 (1966) ; Yokley, Municipal Corporations, § 339 (1957); McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 12.237- (3d ed., 1949). In such' sense, we cannot conclude that it appears with crystal clearness that defendant’s action has affected in a substantial and irreparable manner the operation, of the municipal government; Although it is true that defendant’s action interrupted the meeting of the assembly the evidence shows that after the premises were vacated the deliberations continued. Any other citizen who might have incurred the same conduct would have been tried for breach of the peace and assault only, .as was the defendant herein. In passing, it is advisable to indicate that there is nothing at the present time in the law expressly prohibiting the appearance of the mayor at the meetings of the municipal legislative body. In the Mu- • nicipal Law of 1906, supra, a-provision was incorporated-to the effect that “The Alcalde shall not attend meetings of the council, but shall- appear before it when so requested by the council, in order to furnish such information relative to the affairs of the municipality as may be desired by said council.” (Section 31.) It was thus retained in Act No. 11 of June 25, 1924, supra (§ 29), but it was eliminated since the adoption of the Municipal Law of 1928.
On the other hand, there is weight in the fact that an officer selected in general elections who received the trust of the inhabitants of the municipality is involved and that the alleged cause is not so serious and of such consequences as to require that the popular mandate be ignored.
A careful consideration of all the concurrent circumstances leads us to conclude that what probably exists is a state of-friction between the mayor and some of the members of the municipal assembly which if continued may prejudice public affairs. It is thus acknowledged in the findings of fact [14]*14made.11 But the remedy for this situation is provided in § 107 of the Municipal Law in force, 21 L.P.R.A. § 1741, which originated .'in § 11 of the Municipal Law of 1.928, supra, p. 342. See, Ramírez v. Beverly, Governor, 44 P.R.R. 317 (1932).12
We are hot interfering in any manner with the findings of fact of the committee; we only decide that the conduct deemed proved does not constitute as a question of law the “immoral conduct or unlawful acts involving abandonment, inexcusable negligence, or conduct prejudicial to the best public interest in the discharge of his duties” which as a ground for removal was prescribed by the lawmaker. To claim that our function is limited to determining whether the order removing the mayor is justified is a view which we cannot adopt for it would practically make the committee the absolute and unique arbitrator of the municipal offices, depriving the aggrieved ones of resorting to an adequate forum in order to challenge its conclusions of law.
Finally we want to establish with crystal clearness that we do not condone in any manner the acts of the defendant mayor. His conduct, an attempt of provincial caciquism,13 is an assault against the very roots of the democratic government of the municipalities. But the law does not authorize us to discern as to the fitness of the defendant; it is incumbent upon the political entities and upon the electorate to judge his qualifications.
[15]*15By virtue of the foregoing the decision of the Committee for the Settlement of Municipal Complaints will be set aside and the final dismissal of the charge filed against the Mayor of Santa Isabel, Francisco Robledo Garcia, will be ordered.
Mr. Chief Justice Negrón Fernández did not participate herein. Mr. Justice Santana Becerra dissented in an opinion in which Mr. Justice Hernández Matos concurs.