Robinson v. Younse Lbr. Co.

8 La. App. 160, 1927 La. App. LEXIS 663
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 21, 1927
DocketNo. 2992
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 8 La. App. 160 (Robinson v. Younse Lbr. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Younse Lbr. Co., 8 La. App. 160, 1927 La. App. LEXIS 663 (La. Ct. App. 1927).

Opinion

ODOM, J.

The plaintiff is the surviving widow of J. Mack Robinson who was employed as a log cutter and who while at work in the woods cutting logs a limb fell on .his head and killed him.

Plaintiff brings this suit under Act No. 20 of 1914 and amendment for compensation for the joint benefit of herself and her two minor children, issue of her marriage with J. Mack Robinson, all having been dependent upon him for support.

She asks judgment against the J. R. Younse Lumber Company and against J. R. and T. ‘ R. Younse in solido upon the theory that the J. R. Younse Lumber Company is a commercial ¡partnership composed of said individuals, and in the alternative, if the court should hold that there is no commercial partnership, then in that event she asks that said J. R. and T. R. Younse be condemned in solido for the full amount which she claims.

Defendants J. R. and T. R. Younse deny that any commercial partnership existed between them, and while it is conceded that J. R. Younse was conducting a saw mill business under the name of J. R. Younse Lumber Company and that each was in a way connected with that business, yet they contend there was in fact no contractural relationship existing between the two oand that the mill was owned and operated and the business was conducted by J. R. Younse individually under the trade name of J. R. Younse Lumber Company.

Under the view which we take of the issues involved in this litigation, it is not necessary to discuss or determine the question whether there was or was not a commercial partnership existing between the two Messrs. Younse. Our conclusion is that they are bound jointly and in solido to plaintiff for the amount of compensation which she claims, regardless of whether they were commercial partners or not, under the facts disclosed by the record.

The pertinent facts are that J. R. Younse owned a saw mill situated in Jackson Parish. His brother, T. R. Younse, owned no interest in the mill and its equipment. J. R. Younse was engaged in the saw mill business. There was a tract of timbered land containing 120 acres located within a short distance of his mill which was for sale. Through some arrangement, not definitely disclosed, J. R. Younse got the Monroe Grocery Company, Ltd., to purchase the land. He acted as said company’s agent in the purchase and for the purchase price he drew a draft on said company in favor of the vendors and attached it to the deed, as we infer, which draft was handled by a bank in Jonesboro.

While the deed to the land was taken in the name of the Monroe Grocery Company, Ltd., and it furnished the cash with which to pay the purchase price, the circumstances prior and subsequent to the transaction indicate very strongly that the property was purchased for J. R. Younse under some arrangement by which Younse should cut the timber and pay for it, as cut. But whether the arrangement was made prior or subsequent to the_ purchase of the land, J. R. Younse says he did purchase or secure the timber from the grocery company to be paid for as cut. He testified that he made the trade for the timber or secured it and that he was to pay for it as cut. His brother, T. R. Younse, had nothing whatever to do with the negotiations, and [162]*162while he subsequently logged the timber, as will be detailed later, he testified that he did not know while cutting whose timber it was.

So that the situation with reference to J. R. Younse was that he owned a saw mill, was in the saw mill business, needed timber for the' operation of the mill and secured it from the Monroe Grocery Company, Ltd.

In order that the timber might he manufactured into lumber, the timber, of course, had to he cut and hauled to the mill. His brother, T. R. Younse, owned wagons, teams and trucks, all his individual property. J. R. Younse, the owner of the mill and who' had procured the timber, and T. R. Younse, the owner of the logging outfit, entered into a contract by which T. R. Younse was to log the mill; he was to have the timber felled, cut into logs, hauled to the mill and placed on skidways, all at his own. expense. In addition to the expense of logging the mill, he was to be charged $1.00 for each thousand feet of timber cut, to be applied on the purchase price, and to he paid the Monroe Grocery Company, Ltd., and $1.00 for each thousand feet of lumber manufactured for hauling it to a shipping point. All this timber was to be delivered by T. R. Younse at J. R. Younse’s mill to he there manufactured into lumber and sold*.

T. R. Younse’s remuneration for logging the mill was one-half the proceeds of all lumber sold, the other one-half to go to J. R. Younse ' for manufacturing it. It was agred, however, that ift the lumber was not sold it should be divided half and half between the two.

J. R. Younse, the o.wner of the mill, operated the mill personally and paid all expenses. He sold the lumber and kept account of the proceeds. They had settlements at intervals and, as stated, divided the proceeds equally between them.

J. R. Younse, the owner of the mill, seeks to escape liability for the death of a log cutter on the ground that he had nothing to do with the cutting of the logs or the logging of the mill; that his brother, T. R. Younse, had charge of that end of the business; that T. R. Younse was an independent contractor, and that plaintiff’s right of action, if any, at all, was against T. R. Younse and not against him.

We are not impressed with that defense.

J. R.' Younse owned the mill outfit and procured the timber. T. R. Younse owned i logging outfit. The mill was useless without logs, and the logging outfit was useless without logs to haul. These parties, as we see it, pooled their interests and entered into a common, joint enterprise, one branch of which was to go into the woods, fell the timber, saw t into logs and haul them to the mill, and while T. R. Younse was to have charge of the logging, yet J. R. Younse was as vitally interested in getting the logs to the mill as was T. R. Younse. The logging was not the separate enterprise of T. R. Younse but a joint enterprise of both.

So those who were employed to cut the logs in the woods were emplyees of both T. R. and J. R. Younse and not of one of them.

By no stretch can it be said that T. R. Younse was an independent contractor. He did not contract a specified piece of work for a specified price. He was to have the logs cut and hauled, that was his part of the logging contract', but there was no agreement that he should [163]*163receive any specified amount. His remuneration depended first on whether the lumber was sold and if sold upon the price; he had a joint interest in the manufactured product, and, if sold, in the proceeds.

It is true he controlled the cutting and hauling of the logs. But that was his part of the business. It is usual and, indeed, necessary in the conduct of an enterprise involving several branches, for the different individuals interested to ■ have charge of the separate branches; as in a mercantile' business, for instance, one partner may be the buyer, another a salesman, and another a bookkeeper — each controlling his separate branch.

The logging business in this case being a joint enterprise of J. R. and T. R. Younse, they are jointly and in solido bound for the compensation due for the death of one of their employees.

T. R. Younse, in carrying out his part of the logging business, employed a man named Sewell Lee to have charge of the cutting of the logs.

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Bluebook (online)
8 La. App. 160, 1927 La. App. LEXIS 663, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-younse-lbr-co-lactapp-1927.