Robinson v. Stegall

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Robinson v. Stegall No. 02-1898 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0029P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0029p.06 Michigan, for Appellant. Elizabeth L. Jacobs, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brad H. Beaver, O F F IC E O F T H E A T T ORN E Y G E N E RA L, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Elizabeth L. Jacobs, Detroit, Michigan, for FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Appellee. _________________ _________________ REGINALD ROBINSON, X Petitioner-Appellee. - OPINION - _________________ - No. 02-1898 v. - ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. The State of Michigan > appeals on behalf of Warden Jimmy Stegall from the grant of , a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to prisoner JIMMY STEGA LL, Warden, - Respondent-Appellant. - Reginald Robinson. On appeal, we must determine whether the alleged violation of a consent judgment entered into by N the parties is sufficient to warrant granting the writ despite the Appeal from the United States District Court fact that the district court did not specify which, if any, for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. federal constitutional right had been violated. Because a No. 97-70308—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge. district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus “only on the ground that [a state prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Argued: December 5, 2003 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), we hold that the grant of the writ under Decided and Filed: January 22, 2004 the circumstances presented by this case was premature and therefore remand the matter for further proceedings consistent Before: NORRIS and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; with this opinion. BUNNING, District Judge.* I. _________________ In 1992, petitioner was convicted of kidnaping, in violation COUNSEL of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.349. During the trial, defense counsel received a 13-day continuance to locate two ARGUED: Brad H. Beaver, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY witnesses. Before court was adjourned, however, petitioner GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, told the judge, “Your Honor, I don’t feel I’m being represented right so I’m going to fire my lawyer.” The court replied, “You’re not firing your lawyer now in the middle of * a trial. We’re adjourning this case until the 26th and it’s The Honorable David L. Bunning, United States District Judge for going to conclude at that time.” the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

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When the proceedings resumed on August 26, 1992, petition be denied, on December 6, 1999, the parties entered defense counsel reiterated that “the attorney/client into a consent judgment that reads in full as follows: relationship has broken down” and that petitioner wanted a different attorney. A discussion ensued, during which IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ petitioner told the judge “I’m going to leave and be in of habeas corpus is conditionally granted. Unless the contempt of court. I’m not going to trial with him, man.” He state takes action to afford Petitioner a full hearing in the went on to state that he wished to testify but not without a trial court to determine whether Petitioner was denied the new lawyer. The judge responded, “[W]e’re either going to effective assistance of counsel or his counsel had a proceed with this case with your testimony at this time, or if conflict of interest within ninety (90) days of the date of you refuse to testify, even with this lawyer or in representing this Order, the Court shall issue the writ ordering the yourself, then this case will be concluded.” Given this choice, Respondent to vacate the sentence and conviction. the defense rested without calling any witnesses. Defendant was convicted and received a sentence of 10 to 20 years of This hearing is to be considered as part of Petitioner’s imprisonment. appeal of right. In response, the successor to the original trial judge conducted a hearing over a two-day period in March On appeal, petitioner raised several issues, including 2000. After the hearing, the trial court denied petitioner’s whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to retain claim on the record. After judgment was pronounced, counsel new counsel. Although not raised explicitly in the trial court, for petitioner requested appointment of appellate counsel, petitioner argued that his attorney had a conflict of interest which ultimately occurred on May 9, 2000. because an associate in the attorney’s law firm represented petitioner’s co-defendant. The Michigan Court of Appeals However, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued an order rejected this argument: prior to briefing that dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction under the Michigan Court Rules: On appeal, defendant alleges only the potential for a conflict of interest. Our review of the record indicates The claim of appeal is DISMISSED for lack of that the only prosecution witness cross-examined by jurisdiction because a criminal defendant may only codefendant’s counsel was the officer who conducted the challenge an order denying a motion for relief from photo-showup, and that cocounsel elicited no testimony judgment under MCR 6.500 et seq. by filing an damaging to defendant. Neither defendant nor his application for leave to appeal under MCR 7.205. See codefendant presented a defense. Thus, our review of the MCR 6.509(A). Even though the order in question does record reveals no conflict of interest actually affecting not specifically state that appellant brought the motion the adequacy of defendant’s representation. under the rule in question, a criminal defendant may only petition the lower court for post-appellate relief under People v. Robinson, No. 158824, slip op. at 9 (Mich. App. this subchapter. See MCR 6.501. Jan. 5, 1996) (citations omitted). The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Robinson, No. 227154, Order (Mich. App. July 7, 2000). Defense counsel had not sought leave to appeal, but On January 24, 1997, petitioner initiated this habeas corpus rather had sought to appeal as of right. A motion for proceeding. Although a magistrate recommended that the rehearing was denied, as was a subsequent delayed No. 02-1898 Robinson v. Stegall 5 6 Robinson v. Stegall No. 02-1898

