Robledo 250767 v. Bautista

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided August 13, 2021·No. 2:19-cv-05349·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Paul Anthony Robledo, No. CV-19-05349-PHX-JAT (DMF)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Unknown Bautista, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 110). For the 16 following reasons, the motion will be denied. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 On July 2, 2021, Magistrate Judge Fine issued three orders denying numerous 19 motions filed by Plaintiff. (Docs. 98, 99, 100). On July 8, 2021, Plaintiff appealed those 20 orders in this Court. (Docs. 101, 102, 103). On August 4, 2021, this Court denied Plaintiff’s 21 appeals and affirmed Magistrate Judge Fine’s orders. (Doc. 107). On August 6, 2021, 22 Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s August 4 Order. (Doc. 23 110). 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 District of Arizona Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(g) governs motions for 26 reconsideration. It provides: 27 The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order 28 absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with 1 reasonable diligence. Any such motion shall point out with specificity the matters that the movant believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the 2 Court, any new matters being brought to the Court’s attention for the first 3 time and the reasons they were not presented earlier, and any specific modifications being sought in the Court’s Order. No motion for 4 reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or written argument made 5 by the movant in support of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order. Failure to comply with this subsection may be grounds for denial of 6 the motion. 7 LRCiv 7.2(g)(1). Manifest error under LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) is “error that is plain and 8 indisputable . . . that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law or the credible 9 evidence in the record.” Estrada v. Bashas’ Inc., No. CV-02-00591-PHX-RCB, 2014 WL 10 1319189, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 1, 2014) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 622 (9th ed. 11 2009)). 12 Further, mere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for 13 reconsideration. See Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 689 F. Supp. 1572, 1573 (D. Haw. 14 1988). A motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present 15 evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the 16 litigation.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 17 “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and should be granted only in rare 18 circumstances.” Morgal v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Sup’rs, No. CIV 07-0670-PHX-RCB, 19 2012 WL 2368478, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2012). 20 III. ANALYSIS 21 Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration addresses each of his original appeals 22 individually. (See Doc. 110). Accordingly, the Court will address Plaintiff’s arguments 23 regarding each appeal in turn. 24 a. First Appeal (Doc. 101) 25 Regarding his first appeal, Plaintiff does not ask the Court to reconsider its August 26 4 Order, but to “issue an Order directing the Clerk of the court to send the Plaintiff any 27 forms and instructions for submitting a proposal for a change to the local rules of court.” 28 (Doc. 110 at 1). The Court will not issue such an order as amendments to the local rules 1 can be submitted in accordance with LRCiv 83.9 and instructions for submitting such an 2 amendment can be found on the web page for the United States District Court for the 3 District of Arizona. 4 b. Second Appeal (Doc. 102) 5 Regarding his second appeal, Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint an independent 6 expert to “analyze the cycle menus for the amounts of vitamin B12” in his food, provide 7 that analysis to each party, and answer certain of Plaintiff’s interrogatories. (Doc. 110 at 8 3). In the alternative, Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint an expert witness for him that will 9 not be independent but, instead, will work for and be paid for by Plaintiff. (Id.). 10 To begin, the Court stated in its August 4 Order, “[c]ourts do not appoint 11 independent expert witnesses to assist a litigating party in the collection of evidence.” (Doc. 12 107 at 5). Plaintiff provided no new law showing that he is entitled to the appointment of 13 an independent expert to assist his litigation efforts, nor did Plaintiff argue that the Court’s 14 determination was manifest error. (See Doc. 110). Thus, Plaintiff’s request for the Court to 15 appoint an independent expert to collect evidence for him and answer interrogatories 16 remains improper. 17 Plaintiff instead argues that there is a serious dispute, created by Defendant Trinity 18 Services Group’s failure to answer interrogatories to Plaintiff’s satisfaction, which can only 19 be settled by an expert witness. (Id. at 2–3). The “dispute,” Plaintiff asserts, is Defendant 20 Trinity Services Group’s refusal to provide Plaintiff with the amounts of vitamin B12 in 21 the food it serves or “a list of ten (10) food items that are the best sources of vitamin B12.” 22 (Id.). While there may be a dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant Trinity Services Group 23 regarding certain interrogatories, such a dispute is not the kind that requires the 24 appointment of a neutral expert to resolve. See McCoy v. Stronach, 494 F. Supp. 3d 736, 25 740 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (noting that the appointment of an independent expert was 26 unnecessary as there was no evidence demonstrating a serious dispute for which the court 27 would require special assistance). Plaintiff’s concerns are more appropriately addressed 28 through his pending Motion to Compel (Doc. 108) than through a motion for the 1 appointment of an independent expert. 2 Finally, a motion for reconsideration is not a proper avenue for Plaintiff’s new 3 request that the Court appoint an expert witness for him because it was not a subject of the 4 August 4 Order. Even if it was properly raised, however, Plaintiff’s request would be 5 denied. Plaintiff has presented, and the Court is aware of, no law supporting his request for 6 the Court to select and appoint an expert witness to serve Plaintiff’s interests. (See Doc. 7 110). Instead, it is the Court’s responsibility to serve as a “neutral arbiter of matters the 8 parties present.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). Thus, it 9 would be improper for the Court to procure an expert to assist Plaintiff in the pending 10 litigation. 11 c. Third Appeal (Doc. 103) 12 Regarding his third appeal, Plaintiff asks that sanctions be imposed on Defendant 13 Trinity Services Group because it “could and can not [sic] truthfully state that [the contract 14 at issue] required redaction before a copy could be produced to the Plaintiff.” (Doc. 110 at 15 5). Plaintiff opens this section by arguing that he provided legal support for the proposition 16 that contracts with state agencies are public information by citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41- 17 1609.01. (Id. at 4). None of the provisions in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1609.01, however, state 18 that contracts with state agencies are public information. Instead, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-

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Related

Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp.
689 F. Supp. 1572 (D. Hawaii, 1988)
United States v. Sineneng-Smith
140 S. Ct. 1575 (Supreme Court, 2020)