application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme of right, and if the terms of the Consent Judgment are not Court. fulfilled, this Court shall issue the writ ordering Respondent to vacate Petitioner’s sentence and Petitioner responded to these setbacks by filing a “Brief conviction. Nowhere does the Consent Judgment state after Remand to State Trial Court” in the district court. The that Petitioner shall be entitled as of right to only a district court issued a show cause order in response to the hearing in the trial court, or that, after a hearing in the failure of the Michigan courts to afford appellate review to trial court, a discretionary appeal in the Michigan Court the trial court’s disposition of the ineffective assistance of Appeals would satisfy the requirements of the Consent question. The order explains the following: Judgment. On the contrary, the Consent Judgment states that Petitioner’s Ginther hearing “is to be considered as Review of the record indicates that Petitioner’s part of Petitioner's appeal of right.” The language of the attempts to obtain appellate review of the trial court’s Consent Judgment itself, stating that Petitioner’s Ginther denial of his motion for a new trial after receiving his hearing was to be considered part of Petitioner’s appeal Ginther1 [hearing] were not treated as a part of his appeal of right unambiguously indicates that Petitioner is to of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan receive a full evidentiary hearing, which is only a part of Supreme Court was given the opportunity to order the his appeal of right, the remainder of which . . . must take Michigan Court of Appeals to do so and comply with the place in the Michigan Court of Appeals. terms of the Consent Judgment voluntarily entered into by the parties, but declined to do so. Id. at 863. The district court then ordered that the writ be granted unless the state retried the petitioner within 120 days. Robinson v. Stegall, No. 97-CV-70308-DT, Order to Show Cause, at 4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2002) (footnote added). II. After entertaining argument on the issue, the district court entered an order enforcing its consent judgment and granting As stated at the outset of this opinion, a district court may a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Robinson v. Stegall, 206 grant a writ of habeas corpus “only on the ground that [a state F. Supp. 2d 859 (E.D. Mich. 2002). It reasoned as follows: prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In the This Court finds as a matter of fact that the parties in instant case, the district court never found a violation of this case agreed that Petitioner’s Ginther hearing would petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights, which is the only viable be considered as a part of Petitioner’s appeal of right in constitutional claim raised in the petition. Rather, the parties the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Consent Judgment agreed that petitioner was entitled to a more fully developed stated that the writ is conditionally granted, that record with respect to this claim and therefore entered into a Petitioner must receive a full hearing in the trial court, consent judgment that provided for a Ginther hearing in state that the hearing is to be considered as a part of his appeal court. The trial court found no constitutional violation, however, and the Michigan appellate courts declined to consider the issue on the merits. 1 In M ichigan, a post-trial hearing may be ordered if the record has not been sufficiently developed with respect to an ineffective assistance In its order granting the writ, the district court identifies no of counsel claim. See People v. Ginther, 390 M ich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922 constitutional infirmity that justifies its action. Rather, it (1973). No. 02-1898 Robinson v. Stegall 7 8 Robinson v. Stegall No. 02-1898

relies on the perceived violation of the consent judgment III. negotiated by the parties and approved by the court. The consent judgment, however, did not stipulate to the The judgment of the district court is reversed and the writ conditional finding of a Sixth Amendment violation; it simply of habeas corpus withdrawn. The cause of action is provided for further proceedings in the Michigan courts. remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Thus, even if the district court correctly held that the opinion. respondent violated the provisions of the consent judgment, that does not result in the finding of a constitutional violation. Because 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) explicitly requires such a finding before the writ may issue, the district court’s action was at best premature. At this point in the proceedings, we find it inappropriate to review the merits of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim. Rather, we shall remand the matter to the district court to allow it the first opportunity to evaluate the claim in light of the decision reached by the Michigan courts. In making this assessment, however, the district court will be guided by the standard of review imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. It may grant a habeas corpus petition only if it concludes that the state adjudication of the federal claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law,” or “if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at” an opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring).